Doing Good by Doing Well? The Political Economy of the Medical Biotechnology Industry in the United States by Lehmann, Volker
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
2010 
Doing Good by Doing Well? The Political Economy of the Medical 
Biotechnology Industry in the United States 
Volker Lehmann 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1969 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 









DOING GOOD BY DOING WELL? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MEDICAL 











A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment 




























© 2010  
VOLKER LEHMANN 





This manuscript has been read and accepted for the  
Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the  





July 6, 2010   Professor Irving Leonard Markovitz 
Date   Chair of Examining Committee 
July 6, 2010   Professor Joe Rollins 
Date   Executive Officer 
  
Professor Irving Leonard Markovitz 
Professor Frances Fox Piven 
Professor Gerald Markowitz 
Supervision Committee 
 
















DOING GOOD BY DOING WELL? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MEDICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES  
by 
Volker Lehmann 
Adviser: Professor Irving Leonard Markovitz 
 
This study is dedicated to the political economy of the medical biotechnology industry in 
the United States. The study combines interviews with more than 150 biotechnology actors 
with a historical analysis and evidence from publicly available data bases. The ascent of 
this new industry took place in the United States first and foremost, because there, 
scientific advancements coincided with the rise of supply-side economics, a policy shift 
that was part of a larger, neoliberal, ideological shift. Despite free-market rhetoric, specific 
clusters within the United States became the world’s leading biotechnology clusters 
because of a history of targeted interventions to stimulate economic competitiveness. And 
despite much expectation about a ‘biotechnology revolution’, biotechnology became an 
outsourced sub-industry for research, embedded within the ‘blockbuster drug’ business 
model of large pharmaceutical companies. This business model benefited from America’s 
healthcare system, whose fragmentation and domination by private health providers proved 
to be global drug companies’ most profitable market. To keep the status quo, 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries have successfully engaged in political 
maneuvering. They have helped preventing or watering down U.S. healthcare reform 
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Chapter 1: Biotechnology in Times of Neoliberal Ideology 
 
1.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings 
 
“Biology is as important as the sciences of lifeless matter, and biotechnology will in the 
long run be more important than mechanical and chemical engineering”  
(Julian Huxley, The Retreat from Reason: Conway Memorial Lecture Delivered at 
Conway Hall, 1936) 
 
“One egg, one embryo, one adult – normality. But a bokanovskified egg will bud, will 
proliferate, will divide. From eight to ninetysix buds, and every bud will grow into a 
perfectly formed embryo, and every embryo into a full-sized adult. Making ninety-six 
human beings grow where only one grew before. Progress.” 
(Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, 1932) 
 
This study is dedicated to the political economy of the medical biotechnology industry in 
the United States. It analyzes the neoliberal conditions under which new biotechnologies 
have been invented and commercialized. Neoliberal doctrines and policies assume that 
human well-being can be achieved best by unleashing individual entrepreneurial freedom 
within the institutions of private property, free markets, and free trade, while the state 
withdraws from the provisions of public services. The genesis of the biotechnology 




   
 
neoliberalism unfolded in the United States has fostered a biotechnology industry that 
became embedded in an innovation model for medicines in which entrepreneurialism and 
optimizing returns on investment are central.  
 
The subsequent study of the biotechnology industry is a critique of this neoliberal creed. 
Whereas the biotechnology industry is testimony to the successes of the liberated 
entrepreneurial spirits, it is also a valuable case in point about the inconsistencies and the 
side effects of neoliberal ideology put into practice. To begin with, it shows that laissez-
faire never has been – never can be – without massive state intervention: It was thanks to a 
variety of different government support initiatives that the United State became host to the 
world’s most sophisticated biotechnology industry. A side effect of this achievement is that 
this industry now contributes to the hefty premium for prescription drugs in the United 
States. These are undermining the sustainability of America’s health care system. America 
is not only the country with the world’s most expensive healthcare system, but it is also the 
only industrialized nation that does not have overarching governmental provisions for 
healthcare or price control in place. The centrality of America’s fragmented, unregulated 
healthcare system that allows for exceptional premiums and profits is crucially 
acknowledged by the investment industry, which continues to warn about the specter of 
price controls in the U.S. prescription drug market. It has, however, not been addressed by 
previous studies of the biotechnology industry. 
 
The following analysis is organized around three main contentions: First, it is not 




   
 
advancements, but how. To begin with, biotechnology is a platform technology that is 
being used for a variety of purposes, such as plant breeding, waste water management, and 
the development of medicines. Yet the potential for profits is much bigger in human 
medicine than for any other applications of biotechnologies, and the scientific and 
economic impact is most relevant in this field. There the innovative activities of 
biotechnology firms and the ascent of a new industry illustrate capitalism’s potential for 
creative destruction. So far biotechnological approaches to medicine and drug development 
have been captured by the ‘blockbuster drug’ approach, generating drugs for the 
industrialized world worth at least $1 billion in annual sales. Alternative attempts have 
repeatedly failed: For instance genomics, the science of the structure and the functioning of 
the genome, tries to capitalize on the variations in humans’ genetic information, which 
could in theory lead to more tailor-made drugs. In practice, however, as this study will 
demonstrate, genomics did not lead to an overthrow or at least a disruption of the business 
model of large pharmaceutical companies. Rather, genomics became integrated into the 
development of blockbuster drugs. And despite biotechnology’s posture as a new, nimble 
high-technology driven business that is clashing with the culture of sclerotic, innovation-
poor, large transnational pharmaceutical companies (‘Big Pharma’), the reality was a rather 
complex co-evolution. A new division of labor emerged in which biotechnology became a 
sub-industry for a global drug industry that went through its own technological and 
organizational transformations at the same time. Most importantly, the vast profits that Big 
Pharma’s blockbuster drugs generated – thanks in large part due to ever-increasing 





   
 
Moreover, despite scientific discoveries having taken place earlier and elsewhere, this new 
industry took off in the United States in the late 1970s. At that time, nowhere else did 
scientific advancements dovetail with a number of political changes informed by a 
neoliberal ideology. Whereas neoliberal changes took root after the 1970s in many 
countries, the neoliberal turn in American society at large was most profound and so 
conducive to the ascent of the biotechnology industry that specific locations in the United 
States still remain unparalleled centers of biotechnological excellence up to this date. 
Particularly important were governmental interventions to promote entrepreneurialism to 
regain lost economic territory for the United States from other industrialized competitors. 
 
Finally, focusing on the state of today’s industry, my analysis of the biotechnology industry 
is also a critique of the consequences of neoliberal policies. I will argue that a generally 
overlooked condition for the flourishing of the biotechnology industry is the money that 
large pharmaceutical companies can invest in it thanks to a highly profitable blockbuster 
drug business model. Globally, this business model has become progressively more 
dependent on revenues accrued in the United States healthcare market. Yet America’s 
healthcare system becomes increasingly scrutinized for being the world’s most expensive 
while being neither inclusive nor qualitatively satisfying. This study will explain how the 
biotechnology industry has contributed to this condition, which has become politically 
increasingly contested.  
 
The remainder of this first chapter will first present a number of puzzles that make the 




   
 
will be presented that will also be guiding the study and the chapters ahead. Section 1.3 
will pose theoretical challenges and shortcomings that this study wishes to address. 
Biotechnology will first be placed within the historical context of changing capitalist 
formations. Second, the concept of ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ will be introduced as a guide 
for further inquiry into how and why the United States developed a comparative advantage 
for this new industry. Subsequently, two key terms will be defined: First, the notion of 
‘biotechnology’ will be specified and some key distinctions of the biotechnology industry 
vis-à-vis other businesses be presented (1.4). Since this study highlights the importance of 
historical developments, both for the development of biotechnologies, as well as for 
healthcare, I will then briefly define the notion of ‘path dependence’ (1.5). The next section 
will be dedicated to the research design, as well as the materials and the methods that this 
study on the political economy of the biotechnology industry will deploy (1.6). The first 
chapter will be finished with an outlook on the study ahead (1.7). 
 
1.2 Rationale for the Study 
 
Looking at the biotechnology industry confronts us with several puzzles. In general it 
seems that medical biotechnology has been a ‘revolution in waiting’. As the initial quotes 
indicate, speculations about biotechnology’s blessings and banes began as early as the 
1930s. But also more recently, biotechnology’s achievements continue trailing the 
promises. For one, diseases that affect predominantly people outside the industrialized 
world are almost completely bypassed. But even in the wealthiest country in the world, the 




   
 
study, I will discuss the mixed impact that biotechnology has made on speed, safety, and 
costs of drug development.  
 
This leads to a second, related, conundrum: Human beings deviate from one another 
according to phenotypical, physiological, and genetic parameters. In theory, a science 
honing in on these differences – biotechnology – could lead to better, tailor-made products 
and services. This would have as a consequence smaller target groups and different 
marketing strategies from the blockbuster drug approach to sell as many similar drugs at 
the highest price possible to as many people as possible. In practice, this one-size-fits-all-
approach of Big Pharma continues to dominate the drug business. Like in the days of 
Henry Ford, when “a customer can have a car painted any color he wants so long as it is 
black”, any disease is curable so long as it is treated with a blockbuster drug.  
 
Not only the automobile industry, but most other producing industries have long left the 
days of Ford. It is therefore all the more surprising that biotechnology, often hailed as 
innovative and economically as decisive as information technology, seems to be unable to 
undo standardized product development. Flexible and individualized applications have 
been at the core of the information technology (IT) revolution. By comparison, the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry are still at the stage of the IT industry in the 
1970s, when large mainframe corporations like IBM, Univac and Honeywell Bull 
dominated the field. Only later did individualized products, such as personal computers, 
Apple iTunes, or free-of-charge-services, such as Google’s, become available. Although 




   
 
technological innovation, the variety of insurgent business models also led to more variety 
of applications of new technologies and ultimately, a more spread-out trickling down of 
innovation. It therefore deserves further scrutiny as to why biotechnologies have not 
spurned new business models (be they service-based, or for smaller sub-populations) that 
are economically viable to compete with Big Pharma’s one-size-fits-all blockbuster drugs. 
Towards this end, my study will pay specific attention to the development of genomics. 
 
Another question to be answered is this: Why is it that, despite the increase of global 
interconnectedness, the global medical biotechnology industry remains heavily 
concentrated within few regional clusters in the United States? Economic globalization has 
led to a relocation of production facilities for material goods to low-cost countries. 
Theoretically, the production of knowledge could be shifted around the globe even more 
easily than the facilities needed for producing goods. And whereas outsourcing has gained 
momentum in sectors such as IT, it has happened on a much lower scale for biotechnology. 
For biotechnologies, the United States’ leading position remains uncontested with regards 
to scientific output and patenting, and the number and size of biotechnology companies 
(see section 2.8 below). 
 
It therefore deserves attention how in the United States the specific needs of biotechnology 
entrepreneurs to conduct their business are accommodated. To what extent has this 
concentration been the outcome of the free flow of market powers and how far has it been 
the result of government policies and political interventions? Looking at creative 




   
 
political economy of the biotechnology industry has to analyze how the rhetoric of 
unfettered markets dovetailed with specific government interventions to create the United 
States’ competitive innovation regime for biotechnology. 
 
Also, most innovation theories are informed by the neoliberal economic assumption that 
the individuals’ desire for profit is the most productive engine for innovation. As long as 
the supply side of technological advancement functions properly, a broader benefit for 
society as a whole will ensue. But who exactly profits, for example, from the fact that the 
world’s most valuable and profitable biotechnology company, Amgen, is headquartered in 
California? The answer to this question is determined by the frame of reference. At times, 
Amgen’s shares were worth twice the combined amount of all publicly traded 
biotechnology firms in Europe. On a macro-economic level, this is clearly a sign for the 
competitive advantage that the company and the United States enjoy. On the other hand, 
Amgen’s drugs are sophisticated biotechnology-based pharmaceuticals that cost tens of 
thousands of dollars annually (see 2.10 below). Such high-premium drugs benefit Amgen’s 
employees, the company’s shareholders (who may live anywhere) and patients who have 
access to them. For most Americans these drugs are prohibitively expensive and would 
become available only when remunerated by their health insurance. Expensive medicines 
like Amgen’s drugs covered by employment-based healthcare have put a strain on the 
budgets of health insurances, which are tempted to cut benefits elsewhere or raise their 
premiums. Since about two third of Americans are covered by health insurance through 
their employer, it is the latter who complain that skyrocketing health insurance costs have 




   
 
countries. In sum, there is more than one way to look at Amgen’s successful biotechnology 
drug business. Previous studies on innovation and business practices have ignored that the 
United States’ successful global leadership in biotechnology may have come at the expense 
of rising costs and inequality in healthcare.  
 
Looking at innovation for healthcare from the receiving end – products and services for 
health – is a particular challenge for the neoliberal approach: Public needs should best be 
fulfilled by private entrepreneurial activities. Hence, private corporations should be 
positioned best to unleash the potential of these new techniques. But in the context of 
healthcare, the leitmotiv of neoliberalism, liberating individual entrepreneurial freedom is 
particularly problematic. Health is one of the most undisputable good for the individual 
person as well as for society as a whole. Like land, labor, and money, which Karl Polanyi 
called ‘fictitious commodities’, also health can never be produced with the intent to be 
primarily a commodity. The extent to which the provision of health services is seen as a 
public or a private task is a politically contested balance everywhere. In the United States, 
more than in any affluent, industrialized country, healthcare is predominantly left to market 
mechanisms. The debate about healthcare reform in the United States that erupted since the 
Presidential elections of 2008 is atypical. Specifically for the United States, the question 
therefore is not why has the commodification of health has had a mobilizing effect, but why 
not earlier?  
 
Addressing the above issues, the following inquiry on the biotechnology industry will be 




   
 
 
1) Biotechnology has been co-opted by the pharmaceutical industry’s blockbuster 
drug logic 
Whereas biotechnology has made considerable inroads on other industries such as 
agriculture, its most dynamic and profitable applications relate to human health. The 
creative destruction unleashed by the biotechnology industry has not instigated a 
‘biotechnology revolution’, for instance by making biomedical innovations more geared 
towards individuals. But instead, creative destruction unleashed by the biotechnology 
industry has been reigned in and paid for by Big Pharma’s ‘one size fits all’ blockbuster 
drug business model. Highly profitable, large pharmaceutical companies are continuously 
forced to develop new drugs and products to keep up with investors’ profit expectations. 
As they can no longer do so alone and inhouse, big pharmaceutical companies underwent 
much reorganization, as a consequence of which biotechnology has become a sub-industry 
in a new global architecture for drug development. The increasing complexity and variation 
in the organization of pharmaceutical companies’ business has not made drug development 
either cheaper or faster. Yet the blockbuster drug model continues to prevail thanks to Big 
Pharma’s marketing power. 
 
2) Economic stimulus politics trumps free-market rhetoric 
Despite the free-market rhetoric, biotechnology was not the result of unfettered market 
competition and capitalism’s creative destruction. Instead, the industry came into being in 
the United States at a critical historical juncture in the late 1970s when scientific 




   
 
Domestically, these policies reinforced the already existing clustering of scientific 
excellence and resulted in the concentration of the industry in specific regions in the United 
States. Internationally, federal policies created a competitive advantage for the supply-side 
of biotechnology and the development of the industry in the United States. 
 
3) The absence of federal price controls in America’s privatized healthcare provides a 
comparative advantage for the biotechnology industry in the United States  
As the biotechnology industry matured and became fully embedded in the business logic of 
pharmaceutical companies, the unparalleled incentive structure and the revenues provide 
for by the fragmented United States healthcare system became a crucial competitive 
advantage. Healthcare in the United States has historically evolved as a market-based 
system in which a complicated mix of first public, and later public activities developed 
over time into a labyrinth of conflicting incentives. In absence of an overarching federal 
regulatory regime for the pricing of prescription drugs, the reimbursement incentives of the 
American healthcare market are unparalleled: In no other country in the world do citizens 
spend more on prescription drugs. While the origins of this healthcare setup predate the 
modern biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, these actors continue to profit from 
this uniquely profitable environment. Consequently, they have also had a keen interest in 
keeping healthcare reform at bay and so far have successfully wielded their political 






   
 
1.3 Theoretical Challenges and Value Added 
 
The ascent of the biotechnology industry occurred against organizational and ideological 
changes in the political economy of capitalist states after the 1970s. At that time the post-
World War II regime of capital accumulation had reached an impasse. This capitalist 
formation, dubbed ‘Fordism’, encompassed a standardized mode of production, 
exemplified by the division of labor at the assembly line, as well as a rather homogeneous 
mode of reproduction of labor. To overcome the crisis in capital accumulation, 
corporations resorted to a decentralization of production and diversification of consumption 
patterns. A more flexible, ‘Post-Fordist’ regime of accumulation ensued, and, promoted by 
the global ascent of Japanese corporations, at times dubbed ‘Toyotism’ (Hirsch and Roth 
1986). Throughout the 1980s new production tools such as just-in-time-production and 
flexible supply-chain management were introduced that allowed corporations to respond 
quickly to ever-increasing changes in consumers’ tastes. Such restructuring of corporations 
coincided with the ascent of neoliberal ideologies. As it was the case for corporate 
transformations from ‘Fordism’ to ‘Toyotism’, also neoliberal politics was a reaction to the 
declining profitability of traditional industries of mass-production and the crisis of 
Keynesian, demand-driven policies in many advanced capitalist countries. 
 
Against this backdrop, the biotechnology industry provides insights into the functioning of 
capitalism’s contemporary flexible, knowledge-based, modes of production on at least four 
accounts. First, biotechnology demonstrates the pivotal role that technological and 
organizational innovation play for capitalism. Capitalism’s dynamism is the result of the 




   
 
creative destruction’ (Schumpeter 1942). Second, biotechnology is a contemporary 
example for how capitalism extends proprietary relationships over previously 
uncommodified matters and activities. For example, without biotechnologies, genetic 
information such as that encoded in the human genome, could not have become a tradable 
good for drug development. Third, within the biotechnology industry a plethora of complex 
ownership and corporate governance structures can be studied that are representative for 
contemporary knowledge-based industries. With increasingly complicated models of 
financing and ownership, traditional capital providers, venture capitalists, shareholders, 
investment funds, patent holders, and corporate managers (who may be both a shareholder 
and a paid employee of a company) all compete for controlling a company. And fourth, 
despite the neoliberal rhetoric of unfettered markets, these market forces continue to rely 
on the regulatory power of the state. Advanced modes of production and capital 
accumulation make necessary an even more sophisticated state. Only an elaborate state 
apparatus can safeguard complex market operations such those financed by venture capital, 
or enforce new modes of ownership, for instance of intellectual property. 
 
Therefore, while biotechnology reveals the innovative potential and the momentum of 
capitalism’s creative destruction (claim 1), this alone would not answer the question why 
and how the United States became the country with the most competitive biotechnology 
industry. Obviously, the specific role and the patterns of support for the industry have to be 
analyzed (claim 2). To investigate the comparative advantage that biotechnology in the 
United States continues to enjoy, I will follow an approach to look at ‘varieties of 




   
 
framework, much of the work that firms carry out is relational to alleviate coordination 
problems and to mitigate transaction costs, both within and outside the firm. Different 
capitalist nations have different comparative advantages depending on how coordination is 
supported by the country’s institutions of political economy. VOC distinguishes between 
capitalist economies based on the way in which economic actors coordinate their endeavors 
and what kind of support a country’s institutions of political economy provide for. On the 
one hand, there are liberal market economies (LME) such as the United States, in which 
formalized contractual agreements, hierarchies, and competition in the marketplace are the 
most important means of coordination among economic actors. By contrast, in so-called 
coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as Germany, Sweden, or Japan, informal 
cooperation, deliberation, and sanctioning is more important for coordination among 
actors. VOC assumes that the different capitalist types have institutional features and 
support structures that render certain types of industries and innovations a comparative 
advantage. This approach postulates that CMEs dominate in sectors where staff and 
financiers’ longer-term commitment allows for incremental improvements of production 
systems. Conversely, LMEs should have a comparative advantage in certain technological 
sectors, such as semiconductors, software development, and biotechnology, where 
flexibility and speed are pivotal for rapid wholesale innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 
39). Surprisingly, this assumption has never been investigated specifically for 
biotechnology in the United States, a gap that this study will fill. Taking the individual 
business actors of the biotechnology industry as the starting point, I will analyze in how far 
the institutional features mentioned above are indeed the most important for coordinating 




   
 
Yet up to this point, my analysis of biotechnology as a neoliberal industry would still be 
bogged down by the neoliberal mindset of supply-side economics. VOC, as well as many 
other macro-economically informed approaches (see chapter 3) tend to look at innovation 
predominantly from the supply side. Whether or not there is a demand for these 
innovations, or at whose expenses they are met, is regularly ignored when looking merely 
at the supply-side of the economy. This study therefore explicitly analyzes the unique role 
that America’s fragmented, market-based healthcare system plays. It is, in international 
comparison, a key institution of political economy in support of the biotechnology industry 
in the United States (claim 3).  
 
1.4 Biotechnology: What’s in a Word? 
 
‘Biotechnology’ is a term collectively used for very different techniques. Some of them, 
such as beer brewing and fermentation, were established throughout the ages of human 
history. Others, such as genetic engineering – the identification, splicing, and transferring 
of genes from one organism to another – were developed only at the end of the 20th 
century. For the purpose of this study I will adhere to the definition of the term most 
commonly applied, which was formulated by the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). It includes both the traditional and the most advanced 
applications and describes biotechnology as  
 
“the application of scientific and engineering principles to the processing of 
materials by biological agents to provide goods and services” (Bull, Holt, and Lilly 




   
 
 
This general definition entails various scientific disciplines, such as molecular biology, 
microbiology, cell biology, biochemistry, but also process engineering, and information 
technologies. As this study will focus on medical biotechnology, it means that these 
scientific and engineering principles, including the understanding and the alteration of the 
genetic makeup, are ultimately applied to improve human health. Thus, medical 
biotechnologies comprise the development and production of drugs, diagnostic goods and 
services, but also animated and non-animated tissues and fluids that fulfill bodily functions. 
Bearing in mind this specification, for reasons of convenience I will use the notion 
‘biotechnology’ synonymously with ‘medical biotechnology’ unless stated otherwise. 
 
Throughout this study, it will become apparent that biotechnology has become affiliated 
with different meanings not only scientifically, but also for commerce, for regulatory 
agencies, as well as for the promoters and for the opponents of these technologies. This 
may appear to be a technical argument, but it is also political. Several studies have 
highlighted the relevance of discursive strategies for the creation of biotechnological 
knowledge and the struggle to define the field (Bud 1993; Gottweis 1998; Kay 2000). 
Although these works have at times been too much focused on the power of the discursive 
processes alone, it would be equally wrong to ignore completely the power of controlling 
narratives. Throughout this study, language will be highlighted when it is used as a 




   
 
for the increase of public research funding as well as entrepreneurs and private companies 
that praise their products in the marketplace1
 
.  
A case in point is that biotechnologies have generated various waves of enthusiasms. 
Almost predictably, there has been a new ‘biotech hype’ every 5 to 10 years: During the 
late 1970s, the first production of insulin and interferon promised cures for key diseases 
such as diabetes and cancer. After these prospects did not materialize, the next wave of 
enthusiasm arose in the 1980s around the possibilities of gene therapy. After a number of 
publicized failures with lethal outcome, the burst of this bubble in the mid to late 1990s 
coincided with the advent of yet another one: The sequencing of the entire human DNA 
and the promises this new science –genomics - made for curing diseases. As none of these 
scientific advances has lived up to its promises, it remains to be seen whether the currently 
most promising technology - stem cell research – can buck that trend.  
 
The point is not that these new technologies did not deliver anything: Today, the 
production of human insulin by genetically modified organisms is well-established and has 
millions of benefactors. Also genomics has become a wide-spread tool in the discovery 
process for new drugs. However, the question that this study will answer is to what extent 
                                                 
1 For example, Robert Bud (1998) describes how the investment house E.F. Hutton had taken out a copyright 
on the word ‘biotechnology’ as the title of a newsletter for investors in 1979. The publication dealt with the 
new, molecular biotechnologies and to separate them as new investment opportunities from earlier, more 
mature technologies, such as in fermenting. Shortly thereafter, when the first new biotechnology companies 
that were specialized on molecular biology launched their shares on the stock market, this brand new (or 
newly branded) industry promised an unprecedented rise in value than any other stock in the history of the 





   
 
such ‘irrationally exuberant’ expectations are systemic to the overall functioning of the 
biotechnology industry.  
 
In that vein, a political economy of the biotechnology industry has to acknowledge first, 
that this is an industry distinct from other businesses on at least three accounts:  
 
First, the educational requirements to enter the field are particularly high. The knowledge 
and training that an individual requires to engage in biotechnology need a steep upfront 
investment with regards to training and academic resources. This is for instance different 
from the IT industry, where legions of teenage computer nerds are engaged in writing and 
improving computer software. Twenty-something old university dropouts have repeatedly 
revolutionized the industry by establishing IT empires such as Apple, Microsoft, and 
Google. The same is not true for actors in the biotechnology industry. The scientific 
background that is needed before one can successfully master and commercialize life 
sciences has to be earned the hard way, which almost inevitably implies several academic 
degrees and many years of bench top drudgery in a laboratory.  
 
Second, and related, biotechnology is highly dependent on basic research, which has had 
particular consequences for the institutional setting. Whereas industrial research 
laboratories were at the basis of many science-based technologies, biotechnology was 
characterized from the beginning by its tight connection between academic research and 
industrial commercialization, which Kenney (1986) therefore called the ‘university-




   
 
 
Third, biotechnology deals with animated substances, which, scientific advancements 
notwithstanding, continue to behave in unpredictable, non-linear ways. The testing on 
human beings of a new biomedical invention, for example, is not a mathematical problem 
whose outcome could be calculated a priori. Dealing with living organisms in general bears 
a high level of social controversy and uncertainty. From the beginning on, safety 
considerations as well as ethical boundaries regarding the manipulation of living material 
have added to this insecurity and political charge. What is technologically feasible - such as 
the manipulation of the genetic make-up of organisms - may not always coincide with what 
is tolerable within or across societies.  
 
These aspects make biotechnologies much distinguishable from other advanced 
technologies2
                                                 
2 Breschi (2000) therefore speaks of technology-specific innovation regimes that comprise regulatory  
procedures, the scientific background involved, and the markets for disseminating the new technologies. 
. These differences will have to be kept in mind, when the generation and 
commercialization of biotechnological innovations will be analyzed in the context of the 




   
 
 
1.5 History Matters, But How? 
 
Whereas everybody agrees that history matters, social scientists have come up with 
different concepts of how: Three of them – accidents, path dependence, and critical 
junctures - are presented here that will be relevant for my analysis of the biotechnology 
industry:  
 
Accidents: Economists, who have acknowledged that the invisible hand of the market does 
not automatically lead to a unique single best solution, have called upon path dependence 
to explain how and why the outcome of market competition often depends on historical 
accidents. For instance, functional yet sub-optimal technologies continue to survive, 
because the costs to leave that path are getting increasingly higher the longer one proceeds 
on it. This phenomenon, in reference to the illogical keyboard composition of typewriters 
and computers is dubbed “The economics of QWERTY” (David 1985). Looking at the 
history of the biotechnology industry, for instance, it may or may not have been an accident 
that the techniques to recombine DNA were first discovered by Stanley Cohen at Stanford 
University and Herbert Boyer from the University of San Francisco, CA. It was not an 
accident, however, that these universities were more entrepreneurial than academic 
institutions in other countries. The combination of scientific and entrepreneurial prowess 
was the result of a history of encouraging policies. They sparked the first wave of 
biotechnology firms being spun off of academia in the U.S. – and not elsewhere. In other 




   
 
because accidents only become consequential when they receive a longer-lasting 
institutional support. 
 
Path dependence: In political science, the notion of path dependence reaches back to 
Theodor Lowi’s dictum of “policies determine politics” (1972, p. 299). Such feedback 
loops between policies and politics shape subsequent political dynamics that get locked in a 
particular path of policy development that becomes increasingly difficult to reverse 
(Pierson 1993, p. 606). In path-dependent social processes, timing is of the essence: Early 
decisions are far more consequential than later ones for the ultimate outcome. And existing 
institutions and configurations are not necessarily a reflection of the status quo, but are 
often a sign of institutional inertia (Pierson 2000a, 2000b). Nevertheless, path dependent 
processes should be seen as dynamic: They are not defined by the absence of change, but 
by change that is  
 
“channeled by the self-reinforcing mechanisms that propel the existing path of 
development.” (Hacker, 2002, p. 54) 
 
The United States healthcare system is emblematic for this path dependence. As will be 
elaborated in Chapter 6, the early-on decision to organize healthcare provision 
predominantly by private actors, determined structural bias against public medical services 
that reverberated ever since ever since and stymied also the healthcare reform efforts of 





   
 
Critical Junctures: These are conceived as periods of significant change, which may – or 
may not – occur differently in different countries, and which are considered to generate 
distinct historical legacies (Collier and Collier 1991, p. 27). In the course of this study I 
will demonstrate that a ‘critical juncture’ occurred in the United States after the election of 
Ronald Reagan in 1980, which caused a turn towards neoliberal policies and ideologies. 
The ensuing shift towards entrepreneurialism and economic competition had two path-
dependent ramifications for the biotechnology innovation regime: Domestically, these 
neoliberal supply-side economic policies profited biotechnology development most in 
those regions in the United States that, due to a number of federal policies, had already 
developed a crucial mass of scientific excellence. Internationally, they generated a critical 
competitive advantage for the biotechnology industry in these regions and a first-mover-
advantage that other regions – domestically and internationally – have found hard to catch 
up with ever since.  
 
In sum, the history of policies in favor of the supply-side driven scientific development and 
market-led solutions for public problems has generated a momentum on its own. As the 
difficulties to reform healthcare in the United States demonstrate, they led to entitlements 
and entrenched political positions. A case in point will be presented in Chapter 6, which 
discusses the joint influence that biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry have wielded 







   
 
1.6 Research Design to Study the Political Economy of the Biotechnology 
Industry  
 
The neoliberal conditions under which biotechnologies have been invented and 
commercialized can best be analyzed from the viewpoint of the individual entrepreneurial 
actor. Ultimately, it is s/he who – motivated by the pursuit of private gains – should set in 
motion innovative entrepreneurial activities to the larger benefit. This first step of my 
investigations is inspired by the approach to study ‘varieties of capitalism’ of Hall and 
Soskice (2001). VoC postulates that LMEs should be particularly advantageous for fast-
paced innovative technologies such as biotechnology. In compliance with predictions made 
by VoC theory, the U.S. is host to the world’s by far largest and most competitive 
biotechnology industry3
                                                 
3 The data to prove this claim will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
. This study is a critical review of the assumptions why and how 
the United States institutional support structure is advantageous for generating and 
sustaining the most competitive biotechnology industry. Based on interviews with 
biotechnology entrepreneurs in the United States, this study analyzes the repertoire of 
companies’ coordinating mechanisms and how these affect their strategic choices. Chapter 
4 will present a detailed account of how biotechnology companies strategize in their 
decision-making, and on what kind of support institutions – formal and informal – this is 
based. Strategic decisions are for example, questions about what markets are entered, what 
collaborations sought, and where a company should be located. Not all the support 
structures mentioned are those highlighted by the VoC: Interviews will reveal the 




   
 
and funding. Equally important will be to distinguish between the role of formalized versus 
informal coordination. 
 
In a second step, therefore, by analyzing the individual firm acting within an institutional 
structure, the most important institutional support systems for the biotechnology industry in 
the United States are being identified. I will demonstrate how those most relevant are the 
result of federal policies. Many of them preceded the ascent of biotechnological innovation. 
Taking path dependence seriously, I will reconstruct the politics and history of a number of 
these institutions and support mechanisms. I will show how certain policies have lead to a 
domestic clustering of biotechnology, and an international competitive advantage. Whereas 
chapter 4 and 5 will be dedicated to the supply-side of technological development, this 
study in addition argues that the fragmented and privatized nature of America’s healthcare 
system presents another important support structure for the biotechnology industry in the 
United States. The history and the political struggles around this setup will therefore be 
dealt with in depth separately in chapter 6.  
 
For the gathering of information a triangulation strategy is employed that includes personal 
interviews, statistical data, and historical reconstruction through literature. While all these 
approaches will be helpful throughout the entire investigation, they will be given different 
weight for each individual claim. To obtain a broad and representative overview of firms’ 
business strategies, its coordination mechanisms, and the institutional support, I conducted 
interviews in person and between October 2001 and October 2008. Interviews took place 




   
 
the United States. Interviews took between 45 to 60 minutes and were guided by a 
questionnaire (see Appendix). Similar to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, the 
questions targeted firms’ strategic behavior with regards to key aspects of their decision-
making and the support structures that they entailed. Issues inquired were for instance 
related to vocational training and education (to make sure to obtain – and keep – the proper 
workforce); corporate governance (to attract various sources of funding and manage the 
finances for the activities of the firm accordingly); and finally, internal coordination (to 
have employees act in the interest of the corporation, particularly with regards to 
information sharing). Moreover, it was tested whether these were indeed the most relevant 
aspects in companies’ decision-making process. Towards that end, additional closed, 
quantitative questions were asked (e.g. about company history and financing, number of 
co-operations, human resources), as well as open, qualitative questions (e.g. about R&D 
strategies, reasons for location, the utility of state and national support programs).  
 
Understanding the different business strategies of biotechnology corporations is essential to 
substantiate all three claims of this study. A representative sample of biotechnology 
enterprises was surveyed to obtain a realistic depiction of the variety across the entire 
biotechnology industry. Firms included in the sample varied according to four main 
variables: Their location; the institutional support structures in these locations; companies’ 







   
 
Location and institutional support systems 
Location is a key strategic dimension for corporations’ decision-making. Sampled 
companies were located in five distinct regions: Boston, San Francisco, Washington D.C., 
New York, and San Diego. All of these locations belong to the leading biotechnology 
innovation clusters in the United States with regards to the size and number of companies 
(Cortright and Mayer 2002). Moreover, despite the free-market rhetoric, biotechnology 
actors in those regions also enjoy comparatively more economic support than elsewhere 
with regards to federal research monies they receive (Battelle 2008). These regions’ 
competitive advantages were the result of a long history of purposeful governmental 
interventions (see chapter 5). Comparing business strategies in these five locations offers 
variations in factors for competitive advantage, so that they can be weighed and put into 
chronological order. For example, if competitive advantage was only a matter of scientific 
excellence, one should assume that Boston should lead, because the region has the densest 
population of institutions of higher education, including Harvard University as the 
country’s oldest and wealthiest elite academic institution. Yet today, the world’s by far 
largest agglomeration of biotechnology companies is located in California. There, one hot 
spot continues to be San Francisco, where biotechnology as a business started in earnest 
when the first commercial entities were spun off from university settings. Another 
Californian cluster is located in San Diego, which hosts the fastest growing biotechnology 
agglomeration in the United States. 
 
According to the VoC approach, the United States as a liberal market economy is supposed 




   
 
will scrutinize the different institutional support structures in place. But it will also address 
the sub-national differences. For instance, California’s well-established venture capital 
(VC) industry will be scrutinized as a comparative institutional advantage vis-à-vis other 
regions, such as Massachusetts. On the other hand, and contrary to the predictions of the 
VoC framework for liberal market economies, the relevance of non-formalized 
coordination for biotechnology actors will be scrutinized, too. Biotechnology seems to be 
flourishing best, where there is a chance for disseminating new knowledge also in a ‘tacit’ 
way (Audretsch and Feldman 1996). Seen this way, California’s lead in biotechnology 
would be less a result of contractual agreements, but of a particularly entrepreneurial 
climate. Such informal factors have been considered to have given the West Coast a 
competitive edge over the Boston area with regards to information technology (Saxenian 
1994). 
 
Other locations offer insight into other institutional support structures: The inclusion of the 
Washington D.C. biotechnology cluster adds information about proximity to the federal 
regulatory bodies and the grant-making institutions, particularly the National Institutions of 
Health (NIH). The New York City conurbation, by contrast, is characterized by the major 
presence of two other institutional supporters relevant for the biotechnology industry: 
Located on different sides of the Hudson River are the world’s largest pharmaceutical 
companies and the world’s largest financial institutions. Last but not least, after the end of 
the Cold War the San Diego region has become the country’s fastest growing 
biotechnology cluster. The city has a long history as a military hub and center of excellence 




   
 
institutional support structures will have to be taken into consideration when looking at the 
conversion from one advanced technology to another. 
 
Companies’ different Products, Services, and State of Development  
Comparing and contrasting a variety of companies’ strategic choices helps understanding 
how capitalism’s creative destruction runs its course among biotechnology firms and 
whether this industry is dominated by the economic and organizational imperative of the 
drug development logic (claim 1). Therefore, after choosing the different locations, the 
companies to be included in the survey were selected to reflect the variety of businesses 
present in the five regions. Towards this end, the membership directories of the following 
biotechnology associations were used: Northern California Life Science Association 
BayBio (San Francisco); Biocom (San Diego); Massachusetts Biotechnology Council 
(Boston); MDBio (Maryland); New York Biotechnology Association (New York). These 
industry organizations categorize their members differently. To apply a coherent set of 
characteristics throughout the survey all five clusters, I used the classification of the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), the overarching United States biotechnology 
trade group. BIO distinguishes companies as follows:  
 
1) Drug discovery/biomedical research: Companies carry out research, either for drug 
development or other biomedical purposes. This category includes also firms engaged 
in genomics, the science of the sequence and functions of genes. 
2) Diagnostics: Companies develop biotechnology-based diagnostic tools that measure 




   
 
3) Biomedical devices: companies develop a range of goods (e.g. artificial heart valves, 
drug-coated stents, and dialysis-related products) that combine biotechnology with 
mechanical engineering. 
4)  Contract research/services: Fee-for-service companies that deliver a broad range of 
products and services (biological reagents, testing animals, clinical trials). 
5) Pharmaceuticals: Chemistry-dominated companies that develop, produce, and market 
drugs. 
6) Environment and agriculture: Companies that provide biotechnology products for 
environmental (e.g. enzymes) and agricultural purposes (e.g. seeds). 
 
In addition, companies selected were of different ages and stages of their development, and 
reflected different ownership models: Some were owned by private individuals, whereas 
others were publicly traded on the stock market. In both cases, some companies were 
independent, whereas others were subsidiaries of American or international entities.  
 
Other Sources 
In addition to corporate biotechnology executives, other relevant actors engaged in 
biotechnological innovation were interviewed, too. Two researchers in academia were 
asked to address the institutional changes and the various settings in which ‘basic’ and ‘for 
profit’ research commingles today. For the commercialization of academic research, 
universities’ technology transfer offices have come to play a pivotal role. Interviews were 
therefore conducted with technology transfer offices of three academic research 




   
 
biotechnology lobby group was interviewed. Finally, interviews have also been conducted 
with two institutional investors and two representatives from the venture capital industry.  
 
Taken together, these interviews will illuminate relevant differences about how actors 
engaged in biotechnological innovation make strategic business decisions and what 
institutional support structures are most beneficial for that purpose. Interviews will 
elucidate to what extent companies engage in certain sets of biotechnological applications 
(pharmaceutical research) rather than other (such as environmental biotechnology, genetic 
engineering of crops, or genetic data sequencing), because of profitability considerations 
(claim 1). The interviews also illustrate the institutionally advantageous requirements for a 
company to conduct its business with regards to human resources, scientific infrastructure, 
access to financial means, markets, and how these factors affect their decisions on a 
location. Similarly, the interviews point out the role of state and federal support 
mechanisms, institutional and otherwise, that have turned out to be instrumental for the 
promotion of the biotechnology industry (claim 2). Information derived from interviews 
will then be contrasted with a historical reconstruction of science and technology policies 
relevant for biotechnology from the existing literature. Special attention will be paid to 
intellectual property and to understand how the industry’s innovations involved increasing 
levels of commodification of the knowledge production process.  
 
The repertoire of institutional support mechanisms brought to the fore by interviews will be 
complemented with official statistics and data about historic and current support and 




   
 
biotechnology is regularly provided by the Biotechnology Industry Organization4. Current 
figures for federal expenditures on R&D are made available by the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)5 and budget allocations for biomedical research 
are compiled by the NIH Office of Budget6
 
. Other relevant information about 
biotechnological innovation that will be used is made publicly available by the National 
Venture Capitalist Association (NVCA) and the Association of University Technology 
Transfer Managers (AUTM). 
Interviewees were also asked about the importance for the biotechnology industry of 
America’s fragmented healthcare market without governmental oversight of prices for 
prescription drugs (claim 3). To put healthcare in the United States in international 
perspective, interviews will be combined with other sources of information. Key health 
data from industrialized countries as provided by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) will be compared. Subsequently, the current 
condition of U.S. healthcare is put into historical perspective by reviewing the history of 
United States healthcare based on fragmentation and market mechanisms. I will also study 
the interest group representation of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries with 
regards to preventing healthcare reform and drug price regulation. This part of the analysis 
is based on documents released by BIO, as well as the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), which represents the country’s leading 
pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies.  
                                                 
4 For the most recent update see (Battelle 2008). 
5 See http://www.aaas.org 




   
 
Lastly, industry efforts to influence politics favorable to their strategic business interests 
are investigated. Relevant information is made available by organizations such as the 
Center for Responsive Politics that trace electoral campaign financing7
 
.  
1.7 The Book Ahead 
 
Chapter 2 will present basic information about how an evolving biotechnology industry 
became co-opted by the pharmaceutical industry (claim 1). A history of the pharmaceutical 
industry and how it re-invented itself several times provides the background to understand 
why biotechnology did not lead to a ‘biotechnology revolution’. Contemporary data will be 
presented to demonstrate that biotechnology became sucked into the vortex of 
transformations of the global pharmaceutical industry whose center of gravity increasingly 
shifted to the United States. 
 
Chapter 3 will explore the different theoretical approaches and methodologies chosen so far 
to analyze the biotechnology industry. Many of them do not offer insight into the 
relationship between the supply and the demand side for technologies, which would then 
also address questions of economic power and politics. My own theoretical framework tries 
to overcome such shortcomings of neoliberal supply-side theorizing. I will therefore first 
touch upon neoliberalism as a theoretical and political concept.  
                                                 




   
 
Subsequently, the possibilities and shortcomings of the VoC approach for the analysis of 
biotechnological innovation will be contrasted with ideas of creative destruction and the 
embeddedness of economic activities. Based on this framework, the subsequent chapters 
will investigate three claims mentioned above. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the findings 
derived from the interviews with biotechnology actors. Their decisions and strategies 
reflect how capitalism’s creative destruction works in today’s biotechnology industry. Also 
emerging from these interviews are a number of institutions and procedures whose support 
have become crucial for the strategic decisions that biotechnology managers take.  
 
Chapter 5 will therefore sketch the history and politics of these institutions and the crucial 
role that the support of United States’ government for the supply-side of technological 
developments has played (claim 2). I will describe how, after 1980, as a flip side of 
neoliberal free-market rhetoric, an array of federal policies to promote the biotechnology 
industry has been implemented. Historically these factors established the United States and 
specific regions as hosts of the world’s most competitive biotechnology industry. Yet over 
time, as the industry matured, supply-side support for biotechnology innovation became 
less of a decisive factor. Instead, as Chapter 6 will elaborate, the politics and policies of 
America’s deregulated healthcare system have become crucial for to the biotechnology 
industry (claim 3). I first provide a comparison of key healthcare data that demonstrate the 
outlier status of the United States healthcare system vis-à-vis other industrialized countries. 
Subsequently, a brief historic overview of America’s fragmented healthcare system will be 




   
 
healthcare reform. Lastly, the chapter will address the lobbying efforts of pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology industries to keep healthcare reform and prescription drug price caps at 
bay. Chapter 7 will first summarize the findings of the study as they relate to the three 
claims. Subsequently, a number of intended and unintended consequences of the neoliberal 
policy prescriptions that shaped the biotechnology industry will be addressed. The 
resilience of the blockbuster drug regime will be questioned in light of the accessibility of 
increasingly expensive drugs. Other ramifications of the current innovation regime, 
particularly with regards to the production and commercialization of knowledge will be 
addressed too, as they have repercussions that go beyond the United States. Some 
concluding remarks are then dedicated to the future of the current biotechnology innovation 
regime as it will be affected by the current political and ideological tide towards a bigger 




   
 
Chapter 2: The Co-Evolution of Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Industry  
 
“The victories…over cancer, syphilis and tuberculosis will be as much capitalist 
achievements as motorcars or pipe lines or Bessemer steel have been. In the case of 
medicine, there is a capitalist profession behind the methods, capitalist both because to 
a large extent it works in a business spirit and because it is an emulsion of the 
industrial and commercial bourgeoisie.” (Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, 




To understand the co-evolution of the biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry, it is 
first necessary to recapitulate how the research and manufacturing of drugs developed over 
time. Throughout its history, the drug industry re-invented itself several times and whereas 
most of the key features of this business have changed, some have not. They will be 
addressed first in this introductory section because they provide the relevant background 
for addressing claim 1: To understand why and how the ascent of biological sciences, and 
the commercialization by biotechnology-startup companies did not lead to a ‘biotechnology 
revolution’, but became co-opted by a transforming, highly profitable, pharmaceutical 
industry. This transformation will be discussed according to three major epochs (Pisano 
2002): A ‘pre-R&D’ period that lasted from the first records of human history until 
approximately 1945 (2.2) ; A ‘Golden Age’ of large-scale pharmaceutical R&D that lasted 




   
 
for new drugs had to keep up with ever-increasing profit expectations (2.4). Only during 
this last period did the biotechnology industry come into the picture. In this period of trial 
and error for new business models, the organizational changes of the pharmaceutical 
industry occurred increasingly to capture the scientific potential of the budding 
biotechnology industry (2.5). A real systemic challenge arose in the course of the late 
1990s with the ascent of genomics, the science of the human genome. While this contender 
to the blockbuster drug model ultimately was muted (2.6), biotechnology was there to stay. 
One of the consequences was the shifting geography in drug development and 
commercialization (2.7), which led to the global pharmaceutical industry of today. 
Pharmaceutical companies eye the United States as the most crucial market, in which all 
the globally dominant players vie for market shares of multi-billion dollar blockbuster 
drugs sales (2.8). The global dominance of the United States is even more pronounced with 
regards to the biotechnology industry, as a number of scientific and commercial indicators 
illustrate (2.9). Consequently, today’s drug business is characterized by Big Pharma 
embracing biological drugs, so-called ‘biologics’, some of which have turned into 
blockbuster drugs in their own respect (2.10). Yet as the conclusion argues, the commercial 
successes of a handful of biotechnology companies and their biologics pose no alternative, 
but rather corroborate the blockbuster drug logic: Selling drugs to as many as possible at 
the highest price achievable (2.11). 
 
Ever since medicinal substances reached a level of industrial production there have been 
two distinct features that separate the commercial logic of the pharmaceutical industry from 




   
 
high, whereas the variable costs for production are low. In other words, the cost structure is 
dominated by upfront investment in R&D that can only be recuperated later. Once a 
product (drug) is developed and approved, production costs, for example for another unit of 
the product, are not a decisive factor for competitiveness. The cost-cutting advantages of 
just-in-time production that have been transforming manufacturing industries do not apply 
to the same degree to pharmaceuticals. And while there is considerable debate about the 
precise costs of developing new drugs (an issue that will be revisited in chapter 7), there is 
little doubt that current expenditures easily run into several hundred million dollars. 
 
Related to this is the second issue: Due to its subject – drugs for human bodies – 
pharmaceutical products are much less prone to rapid turnover. Clinical trials take many 
years and changes in consumer preference tastes cannot be satisfied as quickly as for other 
industries: Hence, it takes much more time to launch a new drug than a new cell phone. At 
the same time, once a therapeutic substance is launched on the market, it can be relatively 
easily copied. Therefore, despite the wild swings of capitalist free-market dynamism, 
pharmaceuticals – be they synthesized chemically or biotechnologically – have always 
been the subject of two specific sets of governmental interventions and regulatory regimes: 
Product approval and patents. Both are dealt with in detail in chapter 5. 
 
2.2 Pre-R&D History 
 
Throughout all societies and much of known human history, there had always been 




   
 
industrial production of drugs took off only by the mid-nineteenth century when the 
medicinal effects of organic chemical substances, such as dyestuff, were discovered. 
Chemical companies in Switzerland (Ciba, Sandoz) and Germany (Hoechst, Bayer) first 
began launching standardized pharmaceutical products, such as Bayer’s Aspirin in 1899. 
On the eve of World War I, German companies produced about 80 percent of the global 
pharmaceutical output. In the United States, synthetic pharmaceuticals were either 
imported from Germany or produced in German-owned U.S. plants (Steen 2001, p. 96). 
The first drug firms that were founded in the United States were not part of chemical 
conglomerates but started out as specialized pharmaceutical companies (e.g. Pfizer, Merck, 
Eli Lilly). Also they did not conduct systematic, formal research for drug development. 
Many crucial pharmacological breakthroughs, such as Alexander Fleming’s discovery of 
penicillin as an antibiotic in 1928, were the result of accidents rather than of planned 
studies (Macfarlane 1985). It was only in response to the outbreak of World War II that the 
U.S. Government launched an extensive research and production program to translate the 
discovery of antibiotics and other compounds into large-scale drug production.  
 
2.3 The ‘Golden Age’ 
 
The large-scale production and commercialization of penicillin became a watershed for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Companies like Pfizer, which had accrued expertise in large-scale 
fermentation, garnered critical productivity gains. Recognizing that drug development 
could become a highly profitable business, big pharmaceutical firms established large-scale 




   
 
in fact cured diseases, after 1950 companies had a broad choice among a variety of unmet 
therapeutic needs. R&D programs were organized around the random screening of natural 
and chemically derived substances for their potential medical properties. Tens of thousands 
of compounds were screened before research would hone in on one ‘lead’ compound. 
Despite the limited knowledge of the biological underpinnings of diseases, and despite the 
role of serendipity, this process did lead to the development of new drugs in a ‘target rich’ 
environment over many years. In the 1950s and 1960s, also helped by the increase in 
public support for health-related research, pharmaceutical companies discovered a vast 
range of new chemical entities: From hydrocortisone and other hormonal products, to 
thiazide diuretic drugs against high blood pressure, tranquilizers, and the initial birth 
control products (Mazzucato and Dosi 2006, p. 3). 
 
For pharmaceutical companies, the organizing principle of their R&D efforts was a large 
numbers’ game, which is anything but random, but rather, a matter of internal 
organizational efficiency. Such institutionalized R&D setup based on economies of scale 
became part of the general culture of large drug companies: Centralized, hierarchical 
organizations that reaped the benefits of a management-led efficiency revolution (Chandler 
1977). Companies were vertically integrated and developed in-house capacities for 
research, development, regulatory affairs, production, and marketing. Throughout more 
than three decades this organizational model allowed for a steady growth of the business 
into one of the most profitable industrial sectors. Pharmaceutical companies’ rate of return 
on R&D investment on new drugs introduced in the United States between 1954 and 1978 




   
 
thin: As of 1996, all the randomly sampled substances and the drugs developed on them 
addressed only 500 molecular targets in the human body out of a potentially 10,000 (Drews 
2000). In the 1980s, returns on investment on random screening procedures started to 
decline. Not only was the pharmaceutical industry in need of alternative business strategies, 
it also needed a fundamental change in the methods of R&D.  
 
2.4 The Age of ‘Transformations’ 
 
The pharmaceutical industry’s yearning for transformations coincided with the ascent of 
the biological sciences and their early commercialization by a budding biotechnology 
industry. As will be discussed below, the technical and scientific advances infused by the 
biotechnology industry also had organizational and geographical repercussions for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Conversely, the biotechnology industry profited from the large 
influx of money generated by hugely profitable pharmaceutical businesses. 
 
Today, drug development involves three interrelated processes, each of which adds its 
distinct commercial value: the search for therapeutic ‘targets’, the synthesis of potentially 
therapeutic compounds, and the screening of those compounds for desired and unintended 
medical effects (Pisano, p. 348). Biotechnology consists of a bundle of different 
techniques, from DNA sequencing and gene splicing over antibody production. They enter 
the value-adding chain of drug development at different points. For instance, as the 
knowledge of biological processes and diseases increased, the search for new drugs became 




   
 
sequencing of the human genome promised to elucidate more of the genetic bases of 
diseases and to tailor drugs accordingly. As for the synthesis of drugs, with the exception 
of antibiotics, the overwhelming majority of them used to be small molecules that could be 
synthesized by processes established in organic chemistry. Only the invention of 
Recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques by Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen in 1973 made 
it possible to produce larger therapeutic molecules such as insulin on an industrial scale. In 
contrast to most drugs that have a known structure and are chemically synthesized, these 
so-called ‘biologics’ are complex mixtures that are not easily identified or characterized. 
Biologics comprise products such as vaccines, blood components, monoclonal antibodies, 
or recombinant therapeutic proteins such as human insulin and growth hormones. Biologics 
currently account for basically all commercialized medicines that are synthesized by means 
of biotechnology (see 2.10 below). 
 
The screening of medical effects profited from the combination of biotechnologies and 
advanced computer technologies. This synergy further tightened the feedback loops in drug 
development between rational design of drug candidates and their screening. Combinatorial 
chemistry, for example, allows for the synthesis of vast numbers of drug candidates, which 
in turn generates the need to speed up the screening process of such compounds. This is 
done by high throughput screening (HTS), developed as an automated, robotics-based 
technique for testing large numbers of substances. In combination with combinatorial 
chemistry, HTS is a return of the randomized screening principles, albeit much quicker and 





   
 
Therefore, as drug discovery became more reliant on the scientific advancements in 
biology, contemporary drug development requires an unprecedented breadth of skills and 
approaches. The level of complexity has not only surpassed that of classical drug 
development, for which the predominant expertise used to be in medicinal chemistry, but it 
has also become too complex to be handled within one single company. Pharmaceutical 
companies began outsourcing certain tasks of this process, while honing their skills on how 
to incorporate the different parts into one coherent research program. Moreover, progress in 
one scientific field often had implications in another area. Firms wanting to capitalize on 
such cross-fertilizations increasingly have to have in place adequately flexible 
organizational mechanisms and structures. Taken together, these transformations have led 
to a post-fordist setup for pharmaceutical R&D that mirrors the changes in industrial 
production. Biotechnology played a role when drug development’s technological, 
organizational and geographical setup changed. The centralized, hierarchical model of 
pharmaceutical companies that had all the capacities in-house was succeeded by  
decentralized, more networked organizational models of drug development. Crucially 
important for the point of this study, however, these changes in the organization of R&D 
did not change the logic of the drug business. Throughout all these transformations, 
pharmaceutical companies became even more focused on the marketing of blockbuster 
drugs worth billions of dollars in sales, in which they succeeded most profitably in the 






   
 
2.5 Trial and Error in Search of New Business Models 
 
Incorporating these new technologies into existing business models for pharmaceuticals did 
not always prove successful. Conversely, in these times of transformation several new 
business models had been tried that had barely anything to do with advancements in 
technology. Whether or not they indeed provided a real competitive advantage, it is worth 
revisiting a few of Big Pharma’s follies as they were part of the industry’s creative 
destruction at work. While they reflect on the bounded rationality of allegedly rational 
business actors and their fear to miss the boat vis-à-vis competitors8
 
, they equally reflect on 
the old dictum that “the business of business is business.”  
To begin with, the late 1990s witnessed the rise of the ‘life sciences’ company. These 
companies tried to obtain a competitive advantage by applying modern biotechnologies to 
diverse products such as seeds, agrochemicals, specialized food products and human 
medicine under one corporate roof (Bijman 1999). Although there had undoubtedly been 
scientific synergies, financial analysts and stock markets did not appreciate the life science 
concept. It was not, that for example, the production of genetically modified seeds was 
unprofitable. Quite the contrary, as the U.S. company Monsanto demonstrated, which 
globally dominates the agricultural biotechnology business. But the profit expectations for 
drugs outpaced those for any other product. As a consequence, companies such as 
Monsanto and Novartis split their pharmaceutical from their agricultural business.  
 
                                                 




   
 
Another strategy that gained momentum between 1993 and 1994 was the vertical 
integration of Big Pharma and drug merchants: Three major drug companies, Merck, 
SmithKline, and Eli Lilly acquired large-scale drug distribution intermediaries. These so-
called Pharmacy Beneficiary Managers (PBMs) were seen as a strategic asset in selling the 
companies’ own drugs, but also in obtaining full-scale information about drug consumption 
patterns, patients’ and doctors’ needs, and ultimately treatment effectiveness for the 
development of new medicines. Already two years later, however, Ely Lilly acknowledged 
a $2.4 billion write-down and that the price of $4.1 billion had been an overvaluation 
(Rangan 1998). In 2002, Merck decided to divest from its PBM arm Medco, which realized 
meager profit margins that dragged down the valuation of the entire company (Herper 
2002). Like other companies that disbanded ‘non-core’ divisions, Merck decided to focus 
again on the development of new drugs. 
 
Last but certainly not in the least, since the end of the 1990s the pharmaceutical industry 




   
 
Table 2.1: Top Pharmaceutical Merger & Acquisition Deals 
Date Target Acquirer Deal Value  
($ billion) 
4-Nov-99 Warner-Lambert (USA) Pfizer (USA) 111.8 
17-Jan-00 SmithKline Beecham (UK) Glaxo Wellcome (UK) 79.6 
26-Jan-04 Aventis (France) Sanofi-Synthelabo 
(France) 
71.3 
26-Jan-09 Wyeth (USA) Pfizer (USA) 68.1 
15-Jul-02 Pharmacia (USA) Pfizer (USA) 59.8 
21-Jul-08 Genentech (44.2 %) Roche (Switzerland) 45.7 
9-Mar-09 Schering-Plough (USA) Merck (USA) 41.1 
9-Dec-98 Astra (UK) Zeneca (UK) 39.9 
17-May-99 Hoechst (France) Rhone-Poulenc (France) 33.8 
20-Dec-99 Pharmacia & Upjohn 
(USA) 
Monsanto (USA) 31.9 
Source: (Saigol 2009). 
 
These mergers created gigantic corporations with a superior marketing power and global 
outreach. At the same time, their size alone did no longer guarantee innovative drug 
research. On the contrary, the old centralized, hierarchical drug development model that 
could reap efficiency benefits from large, centralized in-house R&D capacities had become 
an impediment. The merger mania was therefore accompanied by other organizational 
transformations, sometimes even by the same company. To overcome Big Pharma’s stigma 
of an institutional culture that is too big and hostile to innovation, companies such as 
Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, and Roche all by splitting up in-house R&D. By creating 




   
 
companies could emulate the innovative nimbleness of the much smaller biotechnology 
firms (Kling 2009).  
 
2.6 The Rise and Fall of Genomics 
 
Genomics companies aim to exploit the science of the sequence and function of genomes. 
Relying heavily on advanced computational power, this business genre was sparked by the 
dramatic scientific breakthroughs in the course of the 1990s. Genomics was particularly 
boosted by efforts towards a complete sequencing of the human genome, which was 
achieved as the result of a collaborative yet competitive race between the publicly funded 
Human Genome Project (HGP) and a private corporation, Celera Genomics (Sunder Rajan 
2003). As the first map of the human genetic information was published with much fanfare 
in March 2000, this created huge expectations that understanding the human blueprint 
would lead to a plethora of new diagnostics and drugs.  
 
The high market valuation of genetic information had a systemic consequence: At least for 
a while, genomics companies were able to turn the table of the drug innovation regime. A 
new breed of biotechnology corporations carried out the leading edge research on genes, 
entire organisms’ genomes, and their functions. They deploy techniques such as High-
Throughput Screening, or screening by ‘shotgun approach’ (developed by Celera, the 
private competitor to the publicly funded Human Genome Project), all of which rely 
heavily on sophisticated computation. These approaches generate vast amounts of data and 




   
 
managing production, which put large scale corporations at an advantage, this was a 
rationalization revolution in R&D. It was no longer carried out by the old masters of 
routinized innovation, large pharmaceutical firms, but by smaller competitors. Moreover, 
and this is the decisive difference to the times of Schumpeter, this time around routinized 
innovation also entailed routinized patent claims. Rising stars on the genomics horizon, 
companies such as Celera and Human Genome Science plastered the sequenced human 
genome with patents. Patents were filed despite the very limited knowledge about the 
utility of these gene sequences, as the majority of claims were targeting so-called 
Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs) and Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs). ESTs are 
parts of the nucleotide sequence that become visible when a gene is translated into a 
protein, no matter what function this protein has. SNPs are point mutations occuring at a 
rate of about one per thousand nucleotides along the human genome. SNPs can be 
extremely useful for identifying a person’s genetic variance that correlates with their 
susceptibility to a disease and their response to a drug. Yet SNPs are mere marker of this 
and, like ESTs, do not necessarily reveal any bodily function.  
 
Eventually, this Wild-West-style land grab of genetic information came to an end due to a 
number of developments. First, large pharmaceutical companies, as well as other actors 
engaged in biomedical research such as the Wellcome Trust, teamed up against the new 
gold-diggers and set up the so-called ‘SNP-Consortium’. The purpose of this research 
consortium was to release into the public domain information about SNPs that may be 
relevant to drug development so that this information could no longer be patented  




   
 
keen on patenting their inventions, deliberately sacrificed intellectual property because of 
the fear that others – genomics companies – would block entire research alleys altogether. 
Second, the completion of the human genome draft sequence in 2000 placed a plethora of 
information in the public domain and could no longer be exploited commercially. Third, 
United States patenting guidelines for gene sequences became stricter. As of January 2001 
gene sequences, including SNPs and ESTs, could only be claimed as intellectual property if 
the specific function and usefulness 9
 
 of a gene sequence could be 
demonstrated (Krasner 2003). Fourth, it turned out that the human genome contained only 
20,000–25,000 protein-coding genes instead of the originally assumed 100,000 (Human 
Genome Sequencing 2004), so that the relationship between genotype and phenotype was 
much more complex than initially anticipated. These developments together made genetic 
information as such less valuable. They also led to the depreciation of those companies that 
were selling their gene sequencing databases. What became increasingly relevant instead, 
was the linkage between information and downstream physiological and material 
conditions.  
2.7 Geography and Destiny 
 
The ascent of biotechnology also influenced strategic reorganization of pharmaceutical 
companies in terms of their geographical orientation. Until the end of the 1970s, the global 
drug industry was dominated by corporations like Merck (USA), Hoffman-LaRoche 




   
 
but they still had a decidedly home-made tint with regards to where their innovations were 
made and where their products were marketed first. An extreme case was the industry of 
Japan: Japanese firms were large, but predominantly active in their domestic market, the 
second largest in the world. Lenient patent laws and protective pricing mechanisms 
allowed them to copy inventions elsewhere and reap the benefits domestically. Slowly, 
transitions started to set in when the first biotechnology companies such as Genentech, 
Biogen, and Amgen entered the U.S. market with their products in the early 1980s. As it 
became clear that most biotechnological discoveries that had commercial potential were 
first invented in the United States10, the attention of the pharmaceutical industry 
increasingly focused on that country. Some European corporations entered R&D 
collaborations with university hospitals, for instance Hoechst11. Other large European 
pharmaceutical companies (Pharmacia; Hoffman-LaRoche) relocated vast part of their 
R&D activities directly into the traditional cluster of American pharmaceutical business in 
New Jersey. Yet the biggest bet on the future role of biotechnology for drug development 
was made by the Swiss firm Novartis, which bypassed the traditional pharmacy hub New 
Jersey and instead became established in San Francisco, San Diego, and Boston (Cooke 
2005). Most indicative for Novartis’ overall strategic R&D positioning was the decision to 
establish the company’s primary pharmaceutical research arm in Cambridge, MA. 
Investing $4 billion, the Novartis Institutes for Biomedical Research (NIBR) opened in 
2004 to target cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, infectious diseases, and oncology (Dyer 
                                                                                                                                                    
9 For an invention to become patentable, it has to fulfill this ‘utility’ requirement. The history of patent laws 
as it became relevant for the biotechnology industry is discussed in more detail in section 5.6. 
10 The most notable exception being technologies related to monoclonal antibodies, which were first invented 




   
 
2002). This decision epitomizes the crucial position of the United States for the current 
drug development logic: It unifies the diseases (all of which are concerns of affluent 
industrialized societies) with where the relevant technologies for these diseases are 
developed as well as where the company sees its most promising future markets.  
 
As this study argues that biotechnology has become solidly embedded within the business 
models of a transformed pharmaceutical industry, I will next look at the global drug 
industry of today, taking into specific consideration the U.S. market, as well as the 
contribution of biotechnological drugs. 
 
2.8 Current State of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
In 2008, the global market for prescription drugs was worth $ 773 billion. Of this, North 
American sales accounted for 41 percent, $ 312 billion, alone (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: 2008 Global Pharmaceutical Sales By Region 
Region Sales (US$ billion) 




Latin America 47 
Total 773 
Source: IMS Health: www.imshealth.com 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
11 In exchange for Hoechst paying $ 67 million, the company obtained first rights to exploit commercially the 




   
 
A recent list of the top 15 of global firms selling drugs (see Table 2.3 below) illustrates 
how much the global pharmaceutical industry has changed since the end of its ‘Golden 
Age’ in the 1970s. To begin with, the members of the global and the U.S. top sales charts 
are almost identical. Pharmaceutical companies that want to obtain a global leadership 
position can do so only by being successful on the American market. The notable exception 
is the German company Bayer, who is the world’s 13th largest company while not being 
among the top 15 firms on the U.S. market. Yet Bayer is emblematic for how a once 
globally dominating German pharmaceutical industry these days has fallen behind into 
second-tier. Capitalism’s creative destruction took its toll also on other leading German 
companies, such as Hoechst. The transformation of this chemical/drug company into a ‘life 
science company’ was not received well by shareholders and the subsequent spin-off of the 
pharmaceutical business deleted Hoechst from the top rank of global pharmaceutical 
businesses. Other international contenders, notably from Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom, have fared better and were able to vest themselves firmly among the top global 
players.  
 
Two other major developments in the global pharmaceutical landscape are particularly 
noteworthy: Teva, an Israeli firm whose prime activity are generic drugs, demonstrates that 
such a business model can lead into the highest tier. And with Takeda now for the first time 
a Japanese firm ranks among the top sellers in the U.S. and globally.  
 
 





   
 
 
Table 2.3: Top Drug Corporations by Prescription Drug Sales 2008 (US$ Billion) 
Rank 
Global 
Company Headquartered Global Sales US Sales Rank 
US 
1 Pfizer USA 43.4 20.5 1 
2 GlaxoSmithKline UK 36.5 18.4 2 
3 Novartis Switzerland 36.2 12.4 8 
4 Sanofi-Aventis France 35.6 11.0 10 
5 AstraZeneca UK/Sweden 32.5 16.3 3 
6 Hoffman-LaRoche (incl. Genentech) Switzerland 30.3 13.1 7 
7 Johnson & Johnson USA 29.4 16.0 4 
8 Merck USA 26.2 15.5 5 
9 Abbott USA 19.5 10.0 11 
10 Lilly USA 19.1 11.4 9 
11 Amgen USA 15.8 13.4 6 
12 Wyeth USA 15.7 7.6 15 
13 Bayer Germany 15.7  4.5* n.a. 
14 Teva Pharmaceutical Israel 15.3 9.2 12 
15 Takeda Japan 13.9 8.0 14 
 
Table compiled by author; Source: IMS Health: www.imshealth.com 
*including Canada (Bayer Annual Report: http://www.annualreport2008.bayer.com/en/Bayer-Management-
Report-2008.pdfx) 
 
2.9 The Global Dominance of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry 
 
Despite the significant scientific capacities in European nations and the fear of competition 
from newly industrializing countries such as China, Korea, and Singapore (Segal 2004), a 
number of indicators confirm that the United States continues to be the dominant country 
for biotechnological innovation and commercialization. With regards to scientific output, 
scientific publications from the United States are cited more than those from the next seven 
countries combined (Ernst & Young 2007, p. 6). Likewise, most biotechnology patents, 43 




   
 
development pipeline belongs to organizations headquartered in the United States (Moses 
III et al. 2005).  
 
Also the commercial applications of biotechnologies are dominated by U.S. entities. Of all 
4275 biotechnology companies in this world, one third (1452) are situated in the United 
States, more than in any other country (Ernst & Young 2007, p. 7). Despite efforts in other 
industrialized nations and support from governments, particularly in Europe, the number 
and economic range of specialized biotechnology startup-companies in the United States 
remains unparalleled (Dohse 2000; Nasto 2008). The U.S. dominance is even more 
pronounced when looking at the maturity and valuation of the companies: The country 
hosts 336 of the world’s 710 (47 percent) publicly traded biotechnology firms (Ernst & 
Young 2007, p. 7). In 2005, these companies had a market capitalization worth about $400 
billion, which was almost ten times that of European biotechnology firms ($43 billion) 
(Ernst & Young, 2007, Table p. 45). The global share for publicly traded U.S. firms was 69 
percent of all biotechnology industry employees; 76 percent of all revenues; and 82 percent 
of all R&D expenditures (Ernst & Young, 2007, Top Table, p. 7).  
 
The U.S. also remains the largest market for biotechnology drugs. In 2007, sales of 
biologics in the United States amounted to $41 billion, representing 56 percent of a global 
total of $75 billion products. By contrast, the five leading European countries together had 
a share of 24 percent, whereas Japan’s share of global sales for biologics was 5 percent12. 
                                                 
12 IMS Health Reports: “News Release - Global Biotech Sales Grew 12.5 Percent in 2007, Exceeding $75 






   
 
Therefore, for biotechnology drugs sales in the U.S. market are even more important than 
for prescription drugs in general (see 2.8 above). 
 
2.10 Big Pharma and Big Biotech 
 
So far, few biotechnology entrants, all of which are engaged in the production and 
marketing of biologics, have managed to become fully integrated drug firms that could see 
eye to eye to Big Pharma. Among the global top 15 sellers of drugs, Amgen is the only 
biotechnology firm (see Table 2.3 above). At times spectacular, these commercial 
successes of a few selected biotechnology firms confirm, rather than challenge, the 
blockbuster drug model dominated by Big Pharma. The reasons for this are threefold: The 
concentration of market shares in few hands; the direct involvement of Big Pharma; and the 
high prices for biologics.  
 
First, biologics continue to be a small and concentrated subdivision of the pharmaceutical 
market. Collectively, in the United States the sales of biologics rose from $18.9 billion in 
2002 up to $40 billion in 2006, which was under 15 percent of all prescription drugs 
(Aggarwal 2007, p. 1097). Two categories of biologics, growth factors and monoclonal 
antibodies13, account for more than $25 billion alone (Figure 2.1).  
 
 
                                                 
13 Growth factors include erythropoietins, which stimulate red blood cell formation, and colony-stimulating 
factors, which are used in oncology. Monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) are used for various indications, ranging 




   
 





Source: (Aggarwal 2007, p. 1098) 
 
 
This market segment is overwhelmingly dominated by two companies, Amgen and 
Genentech (see Table 2.4). Not only do these two firms have by far the largest revenues, 
they also account for over two-thirds of profits of all U.S. biotechnology firms (as a 








   
 
Table 2.4: Top U.S. Biotechnology Firms (2006 Data) 





1 Amgen Thousand Oaks, CA 14,268 2,950 
2 Genentech* San Francisco, CA 9,284 2,113 
3 Genzyme Cambridge, MA 3,187 ($17) 
4 Gilead Sciences Foster City, CA 3,026 ($1,190) 
5 Biogen Idec Cambridge, MA 2,683 $218 
6 MedImmune** Gaithersburg, MD 1,277 $49 
7 Sepracor Marlborough, MA 1,197 $185 
8 Celgene Summit, NJ 899 $69 
 
*Became a wholly owned subsidiary of Hoffman LaRoche in 2009 
** Became a wholly owned subsidiary of AstraZeneca in 2007 
 
Source: (Ernst & Young 2007, p. 18) 
 
Second, in addition to the original biotechnology contenders, also large pharmaceutical 
firms have taken an interest in the field of biologics (see Figure 2.2), bringing with them 
the financial resources and the market expectations of the blockbuster drug business. Big 
pharmaceutical companies constantly have to fill their pipelines with new drugs to upkeep 
their shareholder value. Patent protection for some of the top revenue generators, products 
such as the world’s bestselling drug Lipitor (see Table 2.6 below) will expire soon and 
revenues will go to generic manufacturers.14 Biologics seem to become a lucrative 
alternative for several reasons. Because of their intricate – biological – structure, biologics 
are harder to copy, so that generic versions (so-called ‘biosimilars’) cannot take over the 
market as quickly once the drug patent expires.  
                                                 
14 It is estimated that about half of the currently patented drugs sold globally will lose patent protection within 
the next five years. In 2010 alone, the pharmaceutical industry is estimated to lose 15 percent of its revenues 




   
 
Moreover, there are already a number of biologics developed by biotechnology firms on 
the market that have proven to work. Investing in their marketing reduces the risk for big 
pharmaceutical firms of late-stage R&D failure. Marketing biologics dovetails with a 
general trend in the pharmaceutical industry, which since the 1980s, increasingly filled its 
pipeline with in-licensed rather than with in-house developed technologies (Booth and 
Zemmel 2004).  
 
Another way to keep the pipeline filled is to acquire the entire company wholesale. In 
recent times therefore, a number of takeovers worth billions of dollars of biotechnology 
companies by big pharmaceutical firms took place. Some acquisitions went as smoothly as 
the $8.8 billion takeover of Millennium by Takeda, and the $15.6 deal between 
AstraZeneca and MedImmune. In other cases, biotechnology companies dreaded the 
acquisition from Big Pharma. Fearing to loose their distinct innovative value and corporate 
identity, ImClone and Genentech refused the bids of Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) and 
Roche, respectively. Although both were ultimately acquired by large pharmaceutical 
companies15, their resilience also demonstrates the limits of a full-blown integration of 
biotechnology into the world of Big Pharma: Both needs but does not necessarily like each 
other. Differences in attitudes and clashes in business culture still continue to be a divisive 
issue between Big Pharma and biotechnology firms, even the biggest ones.
                                                 
15 Roche, which owned a majority of Genentech since 1990, ultimately acquired the remaining 44.2 percent 
of shares for $46.8 billion in March 2009. ImClone accepted a higher bid by Eli Lilly and was formally 




   
 





J&J: Johnson & Johnson; BMS: Bristol-Myers Squibb  
Source: (Aggarwal 2007, p. 1099) 
 
A third reason why biologics confirm the blockbuster drug logic is that these drugs are sold 
with a steep premium. Biologics come at a price that begins above $1,000 per dose and can 







   
 
Table 2.5: Selected Biologics and Costs 
Product Indication Average Monthly Cost* 
Zevalin (ibritumomab) Lymphoma $24,000 
Erbitux (cetuximab) Colorectal cancer $17,000 
Cerezyme (imiglucerase) Gaucher disease $15,000 
Avastin (bevacizumab) Colorectal cancer $4,400–$8,333 
Zavesca (miglustat) Gaucher disease $4,200 
Herceptin (trastuzumab) Breast cancer $3,250 
 
*Dosing duration of all medicines is highly variable, but most regimens require at least one month.  
 
Source: (Herrera 2006, p. 259) 
 
Proponents of the high costs for biologics argue that, because they reach only a smaller 
population, the costs for society at large would not be bigger. One particularly contentious 
issue are the prices for cancer drugs. Price-setting for drugs that are administered only at 
the end of a person’s life is not a rational matter of supply and demand, but a rather 
emotional test of society’s ‘absorption capacity’ of costs16. In addition, biotechnology 
companies also pursue a strategy that is known from regular pharmaceutical companies: 
Instead of inventing new drugs, it is more rewarding to extend the group of patients with a 
different disease to be treated with the same biologics17. For all these reasons, in the United 
States sales of biologics have become the fastest rising segment of the pharmaceutical 
business. Such biologics push up the expenses for healthcare plans and employers decide to 
include them only in the most expensive of their pharmaceutical benefit plans, to which 
only a small population of employees has access (Elswick 2003). Despite the exclusive 
                                                 
16 Pushing the limits by justifying the abovementioned costs for Avastin of above $8,000 monthly, an 
executive of Genentech stated that Genentech had set the price based on “the value of innovation, and the 
value of new therapies.” (as quoted in Berenson (2006)). 
17 For example Genentech (now part of Hoffman LaRoche) aims to extend the FDA approval for its anti-
cancer-drug Avastin. This biologics is currently only approved for late-stage colon, breast and lung cancer, 
where it has shown to prolong life by up to a few months. Avastin’s admission for treating earlier stages of 




   
 
availability, recent sales figures confirm that a few, selected ‘blockbuster biologics’, such 
as Enbrel, Neulasta, Epogen, and Remicade, are now in the same league as ‘regular’, 
chemically derived, top-selling pharmaceuticals in the United States (Table 2.6). If 
anything, biologics have brought the blockbuster drug logic of big pharmaceutical 
companies to a new level.  
 
Table 2.6: Top US Pharmaceutical Products by Sales 2008 
Rank Brand Therapeutic Class Sales (U.S.$ 
billion) 
Company 
1 Lipitor Lipid Regulator 7.8 Pfizer 
2 Nexium Proton Pump Inhibitor 5.9 AstraZeneca 





Diskus Steroid, Inhaled 4.4 GlaxoSmithKline 
5 Seroquel Anti-Psychotic 3.9 AstraZeneca 
6 Singulair Anti-Asthma 3.5 Merck 
7 Enbrel Anti-Athritic*  3.4 Abbott/Amgen/Wyeth 
8 Neulasta Colony Stimulating Factor* 3.1 Amgen 
9 Actos Diabetes medication, Oral 3.1 Takeda 
10 Epogen Erythropoeitin* 3.1 Amgen 
11 Prevacid Proton Pump Inhibitor 3.1 Takeda 
12 Abilify Antipsychotic 3.1 
Otsuka/Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
13 Remicade Anti-Athritic* 3.1 Johnson & Johnson 
14 Effexor Antidepressant 3.0 Wyeth 
15 Lexapro Antidepressant 2.7 Forest Pharmaceuticals 
* Biologics 








To come back to the initial argument of this section: The commercial successes of a 
number of companies and their biologics corroborate the blockbuster drug logic. With 
Genentech being fully acquired by Roche, to date Amgen is the only remaining 
independent large biotechnology company in the league of Big Pharma. Despite the 
stylized ‘clash of cultures’, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies have a symbiotic 
relationship. Large pharmaceutical companies, no longer able to invent enough profitable 
drugs in-house, are in constant need of new technologies to fill their drug development 
pipeline. They often pay a steep premium, certainly for approved drugs, to biotechnology 
companies. A part of this quest is responsible for the organizational and geographical 
transformation that the pharmaceutical industry witnessed. Another reason for the 
geographic and organizational restructuring is the concentration of market power in the 
United States. It is the most lucrative market for drugs, conventional and biological. Global 
drug leaders and leaders in the US market have become increasingly synonymous.  
 
The next chapter will complement these results by adding the views of the biotechnology 
industry community. They will for instance explain how biotechnology companies depend 
on the contractual agreements they have with big pharmaceutical players, and increasingly 
so the closer a technology comes to being sold on the market. They will also spell out the 




   
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Approaches Towards Analyzing 
Biotechnology  
 
“Americans of the late twentieth century have been conditioned to see free enterprise 
and government noninterference as virtues so compelling and self-evident that they 
must have been the goals of our revolutionary forbearers.” (John L. Larson, Internal 
Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the 
early United States, 2001) 
 
 
3.1 The Limitations of Neoliberal Frameworks to Analyze Biotechnology 
 
Neoliberal economists and policy makers regularly focus on technological innovation as 
the most crucial dimension of economic success (Steil, Victor, and Nelson 2002). This 
view has also informed many analyses of the biotechnology industry, either in business 
studies (Oliver 2003; Robbins-Roth 2000), by economists (Pisano 2002), or political 
scientists (Giesecke 2001; Hart 2003). Taking neoliberalism seriously means taking the 
economic motivations and business strategies of individual firms as the starting point. It is 
they who are supposed to drive economic growth and well-being. This study will do so on 
three theoretical accounts: First, I will revisit the concepts of Joseph Schumpeter and 
capitalism’s perennial gale of creative destruction (3.2). His concepts are particularly 
relevant for claim 1, to prove that biotechnology did not have a revolutionizing economic 
impact. Second, I will turn to the historical and substantive aspects of neoliberal concepts 




   
 
economy, and a leaner, but more competitive state apparatus, provided the backdrop 
against which the ascent of the industry in the United States took place. Third, by making 
reference to the approach to study varieties of capitalism, I will put the individual firm at 
the center of my analysis (3.4). My study will be scrutinizing whether the comparative 
institutional advantage of the United States for the biotechnology industry falls in line with 
what the VoC-approach postulates. Shortcomings of VoC that are not only of a general 
matter, but also with regards to an analysis of the biotechnology industry will have to be 
addressed. This includes alternative theoretical frameworks that have been applied in 
previous studies on the biotechnology industry. Some substitute VoC’s view of the firm as 
a relational, rational actor with sociologically informed approaches that look at the social 
embeddedness of the firm (3.5). Others have put a different emphasis on the institutional 
support structure and gave it the term ‘national innovation systems’ (3.6). These 
approaches will bring clarity into the comparative advantage that certain clusters in the 
United States have domestically as well as internationally. Yet they continue to be 
neoliberal frames of reference in the sense that also they ignore to what extent the 
comparative advantage for biotechnologies is determined by the shape of the demand side 
in the United States (3.7). Complementarities between the United States’ liberal market 
economy and biotechnology should therefore be extended to the provision of healthcare. 
As the concluding section (3.8) points out, successful neoliberal policies to unleash the 
generation of biotechnological innovation, were incumbent on the institutional setup the 
United States’ deregulated, fragmented healthcare system, whose negative side effects 




   
 
3.2 Schumpeter’s Core Concepts and their Importance for Biotechnology 
Innovation 
 
As a consequence of the neoliberal ideological and political turn that found support of the 
supply-side in economics critical, Joseph Schumpeter’s ideas about the importance of 
innovation for capitalism were rediscovered18. Be it the invention of new products, or new 
methods of production or transportation, new markets, and new forms of industrial 
organization: They all illustrate the same process of industrial mutation, which 
 
“incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying 
the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the 
essential fact about capitalism…Every piece of business strategy acquires its true 
significance only…[and] must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative 
destruction.” (Schumpeter 1942, p. 83) 
 
Schumpeter’s ideas about the role of innovation in capitalism opens an array of research 
questions for my subsequent analysis of the biotechnology industry: 
 
First, how does capitalism’s potential for ‘creative destruction’ play out within and among 
companies of the biotechnology industry? What actually is created and what is destroyed? 
While Lichtenberg (2006) undertook a systematic, econometric analysis of pharmaceutical 
innovation as a process of creative destruction, so far the biotechnology industry has not 
                                                 
18 Obviously, Karl Marx was much aware of the pivotal role of technology in capitalism. However, his focus 




   
 
been scrutinized applying the Schumpeterian paradigm. Also, contemporary scholars 
redefined the concept of ‘creative destruction.’ Breschi et. al (2000) suggested that where 
there are large, established firms, new entrants have to overcome high barriers In those 
cases it is not ‘creative destruction’ that shapes an industry, but ‘creative accumulation’19.  
 
Second, Schumpeter claims that capitalism has gone through different lengths of innovative 
business cycles depending on the degree of creative destruction that certain innovations 
have brought about (Schumpeter 1964)20. But how disruptive for the various cycles of 
businesses has biotechnology really been so far? Widely disruptive powers of 
biotechnology have been applauded (Oliver 2003) or feared (Rifkin 1998), while others 
have been more skeptical about biotechnology’s revolutionary potential (Fransman, Junne, 
and Roobeek 1995; Nightingale and Martin 2004). This study will extend such skepticism 
and demonstrate that biotechnology so far has not had a revolutionary impact. Yet any 
analysis of the biotechnology industry (including this one) has to address biotechnology’s 
cyclicality: What are the reasons that the several booms of financial excitement about 
biotechnology were followed by collapses in valuation of the entire industry? 
 
Third, zooming in on this problem, how have ‘boom and bust’ cycles in biotechnology 
innovation unfolded? In Schumpeter’s theory, innovative, ‘first mover’ enterprises can 
muster huge profits from the temporary monopoly power of their innovations, largely due 
to the destruction of competitors. But not for long, as the exceptional profits attract 
                                                 
19 Note that creative accumulation does not necessarily have to be an optimal outcome, as path dependence 




   
 
imitators who copy successful ‘first movers.’ Low-risk, profit-seeking imitation first leads 
to an upswing of innovative activity, but the boom is soon to be followed by a downswing. 
This flogging instinct and the fear of missing out on a crucial round of technological 
innovation had already been addressed with regards to the wax and wane of the genomics 
industry (see 2.6 above). The reality of that boom-and-bust cycle was also more 
complicated, because imitating innovation in biotechnologies is inhibited through 
intellectual property protection. 
 
Fourth, what is the relevance of the organizational setting for innovation? For Schumpeter 
(1934), the engine of innovation and growth was the heroic, risk-taking entrepreneur, a 
pioneer with an imaginary mind. But as firms grow, serendipity in innovation would be 
increasingly substituted by routine. Entrepreneurs, by means of spreading enlightenment 
ideas of rationalization, therefore undermine the very source, the spirit of entrepreneurial 
innovation (ibid., p.132). The modern corporate manager that evolved would become the 
antithesis of the original entrepreneur, leading to large, hierarchical, rationalized 
corporations, which capitalize on their rationalization gains thanks to the visible hand of a 
revolution in management (Chandler 1977).  
 
However, one should not per se assume the superiority of large-scale enterprises when it 
comes to organizing research and development: Large firms’ economies of scale advantage 
for routinized innovation may partially or even fully be offset by their hierarchical, 
                                                                                                                                                    
20 Such rearrangements include 3-year long Kitchin cycles, caused by the de/accumulation of inventory; 8 to 
11 year long Juglar cycles, caused by individual innovations such as the dynamo; and the 50 to 60 year long 




   
 
centralized, bureaucratic structures (Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 279). The question of 
limits for ‘routinized innovation’ as described by Schumpeter is all the more important 
because of the specific features of the field of biomedical science: Unlike for example a 
new microchip, which can still be improved after an unsatisfactory test run, this is hardly 
the case for a new drug: A molecule either works or it does not. A drug candidate that is 
developed and tested in the laboratory for many years and then fails the final testing in 
human beings will have to be discarded and never reaches the market. As production costs 
are almost negligible, expenditures that go into discovery of new drugs become the key 
factor. But where and how to invest is a question to which different answers have been 
given at different times. These investment decisions are part of the business logic of the 
biotechnology industry. It is the inherent risk of drug development, which is at the center of 
the co-evolution and the ‘cultural clash’ between allegedly venturous start-up 
biotechnology entrepreneurs and the bureaucratic representative of Big Pharma. This 
conflict will feature prominently during many of the interviews with entrepreneurs of the 
biotechnology industry (see 4.5), which saw their own innovative image clashing with that 
of bureaucratized Big Pharma. 
 
Fifth, is there a role for government intervention in the perennial gale of creative 
destruction? Schumpeter did not make any prescriptions with regards to government 
intervening in the creation of innovation21. He only explained that government should not 
intervene to prevent monopolies as they are the price that has to pay for the vast economic 




   
 
assumed the pre-existence of innovative firms. This turns out to be a serious shortcoming 
of Schumpeter’s theory, because the question of what an innovative environment should 
exactly look like continues to motivate scholars and policy makers alike until this date. 
Consequently, chapter 4 and 5 will discuss a range of policies to stimulate biotechnology 
firms in the United States. 
 
3.3 The Neoliberal Turn  
 
The concept of neoliberalism is open to various conflicting interpretations. Many of them 
have to do with the ambiguity of the term ‘liberalism’, which harks back to ‘liberty’ and its 
individual feature as opposed to a more holistic view on society22. Classic liberalism took 
heed from Adam Smith’s observations about human’s “propensity to truck, barter and 
exchange one thing for another” (Smith 1937, p. 12). His ‘invisible hand of the market’ 
was interpreted as a prescription for economic laissez-faire policies, most prominently free 
trade and a minimalist state. In times of classical liberalism, the intended ‘unintended’ 
consequence of individual wealth production would be wealth production for the society as 
a whole. Yet Smith himself, being a lecturer of moral philosophy, never used the notion of 
laissez-faire. He believed that the pursuit of individual interests be conducted in socially 
                                                                                                                                                    
21 Hospers (2005) therefore concludes that “[t]he case Schumpeter makes is not for the market and against 
intervention in general; it is rather a case for intervention adapted to the particular circumstances of time 
and space.” (p. 33). 
22 To this date, a ‘liberal’ in continental Europe is generally conceived as a conservative concerned with his 
own economic liberty. By contrast, the counterpart in the United States is label for a moderately left-of-center 
view. Another important divide exists between the concept of neoliberal institutionalism, where the 
hegemonic economic power is replaced by a range of regimes (Keohane 1984). For an overview of different 




   
 
controlled forms guided by sociocultural, legal, and organizational rules (Trigilia 2002, p. 
22). 
 
Therefore, substantially not so much different is the assumption of neoliberalism that 
human well-being  
 
“can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade”(Harvey 2005, p.2). 
 
Neoliberalism as a political concept was first formulated by Friedrich August von Hayek in 
1944. To avoid“The Road to Serfdom” (1944) requires two institutional safeguards: The 
limited power of the state and a free economy. Yet as a political project it was lingering 
on23 until political leaders looked for economic responses to the crisis of accumulation in 
the 1970s. Until then, the post World War II economic model of capitalist societies, the 
‘Golden Age’ of capitalism established under American leadership, enjoyed relatively 
broad legitimacy due to features such as: A compromise across classes and ideologies and 
shared common ideas about governments’ role for full employment; Keynesian strategies 
for economic stability and growth that relied on the demand side of the economy, such as 
safeguarding the purchasing power of vast parts of the population for mass-produced 
                                                 
23 It was, however, developed further in academia and in think tanks, most prominently the Mont Pelerin 
Society (MPS). Among MPS’s illustrious members were for instance, Michael Polanyi (Karl’s younger 
brother), Milton Friedman, and Karl Popper. Also today, the MPS continues to warn about the “danger in the 
expansion of government, not least in state welfare, in the power of trade unions and business monopoly, and 





   
 
goods; Strengthening labor interests over those of capital; de-commodifying and extending 
the welfare state; and an international trade system open enough to support domestic 
industries geared for exports and protectionist enough to avert harm to other sectors  
(Streeck and Thelen 2009, p. 97).  
 
The crisis of capital accumulation in industrialized capitalist economies was caused by a 
variety of coinciding factors that cumulated in the 1970s (increasing oil prices, surge in 
labor resistance, and the budgetary burden of an extended welfare state). Neoliberal policy 
shifts affected all of the abovementioned aspects of the compromise and the glue that made 
possible the long boom of capitalism from the late 1940s to the early 1970s.  
 
In the following, I will address several key dimensions of neoliberal transformations: 
Ideology; Financial Orthodoxy; Economic Globalization; Changing Role of the State. As 
they have affected many countries, they will be presented first on a general level, before I 
present the specific circumstances in which they took place in the United States. This way, 
the political and ideological changes will be drawn that affected the rise of the 
biotechnology industry in the United States.   
 
Ideology 
Neoliberal transformation implied the increased marketization of society. As public, social 
needs were considered to be met best by private means coordinated by market forces, 




   
 
towards a well functioning of markets (Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg 2005, p. 12). 
Ultimately, by emphasizing the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace 
 
“neoliberalism values market exchange as an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a 
guide to all human action, and substituting for all other ethical beliefs... It holds that 
the social good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market 
transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market.” 
(Harvey 2005, p. 3). 
 
The United States may historically have always been dominated by a culture of 
individualistic, market-oriented behavior. For instance, in no other industrialized country 
has the ‘marketization of health’ reached the level of the United States. But also here there 
are leftovers of the Keynesian welfare state that underwent neoliberal improvements, such 
as President Clinton’s campaign for ‘ending welfare as we know it’. 
 
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the evolution of an ethics of market exchange 
has been at the heart of advancements in biotechnology. Questions about the 
commodification of living matter, and for what purpose, for instance the patenting cell 
lines or genetic information have turned out to be crucial stumbling blocks – or accelerators 







   
 
Financial Orthodoxy 
Another key dimension of neoliberal politics was the shift away from Keynesian 
macroeconomic demand management towards a supply-side approach to macroeconomic 
management. It argues that overall economic wellbeing is maximized when the barriers to 
producing goods and services (the ‘supply side’ of the economy) are lowered. Consumers 
would then benefit from a greater supply of goods and services at lower prices. Supply-side 
policies would typically lower taxes for corporations and for individuals, particularly in the 
higher bracket, in the expectation that this would free private capital to be invested. 
Moreover, the role of fiscal policies would generally be lessened in favor of monetarist 
interventions to curb inflation24.  
 
In the United States this era began when the Federal Reserve Bank raised the interest rate 
to almost 20 percent until 1981 to regain stability for the currency.  This ‘Volcker shock’ 
triggered a recession in the tailwind of which unemployment rose to over ten percent 
(Harvey 2005, p. 23). When Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981, he 
unleashed a range of initiatives to deregulate businesses, cut federal budgets and taxes, and 
to attack organized labor. Reagan’s specific way towards neoliberalism was to combine all 
these measures with a huge increase in military expenditures. In fact these policies can be 
interpreted as another ‘Keynesian compromise’: Preoccupied with the Cold War, Reagan 
                                                 
24 A third tenet of financial orthodoxy was balanced budgets. Yet while this entered developing countries’ 
structural adjustment policies prescribed by the Bretton Woods Institutions, advanced capitalist countries did 
not heed this advice. Many European countries regularly violate the threshold for the budgetary deficit of 3 
percent of Gross Domestic Product that he European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact requires (Cerny, 
Menz, and Soederberg 2005, p. 16). And in the United States, unprecedented levels of deficit have piled up 
under presidents Ronald Reagan (averaging 4.2 percent of GDP) and George W. Bush (who turned a 1.9 





   
 
launched a deficit-funded arms race (‘Military Keynesianism’) that specifically benefitted 
his electoral majority in the West and the South of the United States (Harvey, p. 88). The 
way in which these military resources were allocated became also consequential for the 
amassing of financial and scientific resources that profited the biotechnology industry (see 
chapter 5).  
 
A Globalizing Economy 
From its beginning in the 1970s, neoliberal transformations have also had the purpose to 
open up the global economy. This included liberalization of trade, increase in 
transboundary flows of capital and investments, and the internationalization of production. 
Some studies that looked at national economies and the effects of neoliberalization on them 
have been using the term synonymously with economic globalization25. Others, looking 
outward-bound to the same dynamic, have defined economic globalization with regards to 
the integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct 
foreign investment, short-term capital flows, international flows of human resources, and 
flows of technology (Bhagwati 2004, p.3). 
 
Why is this relevant for an analysis of the biotechnology industry? Biotechnological 
sciences are not so much dependent on material input than on knowledge. Knowledge-
intense industries have become embattled assets in a globalizing economy, because in 
theory, they are more footloose and are movable more rapidly than material production 
facilities (Hilpert 2003). This is the case, for instance for information and 
                                                 




   
 
telecommunication technologies, where new hubs have sprung up from Dublin to 
Bangalore. In comparison, the medical biotechnology industry remains concentrated where 
it started out: Not only are the major producers of advanced technologies clustered in a few 
regions in the United States, but the majority of their products are geared for the United 
States too (see section 2.8). This, however, is not to say that biotechnology contradicts the 
dynamic of economic globalization. Rather, my study analyzes the reasons for how and 
why biotechnological innovations have become concentrated within a few local clusters in 
the United States, and how this has affected the global architecture of drug development 
and commercialization. My reasoning is similar to Saskia Sassen’s analysis of centers of 
global finance that shape the global financial architecture (2001). Her account of these 
‘global cities’ reveals as much about the reconfiguration of global actors in a local space, as 
it analyzes the implications of their activities for the global financial architecture. 
Innovations in finance and in biotechnology, therefore, reflect the “deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization of socio-economic and political space” (Held et al. 1999, p. 27). Seen 
that way, globalization is a highly uneven process that 
 
 “both reflects existing patterns of inequality and hierarchy while also generating new 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion, new winners and losers…globalization, thus, can 
be understood as embodying processes of structuration and stratification.” (ibid.) 
 
Also the global dissemination of biotechnologies reflects new patterns of winners and 
losers, both among private and public entities, as well as within countries in the 




   
 
2001). Such ‘transformationalist’ assumes that economic globalization does not reflect a 
single logic of development: Neither does it bring about a borderless network economy 
(Kelly 1998), nor a level-playing field (Friedman 2005), or even a stateless world (Ohmae 
1995). I argue that it is not despite globalization pressures, but rather because of them, that 
the United States (or, to be more precise, certain clusters in that country) remains the most 
competitive location for the global biotechnology industry. And while other countries, and 
their governments and bureaucracies, have made efforts to catch up, they have not yet 
succeeded. Such absence of convergence among capitalist countries is an issue that will be 
revisited again (see 3.4 below), when we look at the varieties of capitalism.  
 
The Competitive Nation-State 
Another important dimension of neoliberal transformations can be seen in the change in 
tasks for the states, both domestically and internationally. Throughout the economic boom 
after World War II, it was generally accepted that governments had a role to play in 
policies to stimulate economic growth, full employment, the promotion of industrialization, 
and to a certain degree, redistribution of wealth through progressive fiscal policies and the 
welfare state (Cerny et al., 2005, p. 17). By contrast, the neoliberal state was supposed to 
recede from all these tasks: It should not intervene to achieve a particular outcome, but 
rather set the regulatory framework for a level-playing field among market actors. As an 






   
 
Yet whereas neoliberals in the 1970s and the 1980s were requesting the state from 
withdrawing from intervening more or less entirely, the requests changed: Intrusions of the 
state became no longer contested, they were even demanded, as long as they served an 
entrepreneurial, pro-market purpose. At the same time, social policies are to be 
subordinated to economic policies (Jessop 2002). The biotechnology industry is a thankful 
study object for how actors who claim to profit from an unfettered market economy, and 
who rhetorically often rejecting state intervention, at the same time demand the state to 
intervene, among other things to safeguard private property rights, the rule of law, the 
functioning of markets and free trade.  
 
Moreover, owed to the fact that neoliberalism is an explicitly globally oriented endeavor, 
the neoliberal state should strive for internal reorganizations and institutional arrangements 
to improve its competitive position in the global market in comparison with other countries 
(Harvey, p. 65). Globalization has not brought about the “end of the state”, but has 
encouraged “a spectrum of adjustment strategies and, in certain respects, a more activist 
state” (Held, et.al., p. 9). Instead of a withering away of the state, changes towards a more 
activist state are undertaken to compete with other nations to accommodate better the needs 
of capital. In such a ‘leaner meaner’ state  
 
“the capacity to deliver services that the affluent can supply privately for themselves 
(e.g. health and education) is sacrificed while the more restricted institutional capacity 
necessary to deliver essential business services and security (domestic and global) is 




   
 
 
Putting it another way, the state is not retreating, but is rather changing its mode of 
authority to become a ‘competitive nation-state’ (Hirsch 1995). The state retreats from 
providing domestic welfare directly, from wielding ownership in key industries and 
infrastructural services, from maintaining full employment. Instead, state capacities are 
extended to attract foreign capital, to marketize and privatize economic and social 
activities, and to embed the state in transboundary economic practices and its legal 
institutions (Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg 2005, p. 5). 
 
All these adjustment strategies can be studied in the development of biotechnology. My 
study will address the effects of a range of pro-market, pro-entrepreneurial policies devised 
by the US government throughout the historical development of the biotechnology 
industry. Equally important, such measures were taken to stem the tide of a declining 
competitiveness of the US industry and economy. Yet economic growth driven by 
technological and scientific knowledge call for a very different set of enforcement tools 
compared to one in which industrial production is driven predominantly by material input. 
The enforcement of intellectual property rights becomes a crucial case in point. Patents call 
for an active state on the inside, and a pro-active, state on the outside to safeguard the 
compliance of other states to its rules. Therefore, instead of a ‘night watch state’ that is 
hands-off, the most sophisticated economic actors need a hands-on state as a sophisticated 
active enforcer (Evans, 1998, ibid.) of certain market mechanisms. Such interventions had 
and continued to have a crucial influence, which was not limited to the domestic sphere. As 




   
 
pointed out, post World War II international institutions were significantly shaped by 
United States’ interests and interventions. Some of the most relevant multilateral 
organizations have been established as an expression of the United States’ hegemony 
(Foot, MacFarlane, and Mastanduno 2003), a topic that will be revisited when looking at 
the establishment of international trade agreements and intellectual property regimes 
pertaining to biotechnological innovations (see 7.5 below).  
 
Whereas the sum of the above neoliberal policy prescriptions turned out to be only mildly 
effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation26, a broader ideological transformation 
gained traction not only in the United States, but in quarters as diverse as the United 
Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher, China under Deng Xiao Ping, and Chile during the 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Harvey therefore concludes that  
 
“Neoliberalism has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation, 
but it succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and 
China) creating, the power of an economic elite…The evidence suggests, moreover, 
that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, 
then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be 
unrecognizable.” (Harvey 2005, p. 19) 
 
                                                 
26 As a matter of fact, both in the UK under Margaret Thatcher and in the United States under Ronald Reagan, 




   
 
By now it should have become clear that at least in a number of advanced capitalist 
countries the transformations that took place showed numerous similarities27.  At the same 
time, these countries continue to vary along many crucial parameters. The discussion about 
conversion or diversion among countries will also play a role in the next section that 
revisits some concerns about the VoC approach. They are essential for the comparative 
advantage that the US has to host the world’s most vibrant biotechnology industry.  
 
 
3.4 The Utility of the VoC Approach for the Analysis of the Biotechnology 
Industry 
3.4.1 VoC vis-à-vis other Approaches  
Many surveys inspired by VoC are comparative country studies28. By contrast, I will 
investigate the assumption formulated within the framework of VoC that LMEs have a 
comparative advantage in certain technological sectors, such as semiconductors, software 
development, and biotechnology, where flexibility and speed are pivotal for rapid 
wholesale innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 39). These propositions, however, have 
never been specifically tested for the case of biotechnology in the United States. The 
subsequent study will fill this gap. The reasons for the comparative superiority of 
America’s biotechnology industry that was illustrated in the previous chapter will be 
investigated using the analytical framework suggested by the VoC approach. This 
approach, which will be elaborated further below, argues that such comparative advantage 
                                                 
27 In that sense, focusing on the process of liberalizing capital restraints and market mechanisms, it may be 




   
 
is achieved when the political-economic setup of institutions in a country is complementary 
to the coordination needs of a specific industry. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 are dedicated to the most important institutional complementarities for the 
business of the biotechnology industry. Some of them, such as patenting and access to 
varied sources of capital, can indeed be derived from features that the VoC-typology 
ascribes to the United States as a liberal market economy. Yet other important factors 
crucial for the competitive advantage of the industry in the United States, particularly 
clustering on the sub-national level, will come to the fore too. They will reflect on the 
limits of the VoC approach, which for that reason, will be compared with other theoretical 
approaches used to analyze the biotechnology industry: towards that end, I will discuss 
studies on ‘national systems of innovation’ and concepts of clustering and embeddedness 
of firms.  
 
3.4.2 VoC: What is it? 
The approach to look at variations in capitalist societies that is used here was introduced by 
Hall and Soskice (2001). Influenced by the French Regulation School (Boyer 1990), which 
analyzed the movement away from mass production toward new, flexible production 
regimes, VoC brings the firm into the center of economic analysis. VoC takes a relational 
view on the firm, assuming that business actors interact in a strategic way, trying to pursue 
their individual interests under the circumstances of a given set of institutions. To flourish, 
                                                                                                                                                    
28 See for instance Coates (2005), Hancké (2007). Equally important, the majority of these comparisons are 
empirically focused on European countries. The United States poses as the ‘ideal’ LME, but rather in theory 




   
 
a firm has to engage other actors in a number of spheres of the political economy: to raise 
finances (on capital markets); to determine working conditions and salaries (industrial 
relations); to safeguard that employees have an appropriate skill set (training and 
education); to get access to technologies and other inputs, but also to compete for market 
shares (inter-firm collaborations) (Hall and Gingerich 2009, p. 452). Hence, much of the 
work that firms carry out is relational to alleviate coordination problems and to mitigate 
transaction costs, both within and outside the firm. 
 
In so doing, the approach links the competitiveness of the individual firm to an 
‘institutional comparative advantage’ of national economies. Such ‘comparative advantage’ 
is assessed in terms of key complementarities that are provided by the institutions of the 
political economy of a country. It implies that nations with a specific set of coordination 
mechanism in one sphere of the economy are also likely to develop complementary 
practices in another sphere, too. For example, where there are dense business networks to 
sustain a joint vocational training program, the same networks may also be deployed for 
collective bargaining with employees (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 18). Hence, institutional 
practices are not distributed randomly across nations, but their clustering allows for 
typifying capitalist economies.  
 
Based on the way in which economic actors coordinate their endeavors and what kind of 




   
 
distinguished between two types of capitalist economies29. On the one hand, there are 
liberal market economies (LME) such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the UK, 
in which coordination among economic actors is considered to depend largely on the 
market, on contracts, and on other legal instruments. By contrast, in so-called coordinated 
market economies (CMEs), such as Germany, Sweden, or Japan, informal cooperation, 
deliberation, and sanctioning is more important for coordination among actors. Sometimes 
institutional support is provided for by the state directly, sometimes by corporatist 
organizations.  
 
In the spheres of political economy mentioned above, firms in liberal market economies 
like the United States rely more extensively on market relations to resolve coordination 
challenges than it is the case in CMEs. Consequently, in these spheres LMEs can be 
characterized by institutional support structures for market-forms of coordination (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, pp. 27-31): 
 
Financial systems and markets for corporate governance: Financing of firms is reliant on 
well-established and transparent equity markets, where dispersed investors value the 
company based on publicly available information. And while for new firms in high-
technology fields venture capital often provides funding and guidance, corporate 
governance structures in LMEs are dominated by publicly traded firms whose current 
profitability is the most crucial dimension for performance, and reflected in the share price. 
                                                 
29 Hall and Gingerich (2004) later also analyzed so-called ‘hybrid systems’, such as mixed market economies 




   
 
Industrial relations: In absence of work councils and trade unions, firms in LMEs rely on 
individual bargaining between employers and employees. Competition in the labor market 
leads to a high level of fluidity, which is modulated by macroeconomic policies. In these 
markets hiring and firing of employees is easier than in CMEs, so that both employers and 
employees invest in general skills that are transferrable across companies. 
  
Education and training: complementary to the fluid labor markets mentioned previously, 
companies are loath to invest in very specific training schemes as they fear that their 
trained staff would simply be poached by other firms. From the perspective of the 
employee, anticipating many shifting jobs makes it rational to acquire a general skill set 
that is transferrable between employments. This assumes a high level of general education 
in LMEs, and that firms encourage their employers to acquire marketable skills. This 
institutional  setup will also leave some firms short of employees with highly specialized, 
company-specific skills. 
 
Inter-company relations: LMEs have a high degree on standard market relationships based 
on enforceable formal contracts. Since firms are vulnerable to fluctuation in short-term 
profitability, they find it more difficult to make long-term commitments to providers of 
inputs as well as to customers. At the same time, particularly in the United States, rigorous 
antitrust regulation prevents companies from relational contracts, for instance for joint 
developments of technologies. Instead of research consortia, or inter-firm collaborations 
that are common in CMEs, companies in LMEs rely on the licensing or acquisition of 




   
 
property protection. Related to this and to the fluidity of the labor market, in LMEs 
technology transfer takes place through the movement of highly trained staff from one firm 
to another (or from research institution to private firm).  
 
As a result of these specific institutional setups, liberal market economies have many 
institutional complementarities across the sub-spheres of the economy. For instance, 
flexible labor market arrangements allow companies to dispense with staff in an economic 
downturn and as a reaction to financial markets expecting the company remaining 
profitable. Similarly, educational arrangements in favor of general rather than specialized 
skills, are complementary with fluid labor markets. And, in the context of a legal system 
that inhibits relational contracting, licensing agreements are more effective than inter-firm 
collaborations for technology transfer (see Fig 1.4 Hall Soskice, 2001 p. 32). 
 
VoC not only assumes that the different capitalist types have varied institutional support 
structures, but also, that this renders comparative advantage for certain types of industries 
and innovations in those countries. This approach postulates that CMEs dominate in sectors 
where staff and financiers’ longer-term commitment allows for incremental improvements 
of production systems. By contrast, LMEs have a comparative advantage in high-tech 
sectors characterized by rapid innovative turnover, such as semiconductors, software 





   
 
3.4.3 VoC and Globalization 
VoC also makes a number of assumptions about globalization that are important for my 
analysis of the biotechnology industry. Because comparative institutional advantages lead 
to specialization in either radical or incremental innovation, globalization is supposed to 
confirm rather than undermine comparative institutional advantages of nations. As 
explained earlier (see 3.2), in knowledge-based industries such as biotechnology, labor 
costs alone would not be reason enough to relocate to countries with lower wages. Instead, 
VoC’s theory of comparative institutional advantage suggests that firms relocate activities 
abroad to profit from when they can expect that the institutional framework in political 
economies of another countries are more conducive to the tasks at hand (Hall and Soskice 
2001, p. 57). For instance, American car companies have relocated to and profited from the 
incremental improvement of certain aspects of their manufacturing activities carried out in 
CMEs. Conversely, we can find such ‘institutional arbitrage’ in the behavior of 
pharmaceutical firms from Europe that move R&D activities to the United States (see 2.7 
above), an LME whose institutional framework is more supportive of radical innovation. 
 
Moreover, as a response to globalization it has been argued that in CMEs, strategic 
coalitions between employers and employees in some industries and advocate for 
deregulation in others. By contrast, in LMEs business actors are generally considered to be 
calling for deregulation (Hall and Soskice 2001, pp. 57-58). Looking at the various aspects 
of regulating biotechnologies, with regards to safety, patenting, and regulatory approval of 




   
 
argued that instead of the old varieties of capitalism, in reaction to globalization pressures, 
we witness  
 
“the emergence of varieties of neoliberalism – of diversity within convergence, of the 
forging of different ‘roads to globalization.’ (Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg 2005, p. 
21) 
 
Taking up from this argument, my study explains the road to globalization of America’s 
capitalism and how it became – and to this date is - the variety of neoliberalism most 
attractive for the biotechnology industry.  
 
3.4.4 Criticism of the VoC-Approach  
The VoC-approach is being criticized on many accounts for various reasons: that its 
typology based on two different models of capitalist societies is reductionist; that it is 
ignorant of the role of the state; too static and ignorant of the role of conflicts; and too 
functionalist. Part of this criticism is owed to the fact that the proposed VoC-approach was 
meant to be a research agenda about, rather than a full-blown account of, the differences of 
capitalist societies. While it is not the purpose of my study to contribute to these 
discussions30, I will address some of those criticisms that will later play a role for my 
analysis of the biotechnology industry.  
 
                                                 




   
 
To begin with, not everything with a coordinated market economy, such as Germany, is 
organized according to non-legal, tacit agreements. Conversely, in the United States many 
aspects of economic life that may very well be of crucial importance for the biotechnology 
industry do not occur according to market principles and hierarchical, legal agreements. 
For instance, my study will look at business networks that link biotechnology firms with 
specific types of funding organizations (e.g. Venture Capital and Angel investors), which 
are not easily typified within the dichotomy of contractual (LME) or informal (CME) 
coordination. My study therefore wants to disentangle to what extent the particular variety 
of neoliberalism in the United States that seems to be so conducive for the creation of the 
world’s most competitive biotechnology industry, can be characterized by parameters 
suggested by VoC, and to what extent other factors play a role.  
 
Second, the strength of the VoC approach, to put the individual firm into the center of 
attention, is also its largest deficit, because there is no role for macroeconomic structures, 
in particular the state. Unlike other approaches to group capitalist countries according to 
the role of the state31, it has also been argued that adding a separate variety of capitalism 
defined exclusively by the role that the state plays, adds little analytical value (Hancké, 
Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007, p. 15). My own approach for bringing the state back in 
therefore will based on empirical evidence from personal interviews with biotechnology 
actors. I will specifically focus on their strategic business decisions and see what type of 
state intervention (or lack thereof) created the specific support structures and institutional 
complementarities that made certain regions in the United States the world’s most 
                                                 




   
 
competitive locations for biotechnology. I will demonstrated that what VoC calls the 
‘comparative institutional advantage’ of the United States was the result of politics and 
policies of a series of neoliberal political decisions to boost the United States 
competitiveness in advanced technologies in general and in biotechnology in particular.  
 
Third, it has been contended that VoC is too static and cannot accommodate for the role of 
conflicts. But whereas VoC stresses the importance of business networks for coordination 
and strategic decision-making for firms in CMEs, they play an important role in LMEs too. 
The rise of the biotechnology industry’s interest group representation into an influential 
lobbying organization, which will be discussed in conjunction with healthcare reform 
efforts (see 6.4 below) is a case in point. That episode will also demonstrate that the 
healthcare system in the United States is more than a support structure that economic actors 
passively take advantage of (a criticism of VoC). Instead, business actors also use business 
networks to wield political influence to bend the institutional support structure in their 
favor (in this case: Keep federal oversight over U.S. healthcare at bay). 
 
Lastly, VoC has been also criticized for being focused on the functional outcome of 
coordination with little room for dysfunctionalities. By contrast, my study will also 
highlight the side effects and unintended consequences of the specific setup for 
coordination. A case in point will be the crucial role that the protection of intellectual 
property rights – a core tenet of neoliberal policies - play for the biotechnology industry. 
But whereas the United States have played a leading role in the extension of such rights, 




   
 
innovation. This negative unintended consequence of too many conflicting patent claims 
has been called a “tragedy of the anti-commons” (Heller and Eisenberg 1998) (see 7.4 
below). 
 
In addition to such debates within the VoC frame of reference, it is also worth looking at 
wholesale alternatives. Some, such as concepts of embeddedness and national innovation 
systems, have already been applied for studying the biotechnology industry, and they will 
therefore be discussed next.  
 
3.5 Embeddedness of the Firm 
 
According to Polanyi (1944), to embed economic activities in society, market mechanisms 
alone are not sufficient, but also required are mechanisms such as reciprocity and 
redistribution. By the 1980s, economic sociologists took this analytical perspective when 
looking at the interaction of the firms and their social context in which they operated. 
Starting point was the work of Mark Granovetter, who argued that  
 
“the anonymous market of neoclassical models is virtually nonexistent in economic 
life...transactions of all kinds are rife with the social connections described...there is 
evidence all around us of the extent to which business relations are mixed up with 





   
 
Embeddedness of the firm, then, emphasizes the role of concrete personal relations and 
structures (such as networks) in creating trust and discouraging deceit. For handling 
complex and idiosyncratic transactions, the hierarchical structure of a vertically integrated 
firm that Chandler (1977) saw so superior, is not necessarily the single best answer. The 
pressure for vertical integration is higher when a company lacks the network of personal 
relations. Small firms that are embedded in a dense network of social relations that overlay 
their business relations can resist the pressure to become integrated into a larger firm 
(Granoveter, p. 507). Conversely, to become vertically integrated, certain requirements 
have to be met with regards to the level of market power, access to capital, and appropriate 
access to regulatory authorities, which is not always possible for a small firm. In the next 
chapter, these theoretical, organizational premises will be gauged against the empirical 
evidence of biotechnology companies’ relationships. This will put a test on the typology of 
VoC, which assumes that in the United States as an LME, the level of formalized, 
contractual relationships is high for advanced technologies such as biotechnology.  
 
Moreover, the theoretical assertions about embeddedness gave rise to a whole range of 
inquiries into the relationship between firms and their regional or local setting. Historically, 
the geographic concentrations of trades and companies in some industries date back for 
hundreds of years. Shipbuilding has always been an activity best carried out close to the 
water and iron and steel industries arose in close proximity to iron ore and coal. During the 
20th century, certain regions became synonymous for certain products, such as Hollywood 
for movies and Detroit for cars. Intellectually, the importance of industrial location can be 




   
 
established economic geography as a scientific field. The removal of the factor location 
from the radar of economic mainstream theories only occurred in the mid-20th century, as a 
result of the surge of neoclassical economics.  
 
More recently, the question of location had its reincarnation in theories about clustering. In 
general, the phenomenon of clustering represents a particular combination of competition 
and cooperation. Clustering is path dependent and the origin and evolution of clusters is 
determined by local and historical circumstances. According to Michael Porter,  
 
“[a] cluster is a form of a network that occurs within a geographic location, in which 
the proximity of firms and institutions ensures certain forms of commonality and 
increases the frequency and impact of interaction.” (Porter 1998, p. 226)  
 
Changes in technology have not diminished the role that location used to play for 
competition. Location still matters, but different from an era in which economic 
development was based on the production of heavy industries. For example, whereas the 
early iron and steel industry had to locate close to iron ore and coal, industries that depend 
on the creation of advanced knowledge and technologies are assumed to be much more 
‘footloose’ as they no longer locate close to raw materials. Such footloose industries rely 
on the highly specialized, institutions, services, and particularly the specific skills of highly 
trained individuals32. These professionals are high in demand, but they have high demands 




   
 
sophisticated customers, and they want the location in which they settle to be a pleasant 
and stimulating environment (Florida 2004, 2005). Paradoxically therefore, due to the 
concentration of these new resources, competitive advantage in a global economy often 
seems to be created and concentrated very locally33.  
 
Biotechnology has been characterized by a high degree of commercialization from its 
earliest stages (Kenney 1986). At the same time, biotechnology relies on public science 
more heavily than other industries (McMillan, Narin, and Deeds 2000). This is a 
contradiction not easily reconciled with VoC’s predictions for advanced technologies 
profiting from market-based coordination mechanisms in LMEs. The cause for this is the 
centrality of knowledge in the biotechnology industry. Because in today’s global 
competition knowledge has become a pivotal asset, its creation and dissemination has 
received ample attention both by theorists and policy makers. Michael Polanyi (1966) 
dubbed the term ‘tacit knowledge’ for all those things people know but cannot put into 
words, and cannot formulate as rules. Such knowledge, which is embodied in people and in 
institutions, tends to be difficult to transfer. The spill-over of tacit knowledge appears to be 
a function of the geographical proximity among the entities and clustering is a consequence 
of this. Clusters are sustained by research institutions, universities, and companies. As 
knowledge becomes the pivotal asset in economic transformations, regional knowledge 
capabilities should be rooted in ‘open science’ generated by publicly funded institutions, 
which is then being exploited by private firms (Cooke 2005, p. 1130).  
                                                                                                                                                    
32 Other works (e.g. Saxenian (1994) dwelled on the regional variations in firm embeddedness caused by 
cultural variation. 




   
 
For a company, it is advantageous to locate some activities into such a conglomerate and to 
profit from the spillover of otherwise hard to transfer tacit knowledge. The idea of such 
spillover is that interaction and the exchange of information within a cluster is 
characterized by an unstructured, broad, and almost automatic ‘local buzz’ (Bathelt, 
Malmberg, and Maskell 2004).  
 
On the other hand, Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) emphasize that innovative 
biotechnological knowledge is not only accessed through an open ‘local buzz’. Instead, 
actors also exchange new knowledge with other creators of new knowledge elsewhere 
through strategic partnerships. Such flows of knowledge along so-called ‘pipelines’ are 
more formalized than the tacit buzz. Only when knowledge can be codified and generalized 
is it possible to exchange knowledge beyond geographic proximity and to participate in 
networks of interregional and international reach. The United States, a rules-based, market-
led LME, should have a comparative institutional advantage for such legalized, formal 
exchange. The relevance of open versus commodified sciences for the contemporary state 
of the industry should therefore be an important topic for biotechnology actors (see 4.6.1 
below).  
 
Looking at the relevance of tacit vis-à-vis formalized knowledge or the dynamic of 
clustering alone will not be sufficient to understanding the dynamics of the biotechnology 
industry for two reasons. First, as pointed out by Ibata-Arens, Dierkens, and Zorn (2006), 
the strength of the subnational focus of such approaches is also its weakness as it ignores 




   
 
also the omission of highly informative sociological studies that explicitly address the 
clustering of the United States biotechnology industry (Powell 1996; Powell et al. 2002; 
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996). And VoC, although looking at complementarities 
on the national level, is short of explanatory power, too. Instead, an historically and 
empirically informed reconstruction of the national political context – the so-called 
national innovation systems - will be suited better to look at how biotechnology clusters 
obtained their position.  
 
Second, studies on clustering and tacit knowledge, like most innovation studies, including 
work inspired by VoC, highlight the supply-side and ignore the demand side (see also 
Carlsson (2006, p. 65)). This is a gap that, after turning to national innovation systems, also 
deserves further theoretical scrutiny.  
 
3.6 National Innovation Systems 
 
Derived from Friedrich List’s concept of ‘national systems of production’ (List 1841), 
systemic approaches to innovation have drawn attention on the institutional structure that 
supports innovative activities within an individual country. Beginning in the late 1980s the 
concept of ‘national systems of innovation’ was developed by different authors. Taking 
Japan (Freeman 1987) and Scandinavian countries (Lundvall 1985) as first examples, the 
concept was subsequently refined through a series of comparative studies (Lundvall 1992, 
Nelson, 1993 #162). These authors have argued that it would be arbitrary to look at the 




   
 
policies pertaining to innovation touch upon issues such as economic policies, education, or 
defense. Besides being responsible for a general macro-economic climate, government 
policies and programs that affect innovation could be either the general support for 
education and research or the specifically tailored programs for certain scientific 
endeavors, technologies, or companies. Path dependence partly intentionally, partly not, 
causes considerable continuities in a nation’s innovation system (Nelson and Rosenberg 
1993, p. 16), which can be defined as 
 
“that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the 
development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework 
within which governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation 
process. As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and 
transfer the knowledge, skills and artifacts, which define new technologies. The element 
of nationality follows not only from the domain of technology policy but also from 
elements of shared language and culture which bind the system together, and from the 
national focus of other policies, laws and regulations which condition the innovative 
environment.” (Metcalfe 1997, p. 289) 
 
While a number of studies on national innovation systems have spelled out in detail the 
factors responsible for the development of the biotechnology industry in the United States, 
they are focused on this country as a ‘Best Practice’ model34 for stimulating the supply-side 
of biotechnological innovation. An inclusion of the demand-side in concrete studies on the 
                                                 




   
 
biotechnology industry, coming from diverse perspectives, such as history (Bud 1998; 
Kenney 1986; Zucker, Darby, and Brewer 1998), political economy (Dolata 2003), or 
comparative studies (Barben 2007; Barben and Abels 2000; Gottweis 1998; Jasanoff 2005) 
is missing. This void is all the more surprising as innovation theories do acknowledge the 
importance of demand side (see for example Carlsson (2002)). It will therefore be 
addressed next. 
 
3.7 Bringing in the Demand Side 
 
For manufacturing industries, it has been long-established orthodox economic knowledge 
that expenditures on R&D correlate with the sales of an industry. Schmookler (1966) 
argued that the anticipated market for a product determines the amount of R&D dedicated 
towards improving a product or reducing its costs. The assumption, according to which all 
information about the demand for a product is engrained in its price, has subsequently been 
refined. For instance, market prices do not reflect how the demand-side is organized and 
what should be a publicly available product or service: Instead,  
 
“What is ‘public’ depends in part on certain technological attributes of products and 
services and in part on what people think is important and valuable”(Nelson and 
Winter 1982, p. 368). 35 
 
                                                 
35 Despite this analysis, Nelson’s subsequent deliberations on national innovation systems are not taking into 




   
 
Others have argued that in a global economy, it is the quality of local demand that matters, 
not its size. Consequently, clusters of linked industries can play a pivotal role in shaping 
the demand side (Porter 1998, p. 212-13). In a similar vein, Meyer-Krahmer and Reger 
(1999) postulated that transnational companies decide upon their foreign investments based 
upon the following criteria:  
 
“Where are the attractive, future-oriented markets in which users can be learned from, 
and which generate a sufficiently high return-on-investment for costly product 
development? Where can these markets be best served by highly developed production, 
logistic and supply structures? Where would it therefore be worthwhile to build up 
value-added in one place? In what countries do attractive markets, highly developed 
production structures and excellent research conditions coincide, so that innovative 
core activities can be concentrated there?”  (ibid., pp. 770-1) 
 
These factors played a role in the decisions of pharmaceutical companies to locate 
increasing part of their business to the United States, as already outlined in chapter 2 (see 
2.7). Moreover, as the following chapters will illustrate, all the above factors are crucial for 
the clustering of biotechnology activities in specific regions in the United States.  
 
More than other capitalist countries, in the United States public needs are increasingly 
provided for by commodified, privatized, goods and services. Health is a case in point, and 
healthcare in the United States is exceptional from all other wealthy industrialized nations 




   
 
89). At the same time, America’s health system is predominantly based on private 
insurance, and despite federal programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, there are still 14 
percent of the population – some 48 million – without any coverage at all (ibid., p. 97). 
Because of these discrepancies, a wide range of health-related services and products, 
including drugs, are being withheld from a considerable share of the population 
(Oberlander et al. 2005; Morone and Jacobs 2005). Nonetheless, Americans account for the 
highest annual per-capita-spending on drugs - $792 - which was 86 percent above the 
OECD average (see OECD 2007, p. 93).  
 
Innovation in healthcare technologies, including biotechnologies, is therefore more 
complicated than the theoretical equilibrium that gauges innovation dependent on 
consumers’ evaluation. One cannot assume a linear development from science to 
technology and to meeting the needs of the demand side36. Although medical 
biotechnologies should ultimately benefit human patients, there are other and quite 
different aspects to the shape of the demand side, too. First, some biotechnologies are 
purchased by pharmaceutical companies, based on their strategies for developing new 
drugs. In these cases biotechnologies are only indirectly connected to the patients’ 
demands. Second, there is a doctor, whose advice about which drugs benefit the patient 
best should be impartial with regards to benefitting himself. Third, the doctor’s advice is 
only consequential if the drugs recommended are indeed accessible for the patient. 
Therefore, if the patient does not or cannot pay for medicines on his own, the institutional 
                                                 
36 The complexity of healthcare provisions dovetails with the systemic approach by Edquist and Hommen 
(1999) who describe innovation as a non-linear chain link model. Yet they do so without addressing the 




   
 
setup of the health insurance system in place will be crucial for whether or not a patient’s 
demand for a drug will be met.  
 
As a result, there are partly alternative, partly competing modes of interaction between, for 
instance, producers of scientific knowledge and patients; between pharmaceutical 
companies and doctors; or between healthcare maintenance organizations (HMOs) and the 
government. None of these feedback loops have been sufficiently studied with regards to 
biotechnology innovation. Moreover, all of them acquire crucial coordination efforts of 
firms. I therefore argue that the complementarities of the provision of healthcare in a 
country and the comparative advantage that it provides for advanced health technologies, 
including biotechnologies, are crucial. The standard VoC approach, which postulates the 
complementarities between the United States’ liberal market economy and biotechnology, 
should therefore be extended to the demand side for biotechnologies to explain the 
country’s comparative advantage.  
 
 
3.8 Conclusions and Outlook 
 
The biotechnology industry, I argue, is an example for the intended, as well as the 
unintended consequences that neoliberal market-driven transformations bring about. 
Theories about creative destruction, variations among capitalist societies, the 
embeddedness of economic actors, and of national innovation systems, all bring to the fore 
useful aspects of the evolution of the biotechnology industry and the preeminent position of 




   
 
effect that biotechnology may also have. It may very well be that successful, competitive 
biotechnology companies become embedded within certain regions where they create 
localized benefits. It may also be that this adds to the comparative advantage that the 
United States has in attracting internationally competing industries, such as transnational 
pharmaceutical companies. From a neoliberal viewpoint, both theoretically and practically, 
this would be a successful outcome. At the same time, these economic activities may not 
only have the beneficial effects mentioned above, but also puts an extra strain on society at 
large, as they add to inequalities in healthcare.  
 
I therefore argue to put the competitive advantage of the biotechnology industry in the 
United States into this broader context. Policy-makers continue to boast the supply-side 
successes that are the consequences of their neoliberal policies, while ignoring other 
consequences. Such myopia is similar to the initial enthusiasm about deregulating the 
financial industry and the comparative advantage that the United States – and particularly 
firms operating in the organizational and regulatory environment of Wall Street - enjoyed 
thanks to new innovative financial vehicles. Only when this finance-led economic bubble 
burst were these neoliberal, market-led policies being criticized. They were, however, a 
core component of the original neoliberal policy prescriptions of the American variety of 
neoliberal capitalism.  
 
This also demonstrates the modified role of the state, which is not withering away, but is 
supposed to fulfill new tasks instead. The neoliberal state, while deliberately withdrawing 




   
 
competition. Domestically, this ‘leaner, meaner’ state is considered to provide a scientific-
economic framework – higher education, supply and demand for advanced technologies, 
rules to govern economic actors and financial markets – which allows private actors to 
compete at the global level. Internationally, states compete with each other to provide a 
most favorable environment for these private actors.  
 
Against this theoretical backdrop, I will analyze how the biotechnology industry was 
shaped by the evolution of neoliberal, supply-side-driven economic policies in the United 
States. The path dependence of certain key federal policies, related to military as well as 
other scientific research, shaped first the landscape of scientific excellence and second, the 
clustering of the fledgling biotechnology industry in the United States. Moreover, these 
interventions triggered competitive advantage and clustering to the effect that a few local 
biotechnology industry clusters in the United States have gained an overwhelming global 
competitive advantage.  
 
Over time, biotechnology companies increasingly enjoyed competitively favorable terms in 
the United States from another crucial institution of the American political economy, the 
privatized, deregulated, healthcare system. In a similar vein, as the deregulation of 
America’s financial system provided the complementarities that made the country the 
world’s most competitive location for global finances (with all the consequences), 
America’s deregulated healthcare system is crucial for making the American variety of 
neoliberal capitalism so conducive for the biotechnology industry. My final analysis will 




   
 
biotechnology innovation regime. Yet the first step will be to look in the next chapter at the 
role of private corporate actors in this regime and discuss how biotechnology companies 




   
 
 
Chapter 4: Creative Destruction and Institutional Support 
Structures 
 
“Spectacular prizes much greater than would have been necessary to call forth the 
particular effort are thrown to a small majority of winners, thus propelling much more 
efficaciously than a more equal and more ‘just’ distribution would, the activity of that 
large majority of businessmen who receive in return very modest compensation or 
nothing or less than nothing, and yet do their utmost because they have the big prizes 
before their eyes and overrate their chances of doing equally well. Similarly, the 
threats are addressed to incompetence. But though the incompetent men and the 
obsolete methods are in fact eliminated, sometimes very promptly, sometimes with a 
lag, failure also threatens or actually overtakes many an able man, thus whipping up 
everyone, again much more efficaciously than a more equal and more ‘just’ system of 
penalties would.”  




In the past, the typical ‘textbook development’ (Kenney 1986) of a biotechnology company 
would have unfolded more or less as follows: a university professor who makes an 
invention decides to commercialize it outside of the university. While staying in academia, 
he sets up a company with the help of venture capital (VC). As the new corporation does 




   
 
be sold with considerable profit when the corporation is launched in an initial public 
offering (IPO) at the stock market. This chapter will explain how the world of today’s 
biotechnology industry has grown more complex. Starting out with the relational view on 
the firm as postulated in the VoC-approach I will analyze how business actors try to pursue 
their individual interests under the circumstances of a given set of institutions throughout 
different spheres of political economy. Taking advantage of different parts of the 
institutional support system that surrounds them, biotechnology actors rationalize their 
behavior and make strategic business decisions. This way, looking at their business 
considerations will confirm the three claims made at the outset: The centrality of big 
pharma’s drug development paradigm; the support infrastructure shaped by federal 
policies; and the crucial importance of the U.S. healthcare market. 
 
As explained in the previous chapter (see 3.4.2), VoC postulates that liberal market 
economies like the United States provide a comparative institutional advantage for 
industries engaged in rapid innovation. LMEs rely more extensively on market relations to 
resolve coordination challenges than it is the case in CMEs. Consequently, in these spheres 
LMEs can be characterized by institutional support structures for market-forms of 
coordination (Hall and Soskice 2001, pp. 27-31). The empirical evidence from interviews 
with biotechnology actors will be addressed according to the following spheres of the 
economy: 
 
1) Financial systems and markets for corporate governance: Financing of firms is reliant 




   
 
company based on publicly available information. And while for new firms in high-
technology fields venture capital often provides funding and guidance, corporate 
governance structures in LMEs are dominated by publicly traded firms whose current 
profitability is the most crucial dimension for performance, and reflected in the share price. 
 
2) Industrial relations and education and training:  As there is considerable overlap 
between these two spheres, they are addressed together. Against the backdrop of firms in 
LMEs relying on individual bargaining between employers and employees and competition 
in the labor market leading to a high level of fluidity, employees are hired and fired easily. 
Employees, anticipating many shifting jobs, acquire a high level of general skills that is 
transferrable between employments. And while firms encourage their employees to acquire 
marketable skills, this institutional setup will also leave some firms short of employees 
with highly specialized, company-specific skills. 
 
3) Inter-company relations: LMEs have a high degree on standard market relationships 
based on enforceable formal contracts. Since firms are vulnerable to fluctuation in short-
term profitability, they find it more difficult to make long-term commitments to providers 
of inputs as well as to customers. At the same time, particularly in the United States, 
rigorous antitrust regulation prevents companies from relational contracts, for instance for 
joint developments of technologies. Companies in LMEs rely on the licensing or 
acquisition of innovations, mechanisms which make necessary an effective system of 




   
 
LMEs technology transfer takes place through the movement of highly trained staff from 
one firm to another (or from research institution to private firm).  
 
After an overview of the companies sampled (4.2), the query is organized around how 
these economic spheres in the United States as a liberal market economy are structured and 
how biotechnology firms make their rational decisions based on the support from them: 
Financial systems and markets for corporate governance (4.3); Industrial relations and 
education and training (4.4); and Inter-company relations (4.5). As it will turn out, VoC is 
too unspecific for a complete understanding of the comparative advantage that the 
biotechnology industry in the United States enjoys vis-à-vis other nations. To begin with, it 
has to do with the nature of the industry at hand and that the reference industry for most 
biotechnology firms is the pharmaceutical industry. Drug development is an idiosyncratic 
process that does not comply with the notion of rapid innovation. Despite the high level of 
creative destruction, the development of new medicines remains a very long and 
unpredictable process in which a resilient, ‘old’ blockbuster drug business model continues 
to have the upper hand over other scientifically more promising, approaches. This is 
illustrated by a closer look on the genomics industry.  
 
In addition, there is the nature of the institutional complementarities that are offered to 
biotechnology firms in the United States. In some spheres of the political economy the 
comparative advantage that biotechnology in this country enjoyed is due to the fact that 
there is more informal coordination (for instance in finance) than the model of a liberal 




   
 
to cluster informally around crucial support structures, such as research institutions, human 
resources, and capital (4.6). In fact, the clustering of the biotechnology industry can only be 
explained because of the relevance of such informal coordination. In other spheres of the 
political economy, for instance the direct funding for R&D (4.7), biotechnology takes 
much more advantage of formalized, state-created coordination structures. Interviews will 
highlight those, but also the crucial role of state interventions with regards to the regulation 
of drugs and the healthcare system (4.8). The chapter concludes by outlining those 
dimension of the United States as a liberal market economy that the VoC approach could 
not account for (4.9). These will be further investigated in their historical context in 
chapters 5 and 6.  
 
4.2 Overview of Sampled Companies and Results 
 
Before discussing the substantive issues that seem to be prominently motivating the 
industry and its actors, a brief quantitative description of the companies included in this 
survey will be presented. Overall, more than half of all surveyed biotechnology firms were 
engaged in drug discovery and biomedical research. This group was dominant in all five 













Table 4.1: Types of Biotechnology Companies Surveyed 








SF % SD % 
Biomed/Drug 
Discovery* 
75 15 18 10 13 19 52.4 50.0 54.5 40.0 52.0 63.3 
Diagnostics 13 1 1 3 5 3 9.1 3.3 3.0 12.0 20.0 10.0 
Biomed. Devices 14 3 4 2 2 3 9.8 20.0 12.1 8.0 8.0 10.0 
Contract 
Research/Services 
26 7 4 10 2 3 18.2 13.3 12.1 40.0 8.0 10.0 
Pharmaceutical 
Company 
7 2 4 0 0 1 4.9 6.7 12.1 0.0 0.0 3.3 
Environment/ 
Agbio 
8 2 2 0 3 1 5.6 6.7 6.1 0.0 12.0 3.3 
SUM 143 30.0 33.0 25.0 25.0 30.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*inc. genomics 
Biotechnology is a relatively new industry so that the majority of companies surveyed were 
less than 10 years old (Table 4.2).  
 


















 1 -5 10 6 9 7 10 42 33.3 18.2 36.0 28.0 33.3 29.4 
 6 - 10 8 15 7 9 13 52 26.7 45.5 28.0 36.0 43.3 36.4 
  11-15 6 8 3 4 6 27 20.0 24.2 12.0 16.0 20.0 18.9 
 16 -20 2 4 3 5 1 15 6.7 12.1 12.0 20.0 3.3 10.5 
 > 20 4 0 3 0 0 7 13.3 0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 
average age: 14 10 9 10  10.2       
still existing 2 
years later 22 25 18 20 19 104 73.3 75.8 72.0 80 63.3 72.7 
not existing 2 









They were also relatively small companies with the majority of them having less than 100 
employees and (excluding two outliers - a multinational pharmaceutical corporation and a 
transnational CRO, each with several thousand employees) an average staff of 94 (Table 
4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: Company Size 












10 or less 7 2 4 4 2  23.3 6.1 16.0 16.0 6.7 13.6 
11 to 50 14 12 15 7 11  46.7 36.4 60.0 28.0 36.7 41.5 
51 to 100 5 10 1 7 5  16.7 30.3 4.0 28.0 16.7 19.1 
101 to 200 1 4 4 2 7  3.3 12.1 16.0 8.0 23.3 12.6 
> 200 3 5 1 5 5  10.0 15.2 4.0 20.0 16.7 13.2 
average empl. 162* 276* 53 115.0 117.0        
average empl. 47** 139** 53 115.0 117.0 94.2       
* Including outlier companies (NY 26 and MA 33)  
**Excluding outlier companies (NY 26 and MA 33)  
 
4.3 Indicators of Finances and Corporate Governance 
 
In LMEs, the predominant type of corporate governance is the firm that is publicly traded 
on equity markets. The value of these companies’ shares is a transparent reflection of 
current profitability. Biotechnology firms do not easily fit into this pattern. As for the 
ownership of the corporations, two characteristics are noteworthy. First, a large majority 




   
 
foreign companies constituted 9 and 6 percent, respectively. Second, with the exception of 
Massachusetts and San Francisco, a majority of companies was not yet traded publicly on 
the stock market, but held privately (Table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4: Ownership 
Ownership (Percent) NY  MA MD  SF SD AVGE 
Independent 83.3 75.8 92.0 88.0 86.7 85.2 
subsidiary of US company 13.3 13.3 8.0 0.0 10.0 8.9 
subsidiary of foreign company 3.3 13.3 0.0 12.0 3.3 6.4 
Private 60.0 39.4 72.0 48.0 60.0 55.9 
Public 40.0 57.6 28.0 52.0 40.0 43.5 
 
 
Moreover, as biotechnology firms were spending half of their operational expenses on 
R&D, profitability was normally nowhere within reach. Instead, 77 percent of companies 
surveyed were making losses (Table 4.5). 
 
Table 4.5: Profitability and R&D Expenditures 
Cash Flow MD NY MA SD SF AVGE 
profitable: 29.2 23.3 18.0 23.3 16.7 23.5 
Loss 70.8 76.7 82.0 76.7 83.3 76.5 
R&D as % of operational costs 46.3 50.8 61.2 68.6 50.9 56.7 
 
 
The different approach towards finance is reflected by the fact that biotechnology managers 
seem to worry much less about profitability as about the ‘burn rate’, the velocity at which a 




   
 
‘burn’ money at a rate of at least $5 million per year37. Drug development is costly and 
companies are expected to move along as quickly as possible towards the clinical trial 
phase. These clinical trials to obtain regulatory and hence market approval by the FDA 
require even larger financial stamina and the annual ‘burn rate’ regularly would go up to 
$15-20 million. For a company with several drug candidates in clinical trials, annual losses 
could easily reach $100 million.  
 
4.3.1 Venture Capital as a Source of Financing 
 
In light of these stakes, the institutional support that biotechnology firms look for normally 
does not come from public resources or from conventional banks with loans. Instead, 69 
percent of companies relied on those sources of capital – venture capital and angel 
investors - that were willing to take on the extra risk (Table 4.6).  
 
Table 4.6: Source of Finances 
Source NY MA MD SF SD AVGE 
Angel investors 10.0 12.5 20.0 24.0 20.0 17.3 
local VC 3.3 3.1 16.0 48.0 26.7 19.4 
total VC 33.3 50.0 36.0 76.0 63.3 51.7 
 
 
This financing structure is revealing as it exceeds the contractual market mechanisms 
postulated by VoC for the LME of the United States. Why do companies conceive of VC 
as an attractive source of financing? In terms of coordination efforts, many biotechnology 
                                                 





   
 
companies saw venture financing as a good way to obtain money with limited bureaucratic 
efforts. How this worked was exemplified by a biomedical device company that developed 
a hand-held blood glucose monitor for people with diabetes: 
  
“Getting VC is no problem, because the founder of the company is known to the VC 
scene, and diabetes presents a huge market.” (Interview MD 19) 
 
This quote highlights two important criteria for VC funding in absence of tangible 
products. First, personal, non-market relationships with investors is helpful. This aspect 
will be elaborated further when I talk about the logic of clustering, specifically the 
proximity between biotechnology firms and sources of finance, such as VC and angel 
investors (see below). Second, from the view of the investor, entering a potentially 
rewarding market is more relevant than current profitability. In general technological 
innovation financed by VC is an extrapolation. Instead of current supply and demand for a 
specific product, it is based on future expectations for markets, earnings and profits. In this 
sense, it is like other financial derivatives, such as stock options, bonds, or futures. The 
absence of tangible products is also the reason why intellectual property claims are of such 
importance. They become the bargaining chips (or in today’s finance-dominated language: 
securitization of assets) for the innovators and the providers of capital.  
 
This mechanism of financing is prone to a considerable degree of volatility. For instance, 
when VC funding doubled from 1999 to 2000, which was fuelled by the dotcom boom 




   
 
investors lost their money as the speculative internet bubble deflated by the early 2000s, 
even solid biotechnology firms suffered from the receding availability of VC funds. The 
VC industry continued to appreciate investing in biotechnology companies and, for a while, 
the sector bounced back. Not only has venture funding for biotechnology gone up to 
unprecedented levels in absolute terms, but biotechnology also attracts a relatively larger 
share of the overall VC (Table 4.7). 
 
Table 4.7: VC Funding for Biotechnology 
Year  Total VC 
(million $) 
VC for Biotech 
(million $) 
Biotech Share  
of Total VC (%) 
1995 7,996.00 829.00 10.4 
1996 11,265.00 1,185.00 10.5 
1997 14,871.00 1,414.00 9.5 
1998 21,079.00 1,584.00 7.5 
1999 54,048.00 2,104.00 3.9 
2000 104,768.00 4,250.00 4.1 
2001 40,577.00 3,473.00 8.6 
2002 22,010.00 3,237.00 14.7 
2003 19,777.00 3,672.00 18.6 
2004 22,468.00 4,267.00 19.0 
2005 23,173.00 3,916.00 16.9 
2006 26,741.00 4,594.00 17.2 
2007 30,886.00 5,239.00 17.0 
2008 28,298.00 4,500.00 15.9 
Source: National Venture Capital Association 
  
Interviewed VC industry representatives indicated that, as a consequence of the internet 
boom and bust, there is a trend in the VC community away from ‘dabbling in biotech’. 
Instead, there are fewer, more specialized, and larger funds managing investments of up to 
several hundred million dollars. To spread the risk, VC firms initially invests only $1 to 7 
million in one particular company, preferably with other VC firms until the whole VC 




   
 
request a share of the company, usually about 50 percent. As VC funds have a finite life 
cycle, typically ten to twelve years, VC firms generally pursue one of the two exit 
strategies to recoup their upfront investment and a profit: Either by selling the stakes in the 
company, which normally generates a lower return on investment (ROI). Or through an 
Initial Public Offering (IPO), which is the more profitable alternative. At the same time, the 
chances of IPOs depend upon the general economic climate and whether stock markets are 
conducive to it.38  
 
In general, only one in six companies ever goes public and one in three is acquired. As VC 
firms aim at an ROI of 15 to 20 percent annually, such high returns can only be achieved 
when the inevitable attrition – creative destruction – of companies is carefully managed. A 
most profitable allocation of resources cannot be achieved within one company alone, but 
only for a fund as a whole. Biotechnology corporate executives repeatedly complained 
about the short-sightedness of VC executives who were pulling the plug out of good 
companies. But from the viewpoint of the VC this is just the necessary spark for of 
capitalism’s perennial gale of creative destruction. Company closures and mergers can be 
ordered at the discretion of the VC fund and may be necessary to keep the losses limited. 
The ultima ratio for the venture capitalist, in other words, is to compensate for the 
inevitable losers by nurturing a few companies into big winners.  
                                                 
38 For example, in 1999, the year of the dot.com boom, there were 477 IPOs, 270 of which were backed by 





   
 
Especially for the smaller and younger start-up companies interviewed, many of which 
were previously receiving small-scale public funding, attracting VC was considered a sign 
of maturation. VC firms not only provide money, but as part of the nurturing environment 
that they want to create for their investment they also help with managerial issues. VC 
firms tend to dominate the corporation’s governance by nominating the majority of the 
Boards of Directors. They can assist the management in creating and implementing their 
business and product development strategies, as well as in recruiting key executives and in 
undertaking additional financing initiatives, such as arranging corporate partnerships. In 
VoC terminology, venture capital is an effective tool for the coordination problem with 
regards to where and how to invest money into innovative activites, while also keeping a 
close grip on the performance of the investment.  It is part of the conflicting business 
rationales and strategies, that the interests of biotechnology firms obtaining VC and the VC 
firms handing it out are not always congruent.  
 
4.4 Industrial Relations and Education and Training  
 
VOC postulates that the comparative institutional advantage of LMEs in high-tech 
industries is based on the fact that the interest of employers and highly skilled employees 
tend to coalesce, and that they have less need for a well-regulated framework for 
bargaining between capital and labor (Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007, p. 20). A 
comprehensive investigation of the role of organized labor in high-tech industries is 
missing. To the best of my knowledge, the reason for this is that unlike in creative 




   
 
employees in high-tech sectors is almost non-existent. Indeed, in interviews conducted with 
the biotechnology industry there was hardly a distinction to be made between owners of 
companies and employees. The distinction between owner and employee of a company is 
all the more fluid as, particularly for senior management, shares in the company by which 
they were employed represented a considerable part of the remuneration package.  
 
Likewise, the salaries of employees in the biotechnology industry tend to be higher than in 
most other U.S. industries. In 2006, they earned $70,959 nationally, on average. While 
being lower than average salaries in the pharmaceutical industry ($ 86,892) and in 
information technologies ($ 76,257), the earnings of biotechnology industry employees 
were nearly $29,000 more than wages in the overall U.S. private sector (Battelle 2008).  
 
The remuneration structure reflects the high level of formal education. Although VoC 
assumes that companies in LMEs due to the fluid labor market would be in need of 
‘generalists’, the bar is considerable higher for people in the biotechnology industry: In the 
case of the companies surveyed, only 13 percent of employees were without a college 
degree, whereas 45 percent had a masters or doctoral degree (Table 4.8). 
 
Table 4.8 Educational Level  
Education Level Employees 
(Percent) 
NY MA MD SF SD AVGE 
PhD 26.4 29.8 25.3 21.0 32.4 27.0 
MSc 20.4 17.6 18.2 15.6 16.8 17.7 
BSc 42.0 42.1 44.8 46.2 38.7 42.8 





   
 
 
This high level of academic, formalized training was a reflection of the fact that almost half 
the employees of the companies interviewed were engaged in R&D, which is more 
training-intense than other tasks such as production or marketing: 
 
Table 4.9 Employees per Tasks 
Tasks (%) NY MA MD SF SD AVGE 
Management 16.0 12.6 16.8 13.8 11.6 14.2 
Administration 10.0 15.2 9.5 16.3 11.2 12.4 
R&D 43.0 47.9 42.6 42.3 56.6 46.5 
Production 14.0 12.2 11.7 9.8 11.5 11.8 
Sales 2.0 2.4 5.6 11.2 2.1 4.7 
Others 15.0 9.7 13.8 6.6 7.0 10.4 
 
 
Equally important, despite the high educational level, companies provided a range of 
different opportunities for their staff to continue their training. Almost all companies 
conducted some kind of in-house training, although not of the level of intensity that is 
known for instance from vocational training programs in companies in CMEs such as 
Germany. A high percentage of firms would offer tuition reimbursement to employees as 
incentive to attend classes at a college or university. An expression of the dynamism and 
the fluidity of the biotechnology industry labor market was the considerable turnover of 
staff leaving to obtain a higher degree. Moreover, in  absence of inter-firm agreements to 
invest in training of human resources, in LMEs firms are encouraged to poach each others’ 
most qualified employees. Further below I will explain that this is indeed the case, which is 





   
 
Table 4.10: Companies Providing Training (%) 
Types of Training NY MD MA SF SD AVGE 
Staff Leave for Higher Degree 30.0 39.4 28.0 40 36.7 34.8 
Tuition Reimbursement 10.0 72.7 60.0 32 40.0 42.9 
External 60.0 78.8 76.0 52 80.0 69.4 
Internal 100.0 93.9 76.0 84 86.7 88.1 
 
4.5 Inter-Company Relations  
 
The United States as a liberal market economy should have a comparative advantage for 
biotechnology firms due to the institutionalized support structure for market-based 
relationships between economic actors. In LMEs, it is postulated, firms coordinate their 
business predominantly through enforceable formal contracts. But as they are measured in 
terms of short-term profitability, the long-term commitments are harder to come by. 
Likewise, due to antitrust regulation, particularly in the United States, inter-firm 
collaborations for joint technology development are less common than licensing 
agreements and acquisition of innovation. In looking at how firms deal with these 
challenges, various business models of biotechnology firms will come to the fore. Whereas 
the most competitive and potentially most rewarding segment was the development of 
drugs (in which half of all surveyed companies took part), other firms were hedging their 
bets on less risky grounds. Yet it became apparent that the financial muscles of large 
pharmaceutical companies continued to dominate the value-added chain of drug 
development. Along this chain, coordination has become more complex due to the variety 
of actors and business models. The new more networked R&D setup, still has large 
pharmaceutical companies occupying the commanding and coordinating heights, whereas  




   
 
 
4.5.1. Drug Development Hight-Tech Gamble  
This segment of the biotechnology industry was characterized by the general spirit of a 
highly risky high-tech race to the market, with a potentially high reward. ‘Creative 
destruction’, a certain level of attrition is being taken for granted by both the providers of 
money and by the people who work in the industry. One quantifiable aspect of this was that 
two years after the interviews, 27 percent of the companies surveyed were no longer in 
existence (Table 4.11).  
 







Pharmaceutical  Environmental/ 
Agbio 
27% 35% 23% 21% 15% 29% 0% 
 
This high turnover rate can be a sign of companies’ failure, but also the opposite. Many 
managers openly stated that being taken over by a larger entity is a desirable outcome:  
 
“If there is independent technology development, the most attractive way of growing a 
company is going public. But there is no way to prevent a company takeover. Quite the 
contrary, success makes it even more likely.” (Interview SF 18) 
 
The turnover rate was facilitated by the liberal, market-based, support structures of the 
United States. Companies are built, bought, sold, and dismantled according to short-term 
strategic needs. The high dynamism of the biotechnology industry is reflected particularly 




   
 
interviews, more than one third of the companies surveyed did no longer exist. Included in 
this survey were also 15 genomics firms - representing 20 percent of all firms engaged in 
biomedical and drug discovery research39. They formed a particularly noteworthy subset in 
this survey. As no other segment of the biotechnology industry, genomics firms are the 
embodiment of capitalism’s creative destruction and dynamism. And, as explained in 
chapter 2 (see section 2.6 above) the rise of the genomics industry was a counter-factual 
case in point that in LMEs the value of corporations is a transparent measurement of 
current economic performance. Rather, the business of genomics companies rested on a 
technological potential that became extrapolated into a huge market validation so that 
adding value towards a prospective product becomes more important than current 
profitability. For a while, it even looked as if this industry may turn the table in the power 
relations of the pharmaceutical business. But when the scientific promises of the industry 
did not measure up to economic expectations, in the end the blockbuster drug model of Big 
Pharma prevailed.  
 
A few of the genomics companies included in the survey will be scrutinized in detail as 
they reveal much about the boom and the bust of a new technology. I will begin with a 
success story of one rapidly expanding Massachusetts-based, genomics company: It was 
founded in 1993 by a VC person who attracted two scientists from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technologies and from Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York. The 
company developed genomics technologies for drugs against inflammatory diseases, 
cancer, and metabolic diseases such as obesity and diabetes, all of which were supposed to 
                                                 




   
 
be launched in the United States first. However, a decade into its existence, the company 
did not have any commercial product, despite having spent $1 billion on research. In fact, 
the company had ten products in clinical trials, but was still at least two years away from 
market approval. Serious financial backing continued to come in from 20 strategic alliances 
with pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. These R&D and licensing agreements 
were worth some $1.8 billion. Endowed with such deep pockets, the genomics company 
started to ‘buy its way up’ and acquired other entities that had experience in drug 
development and marketing to become a fully integrated drug company.  
 
Yet also for this successful genomics company, translating genetic information into disease 
mechanisms, drug targets and lead substances, all of which are more value-adding in the 
logic of drug development, turned out to be much more complicated than initially expected. 
After being a benefactor, the firm ultimately became a victim of the perennial gale of 
creative destruction and ultimately ceased to exist. In May 2008, it was acquired by a 
Japanese pharmaceutical company that paid almost $9 billion to get a foot into the market 
for cancer drugs in the United States. And while this was still less than a third of what the 
company’s shares were worth during the heydays of the genomics boom in 2000, at the 
time of the takeover the Japanese drug multinational paid a 53 percent premium for the 
publicly traded shares.  
 
Others firms were less lucky. As in every case of speculative overvaluation, those who 
came late into the game were most likely to get burned first. This was the case with one 




   
 
exploit commercially patents on human genetic information. When it became clear that 
there are less genes and a smaller market for genetic information, the company changed 
business model towards drug discovery and screening technology in 2001. For this, it 
deliberately targeted a receptor that is responsible for the efficacy of 50 percent of all 
drugs, and 30 percent of top selling drugs such as those against cardiovascular diseases. At 
the time of the interview in 2002 the company had just laid off 40 percent of its staff, but 
that could not prevent its closure a year later.  
 
Another genomics corporation was able to raise $90 million in an IPO during the days of 
the stock market’s enthusiasm for genomics in 2000. However, already two years later the 
company was running out of finances and was at the brink of closure because, as a manager 
said,  
 
“some deals got cancelled at a very late stage because Big Pharma had already 
overspent on genomics.” (Interview MD 17) 
 
Companies that were successfully managing the genomics downturn could no longer 
assume indefinite support from a big spender but had to get by with less as investors 
became more scrutinizing and staged their payments more cautiously (Interview MD 25). 
In 2004, at the deepest point of the depression of genomic companies, the market value of 
companies was sometimes less than the money they had in the bank. One company 





   
 
Not only genomics firms, in general the majority of biotechnology companies engaged in 
drug development indicated that they ultimately depended on a big pharmaceutical 
corporation. Often the biotechnology company provided a technology (e.g. a technology 
platform, a lead for a drug, or an early-stage drug candidate) and received milestone 
payments for moving that technology up the value-added chain. In general, the closer to 
market approval, the higher the stakes become and royalty and milestone payments can at 
times reach tens of millions of dollars annually. Considerable amounts of capital are being 
invested – and destroyed – particularly in the course of clinical trials. Biotechnology 
companies with several drug candidates in clinical trials easily lost $100 million annually. 
Sometimes, the destruction of capital went on for an amazingly long period, as one 
surveyed company accumulated $80 million in debts over a period of 20 years. Another 
surveyed loss-making company was ultimately taken over by a larger biotechnology 
corporation to co-develop a drug. But despite the staggering amount of $1.3 billion for 
which the loss-making company was acquired, the company continued to ‘burn money’ 
(Interview MA 21). Obviously, for biotechnology companies to stay afloat during the long 
and unpredictable process of drugs to the market requires the deep pockets of 
pharmaceutical firms. 
 
A somewhat different approach was pursued by those few biotechnology companies that 
wanted to become a full-fledged pharmaceutical company on their own. Most times, they 
relied on a continuous substantial cash flow from drugs already marketed. One 
Massachusetts firm surveyed (MA 16) exemplified what it took to coordinate successfully 




   
 
by a New York professor and a Wall Street investor, the company raised $20 million in 
VC. Investors, enticed by the company’s strategic intellectual property portfolio of 80 
patents issued in the United States and another 150 pending, rendered the IPO and a second 
offering worth $130 million. This money allowed acquiring a company whose product had 
already been marketed in Europe. Revenues and technologies were then used for a 
bootstrap strategy: First, obtaining regulatory approval also in the United States for the 
product already marketed in Europe. Second, using the revenues from the U.S. market to 
develop technologies further and becoming a full-fledged pharmaceutical company. Part of 
this strategy is an institutional arbitrage between healthcare markets, which will be 
revisited further below (see 6.2). 
 
In their race to the market, companies that compete in a similar field of technologies watch 
each other closely. The company that is able to raise the largest amount of money will be 
the fastest to propel its technology further towards a marketable product, or, in the words of 
one participant 
 
“Money buys you time. More money buys you more time.”  (Interview NY 27)  
 
Clearly, an institutional environment that allows time and money being so easily 
transferred into one another, is advantageous for industries with rapid innovative turnover. 
At the same time the biotechnology industry heavily depends on patenting. Patents – the 
core of LMEs instruments to regulate market-based exchange in biotechnologies – play an 




   
 
Critical patents may block certain technological trajectories for competitors which then 
may have to invent around these intellectual property barriers. And although companies 
saw this as a nuisance at some times, they also profited from it at others and accept this as 
parts of the rules that are laid down:  
 
“We spend a considerable amount of our time and energy here to invent around other 
people’s patents. But that’s life.” (Interview MA 1) 
 
As a rule of thumb, the faster the pace of innovation and the less tangible, the more arduous 
the protection of intellectual property turns out to be for the innovation process as a whole. 
The genomics industry was a case in point (see 2.6). 
 
On the other hand, patents allowed for a variety of business models that would otherwise 
not have been possible: For example, one publicly traded drug development company (SD 
4) had filed several hundred patent applications on its platform technology, which was 
supposed to be used in the development of drugs against obesity, psychic disorder, heart 
failure, and inflammatory diseases. These huge prospective markets in the United States 
and other industrialized countries made it possible for the company, while continuously 
losing more than $25 million per year, to raise over $320 million in VC and from the stock 
market. 
 
Somewhat similar was the case of another drug development company surveyed (MA 23), 




   
 
potentially highly profitable market for drugs against male erectile dysfunction and heart 
failure; Second a large portfolio of patents as the company had filed 240 patents globally 
and was issued 42 in the United States alone. The purpose of this so-called ‘Me-Too-Drug’ 
company was to improve or invent around proprietary versions of already existing drugs. 
Towards this end, the company received funding from a number of large pharmaceutical 
corporations. The rationale of these large pharmaceutical players was to check potential 
competitors, as all stakeholders in the drug development company would obtain the rights 
to co-marketing in the United States. 
 
4.5.2 Biotech Laying Low: Reduced Risk, Alternative Routes, Lower Profits   
Whereas the high-tech-high reward business model was dominant, it was not the only one 
that rational business actors in the biotechnology industry pursued. Since the road towards 
FDA drug approval is long, costly, and risky, corporate actors deploy various business 
models to hedge against the risk of all-or-nothing. This also leads to specializations along 
the value-added chain. At the lowest rank of the ladder were those companies that keep 
scientific research and technological development afloat. Servicing the most innovative 
firms, they provide the nuts and bolts of biotechnological innovation, products such as 
reagents, biological markers and testing animals, as well as services such as biomedical 
data management. It may not have been sheer coincidence therefore that two biotechnology 
managers in California, whose companies provide research tools for the biomedical 
research community, referred to the state’s gold rush history when justifying their current 





   
 
“We are selling picks and shovels to the miners.” (Interview SF 7) 
“There are a lot of gold diggers out here; we want to provide the shovels.”  (Interview 
SD 8) 
 
As these corporations deliver real products, they were generally profitable. While some 
firms were complacent with the niche that they had carved out for themselves, there were 
also those servicing companies that wanted to reinvest their revenues to climb up higher on 
the ladder of added value and, for instance, carry out research for discovering drug targets. 
Such ‘bootstrap strategy’ for growing a company based on revenues may take longer, but 
has the advantage of maintaining independent from investors’ requests.  
 
One other company (SF 10) that decided against engaging into the risky business of drug 
discovery instead focused on technologies of how drugs are delivered in the human body. 
This biotechnology firm worked with already approved drugs, improved their delivery 
mechanisms then sold them back to a pharmaceutical company. Somewhat similar is the 
approach of a company (SF 15) that licensed the technologies from different companies to 
produce interferon. By selling interferon medicines in the United States and generating 
revenues, the company financed research on interferon-based medicines for new 
indications, which then have to clear the regulatory hurdle. Using an already approved drug 
and finding a new disease for it to cure is a common, cost-saving practice throughout the 
pharmaceutical industry40. It is particularly attractive for monoclonal antibodies such as 




   
 
chemical molecules many regular drugs are based upon and, consequently harder to 
synthesize. Hence, for biologics, finding a new disease for a known drug rather than 
finding a new drug for a known disease is even more appealing than for chemically derived 
drugs. 
 
Despite these different business models service companies were in general more profitable 
than companies gauged by the potential of their technologies for a speculatively hugely 
profitable product in the future. By the same token, revenue-based service businesses are 
never traded for the huge amounts of money that the latter often muster.  
 
4.5.3 Middle Grounds: From Diagnostics to Agricultural Biotechnology 
About one fifth of all biotechnology companies surveyed were engaged in activities related 
to biomedical devices and diagnostics. Also here a majority indicated the overwhelming 
relevance of the Unites States healthcare market for the destiny of their business. The 
biggest difference to the drug development business model was the lower regulatory 
hurdle, which did not include clinical trials over several years with hundreds of 
participants. Hence, it was easier for a company to come to the market with for instance a 
diagnostics kit than with a new drug. In this sense, financial burdens and risks were 
somewhat mitigated, which is also reflected by the fact that two years after the interviews 
only a fifth of them had ceased to exist vis-à-vis 35 percent of all drug development 
companies (see Table 4.11).  
 
                                                                                                                                                    




   
 
However, where exactly a company found itself on the spectrum between risks and rewards 
often times depended on the level of sophistication of its technologies and the potential 
volume of the targeted disease market. For example, one genetic test-chip company (SD 
10) pursued a business model similar to many of the drug development companies 
surveyed: Aiming at diseases prevalent in affluent societies; a high-tech approach; strong 
patent portfolio; high speculative profit expectations; and trust of the investment 
community. This diagnostics company developed gene-based diagnostic tests for 
conditions such as cystic fibrosis and Alzheimer disease. Its IPR portfolio consisted of 
some 50 patents issued and another 150 pending worldwide. Because its founder was 
known as a successful entrepreneur to the biotechnology community and investors, the 
company’s IPO raised some $270 million. Despite revenues of ten million dollars, the 
company still lost $36 million per year and the strategic exit scenario therefore was to be 
taken over by a big diagnostics company.  
 
The majority of companies engaged in diagnostics or biomedical devices, even if they were 
predominantly conducting R&D and their products had not yet obtained market approval, 
had some production facilities. They were different from drug development companies in 
the sense that the logics of organizing production are different from organizing R&D. For 
example, whereas pharmaceutical production is often contracted out to low-cost locations 
and countries, the production of biomedical or diagnostics devices was kept closer to home. 
One company (SD 4), which developed a medical device to rescue heart stroke patients, 
insisted to stay in SD. Once the company would reach US market approval that would 
                                                                                                                                                    




   
 
make large-scale production necessary, the company may consider outsourcing production, 
but it would favor a production company in the San Diego area. Similar arguments were 
made by a much more established, profitable diagnostics kit company with a staff of 500:  
 
“The company will stay in San Diego, even if production will be extended: biologics is 
high-tech production and the standards are not easily met in cheaper regions or 
countries.” [Interview SD 23] 
 
What this also shows is that despite the alleged strength that LMEs provide due to a 
flexible and not specialized labor market, these applications of biotechnologies cannot be 
shifted around too easily, but are bound to regions with the appropriate skill set. In sum, 
therefore, while the incentives provided by America’s profitable healthcare market are 
similar to those biotechnology actors engaged in the high-tech-high-reward gamble of drug 
development, due to the more tangible nature of their dealings, biomedical and diagnostics 
companies hedge their bets differently.  
 
Companies that were engaged in environmental and agricultural biotechnology were only a 
small sub-group (n=8) in this survey. Interestingly, two companies had started out 






   
 
“We were initially a company for agbio/environment enzyme production. But then, we 
moved over to producing research reagents for biopharmaceutical companies, because 
of the better prospects for that market.” (Interview MD 14) 
 
Conversely, there was not a single company that made the opposite transition from 
pharmaceutical towards agricultural biotechnology. Operating in different spheres in terms 
of profit expectations also affected agricultural companies in a very concrete manner when 
it came to choosing a location for their business:  
 
“The problem with an agbio company in a cluster like the Bay Area is that we also 
have to compete with pharma/biotechn’s higher salaries and business expenses here.” 
(Interview SF 19) 
 
In this last regard, results would have been different in a biotechnology cluster, for instance 
around Durham in North Carolina, which has more agricultural biotechnology companies. 
As it stands, however, the findings corroborate this study’s first claim: That the viability 
and dynamism of the biotechnology industry is driven by applications of biotechnology for 
medical purposes. This dynamism has made the value-added chain from an invention 
towards the approval in the market longer and more complex, which is best demonstrated 
by the entrance of two new organizational species to which I will turn next: Contract 





   
 
4.5.4 Contract Research Organizations and Virtual Drug Companies 
Although CROs and virtual drug companies do not necessarily apply biotechnology in the 
strict sense of the definition used in Chaper 1, their inclusion in this survey helps 
understanding ongoing organizational changes of the pharmaceutical industry. Like 
biotechnology firms involved in drug discovery, they fulfill relevant tasks that large 
pharmaceutical corporations used to conduct in-house in the past. CROs carry out very 
little R&D on their own. Instead, they are a service provider that coordinates and carries 
out clinical trials for pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. Starting out in the beginning 
of the 1980s as small, specialized boutique firms, such companies have grown substantially 
with regards to size and number, as well as the services offered. By the early 2000s, the 
global CRO industry was estimated to have a market size of $8 billion (Mirowski and Van 
Horn 2005). Included in this survey (MA 33) is one of the oldest companies of its kind, 
founded in 1983, which currently belongs to the top ten global CROs. A transnational 
corporation with headquarters in Boston, the company had $565 million in annual revenues 
and carried out testing for all major pharmaceutical firms. According to the CRO 
representative interviewed, particularly biotechnology firms were requesting their services 
as they could not rely on structures built in-house to conduct and manage clinical trials. 
Conversely, CROs are known for a high turnover in staff and biotechnology executives 
repeatedly highlighted that they are an attractive source to hire from. CROs have certain 
‘sweat shop’ characteristics, because their staff is relatively low paid and less trained than 
counterparts in large pharmaceutical firms, while being at the same time well specialized in 





   
 
Also virtual drug companies do not carry out their own R&D. Instead, they coordinate the 
steps necessary to move a technology or a drug candidate, normally protected by IPRs, 
closer to the market. Included in this survey were four virtual drug companies whose 
common business rationale was the value that their coordination efforts added along the 
drug development chain. In order to get remunerated for this effort, companies pursued 
different strategies as to when and how they got engaged with a major pharmaceutical 
player. For instance, one company (MA 17) sought opportunities in the market for drugs 
below Big Pharma’s blockbuster drug threshold of one billion dollars a year in sales. As an 
intermediary in the drug development pipeline it licensed early-stage technologies, 
coordinated clinical trials, and ultimately hoped to sell or license them back to a big 
pharmaceutical company. Two other virtual drug companies licensed drug compounds that 
had been abandoned or had lost patent protection. These compounds were then retooled 
into treatments against a different disease and run through clinical trials for regulatory 
approval for these new indications. Once approved for the US market, they were licensed 
for production and marketing to a pharmaceutical company. One manager derided this 
approach of working with the leftovers of the blockbuster drug development routine as 
‘Pharma Junk’ (Interview SF 7), but the more correct description would be ‘Pharma 
Recycling.’  
 
A virtual mode of operation also implies less overhead for staff and laboratory space, 
which allows companies to react quickly to the ups and downs of the destiny of their drug 
developments. One company surveyed sold the US marketing rights for a product for $20 




   
 
decided to lay off the majority of their 110 employees and revamped their business model 
towards a virtual drug company with freelance staff. At the end of the day: 
 
“It's all about the drug. In the future, a big pharma company might license our 
developed drug or take over the entire company - whatever is more advantageous for 
big pharma to get the drug.”  (Interview SD 22) 
 
In sum, virtual drug companies prove to be an efficient vehicle to exploit niches in the 
current drug development regime. Ultimately, their coordination effort is remunerated 
because they re-integrate activities that have been fallen by the wayside, back into the 
blockbuster drug development regime.  
 
So far, this analysis of the biotechnology industry followed VoC’s approach as to where 
LMEs such as the United States should provide a comparative institutional advantage for a 
rapidly innovating industry, such as biotechnology. Yet parts of this institutional support 
structure – in particular the protection of intellectual property – are at the same time key to 
market-driven innovations, but also slowing down the process of rapid innovation. 
Moreover, I argue that creative destruction and rapid innovation for the time being did not 
change the power relations in the drug development process. Both arguments were 
confirmed in particular by the genomics industry. Genomics companies highlighted how 
creative destruction worked in one of the most advanced and financially risky fields of the 
biotechnology industry, but also the extent to which the industry’s center of gravity is 




   
 
This section has illustrated some limitations of the categories suggested by the VoC-
approach to explain the coordination activities in the biotechnology industry. Most of these 
shortcomings were due to the specific nature of innovation with which this industry deals 
with. Moreover, VoC by definition cannot account for sub-national differences, for 
instance of certain support structures. The geographical proximity of certain 
institutionalized support structures such as scientific institutions, human resources, and 
funding all are important reasons for sub-national clustering of the biotechnology industry, 
which will be addressed next.  
 
4.6 Biotechnology’s Embeddedness in Regional Clusters 
4.6.1 Proximity to Science 
This section will investigate the reasons for why the biotechnology industry tends to cluster 
around crucial support structures, such as research institutions, human resources, and 
capital. I will start my investigation of the particular logic of clusters with the relevance of 
proximity to universities. This relationship deserves special scrutiny, as traditionally the 
interrelatedness with scientific research and academia has been considered to be one of 
biotechnology industry’s signature features (Kenney 1986; Zucker, Darby, and Brewer 
1998). This survey found that more than one third of all companies included were the result 
of a formal spin-off. A spin-off was defined to include only those cases where the new 







   
 
Table 4.12: Share of Spinoffs among all Companies Established* 
 NY  MA MD  SF SD AVGE 
Total  23.3 36.4 28.0 48.0 50.0 37.1 
Universities 20.0 21.2 8.0 36.0 6.7 18.4 
Federal Research Institutes 3.3 3.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 
Other Research Institutes 0.0 6.1 0.0 0.0 20.0 5.2 
Company 0.0 6.1 8.0 12.0 23.3 9.9 
*(includes only companies where founders left together with proprietary technologies) 
 
Universities were the major source for establishing such new companies, accounting for 
more than half of all spin-offs (Table 4.13).  
 
Table 4.13: Source of Spinoffs  












Universities 85.7 58.3 28.6 75.0 13.3 52.2 
Federal Research institutes 14.3 8.3 42.9 0.0 0.0 13.1 
Other Research Institutes 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 40.0 11.3 
Company 0.0 16.7 28.6 25.0 46.7 23.4 
 
In this sense, nothing seems to have changed with regards to the central role of academia 
for the provision of biotechnological science. Moreover, these findings also corroborate 
with one crucial prediction of the VoC-approach: Technology transfer in LMEs is 
predominantly fostered by the movement of highly trained staff. It comes as no surprise 
therefore that, when asked why a company was at its current location, proximity to 
scientific knowledge was mentioned prominently in all five regions. Below this general 
agreement, however, there was a more subtle picture. It had to do with the varied roles that 
scientific research institutions played as support structures for biotechnology firms, 





   
 
For instance, it became apparent that there was a hierarchy among universities concerning 
the leverage these had when collaborating with for-profit corporations. One aspect of this 
were the different policies vis-à-vis their faculty setting up biotechnology start-up 
companies that universities put in place. Some institutions gave their academics the chance 
to carry out research in their university laboratories that benefit their private companies. 
For example, the University of Medicine and Dentistry, New Jersey (UMDNJ) benefited 
one interviewed company (MD 7), whose Chief Scientific Officer could use the laboratory 
that belonged to him as a faculty member for research that dovetailed with the interests of 
his company. This research had already rendered six patents, which the professor filed 
through the university. While the fees were paid by his company, the professor’s firm 
gained the right to exclusively license back these technologies from the university.  
 
In a similar vein, another company was founded around a technology licensed from and 
invented at Harvard University (MA 23). Yet the inventor decided to leave Harvard for 
Boston University, because he wanted to remain engaged in this new start-up company. As 
a faculty member of Boston University, he could carry out drug discovery research funded 
by his company, which would also have the first right of using the results. Harvard’s 
policies prevent such relationships. By statute, inventions of Harvard faculty are the 
property of the university and companies in which faculty has a stake do not enjoy 





   
 
Research universities such as Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technologies 
(MIT) therefore established Technology Licensing Offices41 that help them 
commercializing their inventions. The benefits from this can be substantial: One survey of 
the economic impact of MIT spin-offs estimated that MIT graduates and faculty were 
involved in the formation of 4,000 companies, which employed 1.1 million people, had 
annual world sales of $232 billion, and if formed an independent nation, based on these 
revenues would make it the 24th largest economy in the world (Bank Boston 1997). As for 
Harvard University, in 2008 alone, Harvard’s technology licenses generated more than $21 
million in revenues42. 
 
In addition to generating revenues, technology transfer offices also have to negotiate the 
respective realms of interest with the faculty. To prevent MIT professors from exploiting 
university students and laboratory facilities for the benefit of their own companies, MIT 
has put in place a policy to separate the interests of the university from that of its faculty. 
Corporations in which MIT staff has a financial stake cannot sponsor research at MIT. 
Moreover, faculty is only allowed to dedicate one day a week to work outside the 
university, such as for consulting or for founding a company. However, as the 
representatives of the MIT Technology Licensing Office admitted, a number of IT 
companies were started around these guidelines.  
                                                 
41 The following section profited from interviews with representatives from Harvard’s and MIT’s technology 
licensing offices in January 2002. 
42 See the website of the Harvard Office of Technology Development: 





   
 
While they are particularly hard to enforce with regards to software development, 
apparently they were also applied with some grain of salt elsewhere as the case of 
Professor Erik Lander at MIT’s Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research demonstrates. 
Lander was not only prominently engaged in the Human Genome Project, but he also who 
co-founded Millennium Pharmaceuticals, a company that continued to fund research at the 
Whitehead Institute.  
 
Self-confidence about the economic value of their scientific expertise was not limited to 
these elite private research universities in Massachusetts. In both San Diego and San 
Francisco, biotechnology executives complained about the impossibility to collaborate with 
the public institutions of the University of California (UC) system. One company founder 
from San Diego for instance, contended that 
 
“the patent system of UCSD [University of California San Diego, VL] makes it hard 
for our company to use technologies from the university.” (Interview SD 26)  
 
Apparently therefore, the universities of the UC system, which were so instrumental in 
establishing the scientific basis of the biotechnology industry43 are today shunned as 
collaborators because they have become too capable as for-profit-managers of their own 
intellectual property. Obviously, the coordination of research interests by means of 
individual commodification and contractualization, which is so crucial to the setup of the 
United States’ successful biotechnology innovation regime, also has its drawbacks. It is 
                                                 




   
 
therefore a matter of interpretation and political negotiation among different actors, a topic 
that will be revisited in chapter 7 (see 7.4). 
4.6.2 Clustering of Trained Staff 
At the same time where top-tier research universities were not always cherished as research 
collaborators, they were considered an important source for knowledge as faculty could be 
brought in as consultants. For similar reasons, corporate managers considered two high-
profile biomedical research institutions – The Scripps Research and the Salk Institute – as 
an advantage for San Diego. Whereas the Scripps Institute allowed collaborations in which 
outsiders could command the IPR, as was the case for Novartis (see 2.7), Salk Institute 
policies prevented this44. But faculty and scientists from both research institution could be 
hired as consultants, adding to the relevance that proximity to trained human resources has 
for biotechnology companies. In the words of a company representative in San Diego: 
 
 “We are here because of the critical mass of other biotech companies and R&D 
institutions… not so much for collaborations but for recruitment of trained staff - 
trained staff in general.” (Interview SD 4) 
 
This is reflected by the recruitment pattern, not only in San Diego, but throughout all 
regions included in this survey. Almost four fifths were hired from within the region, which 
indicates the tendency of clustering of biotechnology companies and scientific institutions. 
It is also noteworthy that more than one fifth of the people working in the biotechnology 
                                                 





   
 
industry were born outside the U.S., which indicates the attraction that this industry has for 
people with migration background that are particularly highly educated. 
 
Table 4.14 Geographical Distribution of Recruitment 
Recruitment NY MA MD SF SD AVGE 
Within Company 0.3 7 4.3 0.4 0.4 2.5 
Regional 83.3 65.2 85.6 89.4 69.4 78.6 
National 14.5 23.6 8.5 9.4 28 16.8 
International 3.8 4.2 1.6 0.8 2.2 2.5 
Not US-born 19.0 20.6 18.1 28.6 28.2 22.9 
 
The generally high level of payment in the biotechnology industry mentioned earlier cannot 
explain the competitive advantage of certain regions over others. Contemporary studies on 
competitiveness and its protagonists, the ‘creative class’ (Florida 2004, 2005), therefore 
highlight the importance of cultural factors. According to this logic, knowledge-based 
industries, including biotechnology, tend to prefer certain regions and find it easier to 
attract the most capable human resources. Consequently, a vibrant biotechnology cluster 
would depend not only on the quality of its life sciences, but also on its quality of life. This 
was confirmed in different ways by different interviewees. For instance one company 
executive (MA 8) explained how soft factors are indeed important for Boston. Whereas 
cities like Chicago or New York are dominated by other activities, such as production or 
finance, in Boston the environment was more appreciative of biotechnology: “It’s a sexy 
dinner party topic.”   
 
Somewhat less glamorous, from the perspective of an employee working in a volatile, 




   
 
one is employed. The majority of biotechnology employees had been laid off at least once, 
but a cluster provides some stability, because it allows people to stay in the region: 
 
“Working in biotechnology means working in a high-risk business. It is not unlikely 
that the company I am working for now may go out of business at one point…If there 
are other companies around and I get laid off, I can find a job easier without having to 
move, without having to sell my house, and without having to find a new school for my 
children.” (Interview (MA 22) 
 
In absence of any formalized, legal, and collective mechanisms to safeguard employees’ 
wellbeing, the loyalty of employees in this industry, therefore, never is, never can be 
unanimously focused on one single company. Clustering is one consequence of this 
market-led mode of rapid innovation, unaccounted for by the VoC typology, which does 
not see geography as an issue. 
 
Yet ‘geographic stickiness’ determines companies’ destinies also in another way: Often it 
is the location of the founders that determines where a company will reside. In both San 
Diego and San Francisco, the question why a company was at its current location, the most 
frequently mentioned reason (50 and 52 percent, respectively) was that the founders had 
already been there and wanted to stay. The interviews therefore did not conform to 
postulations about knowledge-based industries being more footloose than production-based 
ones (Hilpert 2003). Moreover, the findings highlight the limits of the assumptions in VoC 




   
 
economically strategizing actors as those in the biotechnology industry are to a large extent 
motivated by non-formal motives too that show the embeddedness of economic activities 
within social ones. This will become even more obvious in the next section, which looks at 
the discrepancy between formal and non-formal agreements between investors and 
recipient firms in the biotechnology industry. 
 
4.6.3 Proximity to Capital  
Venture capital was the single most important source of money for the majority of 
companies interviewed (see Table 4.6 above). Yet there were surprising differences among 
the regions that deserve to be explored further. For example, one would assume that in 
New York, the world’s leading financial hub, the proximity to investors should also benefit 
the biotechnology industry. This was the case for one biomedical device company, which 
was set up by Wall Street bankers who invested part of their own money to expedite the 
establishment of their own, new corporation. To expedite the establishment of their own, 
new company, according to one of the founders,  
 
“writing a cheque is faster and easier than applying for funds.” (Interview NY 16)  
 
In the end, they did both and used their financial expertise to raise $30 million from 
different VC funds. However, this was the only company surveyed in New York where 
there was an obvious link to the investment community and that was profiting from local 
VC. While there is obviously no scarcity of funds, they are not necessarily spent locally. 




   
 
 
“Private money tends to overlook the no-boom regions such as Long Island and would 
rather pour its resources into established clusters such as Boston/Cambridge.” 
(Interview NY 7). 
 
In fact, looking at data available for overall VC investment in biotechnology companies, 
the New York/New Jersey conurbation is only in the third position after California and 
Massachusetts (Table 4.15):  
 
Table 4.15: States Ranked by VC Investment in Biosciences, 2002-2007 
Rank State Total in $ Million 
1 California 20,743 
2 Massachusetts 7,091 
3 New Jersey 2,778 
4 Pennsylvania 2,772 
5 Maryland 1,957 
6 New York 1,225 
Source: Battelle 2008, p. 38 
 
The statistics above indicate the dominance of VC investment that was also confirmed 
during the survey. The strength of the Californian VC industry and access to funding was 
repeatedly mentioned as the main reason for locating a company in California. Specifically, 
48 percent of all companies surveyed in the San Francisco Bay Area were enjoying funding 






   
 
“VC does not like to travel. I can find enough potential for high returns on my 
investment in this region.” (Interview 9/09/2003) 
 
The fact that VC money is so hesitant to travel harks back to the mode of operation of VC 
firms mentioned earlier: Typically, a VC firm not only provides financial support, but also 
advice and managerial guidance, roles that becomes easier when the biotechnology 
company is nearby. Similarly, a study by Powell et al. (2002) on the spatial clustering of 
biotechnology and VC found that local support is normally geared at younger companies, 
whereas external investments tend to go to firms that already have something more to 
‘show’, e.g. a late-stage clinical trial or even a marketable product. Conversely, as VC 
firms become larger and more experienced, they invest more in both younger and further 
away companies, a trend that appears to be somewhat modulated by the VC’s regional 
origin: Whereas Boston VC money tends to stay regional, New York money roams the 
country and Bay Area VCs start out in California before looking for opportunities 
elsewhere.  
 
In this regard, the survey demonstrated that VC located in the Bay Area was still close 
enough and readily available to be invested in San Diego. There, almost two thirds of 
companies received venture funding, albeit less from local investors. Local funding in San 
Diego came less often from VC, but from ‘angel investors’. Angels are wealthy individuals 
who invest in a company at an early stage of its development. Usually angels invest less 




   
 
provide the larger amounts of money, VC firms were only very slowly – if at all – 
evaluating their projects and therefore, it was better relying on angels and private investors: 
 
“If you know the people with the checkbooks, you don’t have to beg for VC and wait 
until they approve your business plan.” (Interview SD 8) 
 
The proximity between scientists and angel investors adds to the advantages of clusters. In 
the words of one other biotechnology executive from California:  
 
“There are a lot of angels in San Diego, who usually invest in people they know…Face-
to-face contact is critical. Investors invest in people, not products.” (Interview SF 11) 
 
San Diego is interesting in this regard, because some companies explicitly mentioned how 
they benefited from local entrepreneurs and angel investors who had made their money in 
information technologies and military-related technologies. The close relationship with 
angel investors was often mentioned a reason for why the company was at its current 
location. San Diego companies profited from informal networks such as the south 
Californian angel investor network ‘Tech Coast Angels’45, whose members invest only in 
southern California companies. Similar to the screening criteria of a VC investor, this angel 
network only invests in firms that fulfill certain criteria, such as an annual revenue 
potential of at least $50 million; overcome barriers to market entry such as patents; and 
have an exit strategy with regards to who will eventually acquire the company. In sum, 
                                                 




   
 
compared with VC angel investors further intensify the already personalized relationship 
between money and science.  
 
On a theoretical level, VC and angel investors demonstrate the embeddedness of economic 
activities in social activities also for the biotechnology industry: Rational actors make their 
business decisions not only based on market considerations. While all of the different steps 
of their business engagement may be based on contracts and may be executed in a 
‘formalized’ manner, they ultimately are existent only because of trust. Even more, 
whereas the VoC approach has little room for such tacit, non-contract-related, knowledge 
for rapid innovation in LMEs, I argue that the comparative advantage of certain regions in 
the United States is based on just that: A comparative institutional advantage for 
biotechnology locations ensues when in close proximity investors and recipients of funds 
share a common, non-formalizable understanding of their innovative activities: In short, 
trust among the protagonists makes the setup more dynamic and more innovative.  
 
4.6.4 Proximity to Other Companies 
So far this inquiry highlighted the benefits of biotechnology companies embedded in 
clusters due to the proximity between scientific institutions and financial investors. But 
clustering is first and foremost related to companies. So putting aside the previously 
mentioned ‘safety net’ function for people who may be laid off, how much of a blessing is 
it to have other biotechnology companies in close proximity, and for what? One answer to 
this is, again, human resources, the demand for which very much depends on the 




   
 
company may need different skill sets as soon as it is getting closer to having its first 
products approved by the FDA. These transitions are sometimes helped by the rate of 
attrition of companies, but also by general trends in the pharmaceutical industry: 
 
“The mergers of Big Pharma companies in the late 1990s released staff that was then 
hired by biotech companies wanting to become drug companies.” (Interview MD 3) 
  
But not only mergers, also company takeovers release large numbers of staff, taking with 
them their scientific and managerial expertise. For instance a number of San Diego 
companies included in this study were started by individuals who left a first-generation 
biotechnology company, Hybritech, after it was acquired by the multinational drug 
company Ely Lilly in 1986. Interview partners described how the clash of culture between 
an innovative biotechnology firm and a large, bureaucratized transnational drug firm, led to 
an exodus of trained staff from the acquired biotechnology firm.  
 
This is an important aspect of how creative destruction works in practice. It is also a 
mechanism for technology transfer, and it is in line with what VoC predicts for liberal 
market economies. Yet not always do successful companies have to be destroyed first to 
give rise to the creation of new firms. On the contrary, it seemed that a sign for a matured 
cluster is the existence of thriving companies that function as an institutional frame and a 
nurturing ground to spin off new start-up companies. This was for instance a side effect of 
the successful genomics company in Massachusetts mentioned earlier (see 4.5.1). That 




   
 
or set up their own firms. This is not only different from publicly funded incubator 
programs, but also from the beginning of the industry in the 1970s when this function was 
fulfilled by universities. Referring to the critical role of large-scale biotechnology 
companies for nurturing the right talent, and justifying why his company was in San 
Francisco, one corporate executive made the following calculation:  
 
“Genentech [the world’s second largest biotechnology company, VL] has 5000 
employees and a turnover rate of 10 percent. In other words, 500 employees leave 
Genentech every year – this  is a highly attractive pool to hire from.” (Interview SF 17) 
 
One would assume that the clustering of companies would also facilitate their 
collaborations. Yet when asking firms about their collaborations, which included only 
those sealed by a contractual agreement, the opposite turned out to be true (Table 4.16). 
Surveyed companies had only 17 percent of their collaborations with local partners. More 
than two thirds of the formalized collaborations were on the national and international level 
(respectively 44 and 25 percent). 
 




















 Local 23.6 11.0 7.8 13.0 27.5 16.6 
Regional 18.1 12.0 25.3 7.7 7.2 14.1 
National 39.3 50.0 43.8 49.7 37.1 44.0 
International 19.0 27.0 23.0 29.6 28.2 25.4 
* Formalized by contract. Excluded are companies with >50 unspecified collaborations 
These findings seem to indicate that proximity to other companies mattered most with 




   
 
individuals, but not so much for cooperation to conduct joint business. It is therefore 
particularly interesting to look at the attraction of clusters for foreign companies and their 
reasons to establish a local subsidiary. 
 
Nine of the companies included in the survey were the subsidiary of a foreign company. 
One of the purposes repeatedly coming up throughout the interviews was that Non-
American corporations were attracted to enter the United States’ huge and profitable 
market. Yet for this reason alone, a subsidiary may as well have been opened in Iowa, 
North Dakota, or Kansas. Instead, foreign companies that choose to locate their 
subsidiaries in the regions surveyed did so, because of a combination of advantages that 
these clusters of biotechnology innovation could conceivably offer. For instance, one 
Massachusetts-based diagnostics biotechnology company (MA 32) was acquired by a 
German multinational pharmaceutical company. The buyer was attracted and willing to pay 
$11 million, in part, to acquire the company’s IPR portfolio of 50 patents worldwide, but 
also to have a pied-à-terre in the research community in Massachusetts. While the 
diagnostics company had some revenues from selling diagnostics kits, it did not break 
even. Nevertheless, the pharmaceutical mother company kept the loss-making subsidiary 
afloat as its diagnostics R&D hub in North America. 
 
Having an American R&D department at almost any cost was also the reason why one 
other large German pharmaceutical firm bought a cancer drug development biotechnology 
company surveyed in Massachusetts. This firm was acquired for $70 million, without 




   
 
While eventually the German pharmaceutical firm should profit from marketed products, 
for the time being:  
 
“They are a kind of a sugar daddy. They do whatever it takes to have access to our 
research expertise.” (Interview MA 1)  
 
This division of labor was even more elaborated for another firm in San Diego, which was 
bought by a multi-billion-dollar-worth Japanese pharmaceutical company. Historically, 
Japanese drug firms were focused on their huge, protected, domestic market (see 2.7). In 
this particular case, the Japanese firm wanted to launch a product on the American market 
for the first time, and towards that end, bought up a company in San Diego to tap into the 
pool of scientific expertise available there. According to the interviewee  
 
“we are loosing 28 million dollars a year, but we have a lot of autonomy, because the 
marketing strategy [of the Japanese mother company, VL] is not clear at the moment.” 
 
It seems that this one-level-removed, at-arms-length conduct of business added to the 
generally derogatory view that research-oriented biotechnology firms had of large 
pharmaceutical companies. It is ultimately – again – a cultural conflict about profitability 
of research endeavors between two different types of business. Having a foreign paymaster 






   
 
Conversely, the hopes of foreign companies to profit from regional scientific excellence 
did not always pay out. For instance, one Japanese medical device company interviewed 
set up a subsidiary in the San Francisco area to carry out software development and R&D 
and profit from that location’s strength in these fields. However, at the time of the 
interview, strategies had changed and all technologies were developed in Japan. The 
location was still considered to be an advantage as it is close to their biggest customer as 
well as many other companies in San Francisco and San Diego. Equally mixed were the 
experiences of a German drug development company, which entered a joint venture with 
the world’s largest biotechnology firm Amgen (CA). As a prerequisite for receiving $40 
million from Amgen, the joint venture had to be in the Bay Area. When Amgen left the 
joint venture in 1997, the San Francisco subsidiary was downsized to function only as a 
business hub to acquire companies in California and in the Boston area. Equally important 
as to tap into the pool of knowledge was the proximity to venture capital and the US 
stockmarket, because, according to the interviewee, “Public money is harder to raise in 
Germany”. (Interview SF 7) 
 
These statements illustrate some of the incentives as well as the high hurdle for entering the 
American market. Obviously, foreign entrants need to be prepared for continued financial 
subsidies. The most likely candidates are therefore large companies from other advanced 
industrialized nations, which prefer to set up subsidiaries in biotechnology innovation 
clusters. The examples of unsuccessful entries demonstrate that many times the 
expectations have been too high. Yet their hope is that by being embedded in one of the 




   
 
combination of market access, research capacities, and capital.  In other words, by shifting 
certain activities into these specific clusters of biotechnology innovation, foreign 
companies want to profit from the institutional arbitrage that the support structures of the 
political economy of the United States provide for (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 57). 
 
While these last contentions revolved around the shortcomings of the VoC approach with 
regards to underestimating the importance of non-formalized means and ways of 
coordination among business actors, there are also other spheres of the political economy 
(for instance in science funding and regulation), where biotechnology takes much more 
advantage of formalized, state-created coordination structures, than VoC would ascribe to 
the U.S. as a liberal market economy. These will be addressed next. 
 
4.7 Public Funding for the Biotechnology Industry 
 
Whereas the majority of respondents considered public financial support – either federal or 
from the states – only the second-best solution for their business, this verdict depended 
much on where companies or clusters were in their development cycle. Most federal 
support programs mentioned by interviewees fell into the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program and its sister entity, the Small Business Technology Transfer 
(STTR) program. The purpose of the existence for these funding mechanisms is the 
development of new ideas and the proof of concept. SBIR and STTR awards are either 




   
 
general approval of how these federal grant schemes worked. Of the surveyed companies, 
56 percent had used such a grant and 35 percent found it useful. (Table 4.17):  
 
Table 4.17 Federal and State Support Programs 
Support 
programs 
 NY MA MD SF SD AVGE 
Federal: awareness 87.7 69.7 92.0 72.0 90.0 82.3 
 usage 63.3 45.5 76.0 40.0 53.3 55.6 
 relevance 46.7 24.2 48.0 24.0 33.3 35.2 
  NY MA MD SF SD AVGE 
State: awareness 70.0 9.1 88.0 36.0 50.0 50.6 
 usage 40.0 0.0 68.0 28.0 20.0 31.2 
 relevance 30.0 0.0 64.0 12.0 6.7 22.5 
  local  36.7 0.0 28.0 8.0 23.3 19.2 
 
For a number of smaller companies interviewed, these federal financial support 
mechanisms often played a decisive role in moving ahead. The flipside of that same coin 
was that larger and more advanced companies often found the grant application procedure 
too cumbersome for too little money. For them, an SBIR grant barely covers one month of 
the costs of a clinical trial. Moreover, applying for funding was complicated by 
considerations regarding intellectual property rights. While some company representatives 
contended that receiving public money made it more difficult claiming intellectual property 
afterwards, others criticized the peer review process upon which SBIR grants were 
distributed, because it would provide insight into the technologies to competitors who may 
use such information for their own advantage. Despite such criticism, these federal 
programs proved to be an important support structure for a segment of the biotechnology 





   
 
The overall assessment of state programs was decidedly less favorable. Although every 
state by now prides itself of having a biotechnology support policy framework (Battelle 
2008)46, corporations included in this survey generally gauged them less relevant to their 
work than federal support programs. Less than a third (31 percent) had used them and less 
than a quarter (23 percent) found them useful. There were, however, important 
geographical differences. In the Boston region, for example, there was little awareness of 
state programs and not a single company had ever used one. Interviewees explained that 
services that in theory could be delivered by a state or public program, such as providing 
incubator space or helping with finding investors, in practice in Massachusetts are provided 
by private entities. One other example was the outsourcing of $50 million of a state 
technology fund, which was managed by a VC firm. Overall, the fact that Massachusetts 
programs were irrelevant to companies may also be an indication for the maturity and 
sophistication of the biotechnology industry in the Boston area.  
 
Also Californian support programs were considered useful only by a minority of firms, 
respectively 12 percent in San Francisco and 7 percent in San Diego. Yet in San Diego, 23 
percent of interviewed companies profited from local support. Some of it was generated 
completely without public monies, such as informal networks of private ‘Angel’ investors 
(see 4.6.3 above). Another local support institution was the public-private partnership 
program by the UCSD, which brings together research institutions, investors, corporations, 
and professional services providers to accelerate the commercialization of innovations.  
 
                                                 




   
 
Of all regions surveyed, Maryland’s state support programs scored highest. State initiatives 
were considered relevant by 64 percent of interviewed companies, and were used for a 
variety of purposes. For instance, one firm (MD 4) praised the research partnerships that it 
could enter with the state-funded University of Maryland. While the corporation made a 
small payment to the university, the state matched those funds, but the company retained 
the rights to the research results. In effect, the state of Maryland paid twice so that the 
university could provide contract research services to a private company. Maryland was 
also lauded for providing state grants that could be used very aggressively for international 
trade and business to enter new markets. One other firm (MD 8) was granted $20 million 
by the state to set up a contract manufacturing facility in the region. While the state 
retained the ownership of the facility, the company leases back the facility from Maryland 
and the pursuits went into the budget of the statewide biotechnology interest group 
organization, MDBio. Last but not least, the state was also funding eleven incubators for 
start-up companies. The high approval rate of the Maryland biotechnology state initiative is 
all the more noteworthy as the companies interviewed were also the ones that took most 
advantage and judged useful (76 and 48 percent, respectively) of available federal support. 
To some part, this may be explained by the geographical proximity of the federal 
institutions in Maryland, and especially the NIH. But to some part, the dependence on 
public support may also express that the Maryland biotechnology cluster is less developed, 
diverse, and strong than other regions. Maryland’s biotechnology industry demonstrates 
also that in the United States as a representative of liberal market economies, the neoliberal 
paradigm of public non-interference in business activities is never a principled demand. 




   
 
public hand is willingly taken into account. This is the complex role that the neoliberal 
state plays as it becomes a national-competition-state (Hirsch 1995). Interviews also 
illustrated two other functions of the states in this regard crucial for their business 
endeavors: The structure of the American healthcare market, as well as the regulatory 
environment for pharmaceuticals. Both will be addressed next. 
 
4.8 Healthcare Markets and Regulatory Hurdles 
 
VoC, like other theoretical approaches, seeks for comparative institutional advantage in 
those coordination structures provided for by the institutions of the economic supply-side. 
This neoliberal view on the supply-side leaves out the crucial role that coordination of the 
demand-side plays for economic actors. Throughout the interviews with biotechnology 
entrepreneurs, the demand side was regularly brought in when interviewees were asked 
about the relevance of the United States healthcare market. Emblematic for many others 
was the following view of one executive: 
 
“The American Healthcare market is the least regulated and the most profitable… 
Higher prices for our products mean that we can get back our investment on R&D 
faster.” (Interview MD 5) 
 
Yet there were also others, who alluded to both the United States and Europe as the two 





   
 
“Presently, our most important goal is to get two products [one of which is already 
marketed in Europe, VL] on the US market. For the future of our business, FDA and 
EU approval are key”. (Interview MA 16) 
 
This position pointed to the pivotal role of the FDA. Except for those companies that were 
engaged in agricultural and environmental biotechnologies, the FDA was the ultimate 
regulatory agency for the firms surveyed. As it turned out, the FDA was considered one of 
the support structures of the political economy of the United States. In looking for 
institutional arbitrage, notably between the United States and Europe, biotechnology actors 
considered the FDA playing a positive role for the United States. Timing is of the essence 
and often companies that conducted several clinical trials in parallel, did so also outside the 
United States. Ultimately, however the purpose was to get approval in United States, 
“because it is the faster process.” Equally important, companies wanted to obtain 
regulatory approval for their products in United States first, because “That is where the 
money is” (Interview MD 5). Not all interviewees agreed, however. As one side effect of 
the regulatory environment in the United States for drug approval and marketing it was 
contended that 
 
“the FDA has censoring power over marketing…Price controls [in Europe, VL] should 
be loosened up, because the United States’ high payback on R&D subsidizes EU’s 





   
 
Again, we see how the role of the neoliberal state has changed: instead of being a hurdle 
for entrepreneurial activity, its interventions become an asset in the international 
competitive arena. The question of extending FDA’s authority with regards to pricing – 
both domestically and internationally – will be revisited in the next chapter. It is an 
important systemic issue for how the American variety of capitalism (under neoliberal 
premise) offers comparative advantage for biotechnology actors. 
 
Yet the role of the FDA is also crucial for understanding the changes within the value-
added chain of drug development. In the past, large pharmaceutical firms used to have 
several in-house candidates in the pipeline towards drug approval, and one failure would 
not sink the entire company. Today, however, when pharmaceutical firms are outsourcing 
the research towards several smaller corporations, they are also outsourcing the risk. 
Biotechnology or any other corporations that depend on the approval of a single product, 
will most likely be wiped out if that approval is denied. During many interviews therefore, 
the FDA’s verdict on the outcome of clinical trials and ultimately, market approval was the 
great divider between the making and breaking of a company. In the words of one of 
executive whose company had just enough money to finish a clinical trial:  
 
“After a successful market approval, we may be acquired. But if we fail again, this will 
be the end for us.” (Interview SF13)  
 
FDA’s approval decides on which side of capitalism’s perennial gale of creative 




   
 
procedure, as well as knowing intimately the approval process, is an asset that specialized 
business can capitalize on. This was manifested by two companies, not coincidentally 
located close to the FDA in Maryland, which used their insider knowledge of FDA 
approval procedures and its proximity to the regulatory agency to help companies get their 
drugs approved: 
 
“A blockbuster drug is worth $ 1 billion in sales annually. You do the math. One month 
delay is worth almost $100 million. To know where the approval procedure may get 
stuck can save a lot of time and money.” (Interview MD 20) 
 
These firms capitalize from the personal contacts established over the years. Again, as was 
the case with the intimate relationship between investors and recipients of funding (see 
4.6.3 above), such specialized coordinating businesses are hardly possibly only on ‘formal’ 
or ‘contractual’ terms. They highlight the tacit, informal component of America’s 
comparatively advantageous biotechnology innovation model that cannot be subsumed 
under the categories for liberal market economies of the VoC approach. 
 
4.9 Concluding Remarks: Pipelines, Pipers, Paymasters 
 
This chapter took off from a relational view on the firm and business actors who pursue 
their individual interests under the circumstances of a given set of institutions. Findings 
were in line with some of the predictions made by the VoC framework for how the United 




   
 
a rapidly innovating, advanced industry, such as biotechnology on institutions of the 
political economy such as the financial systems and the models of corporate governance; 
industrial relations and education and training; and inter-company relations. 
 
On the other hand, the framework did not completely explain a number of issues that were 
equally important to the innovation model in biotechnology. To begin with, it is not clear 
how rapidly innovative biotechnology indeed is. Whereas technological turnaround and 
creative destruction may be fast, drug development is not. The genomics industry proved to 
be a case in point as this sub-industry, despite its rapid technological progress did not 
change the approach towards new drugs after all. Second, not all relationships that matter 
for the biotechnology industry are of a formalized, contractual nature. The ‘tacit’ aspect of 
knowledge that leads to the close proximity between biotechnology and scientific 
institutions is equally relevant for the intimate relationship with high-risk venture funding. 
Lastly, interviews highlighted the crucial role of state interventions on various levels: Start-
up firms that profit from direct government subsidies, the importance of patent 
enforcements, the gatekeeper function of the FDA to the world’s most profitable healthcare 
market.  
 
The way in which biotechnology actors rationalize their behavior and make strategic 
business decisions therefore highlight the different parts of the institutional support system 
that surrounds them. Looking at these corporate actors allows drawing some preliminary 
conclusions about the U.S. biotechnology innovation regime. Biotechnology remains 




   
 
and people. The hegemonic business logic is dictated by its most advanced players, those 
companies that are engaged in the development of new pharmaceutical drugs. By 
comparison, other business models and fields of application such as agriculture ultimately 
have to measure up with the profit expectations that the world of pharmaceuticals has 
created.  
 
Many companies mentioned the profitability of the American healthcare market as their 
primary reason for first launching their products in the United States, an attraction that also 
encouraged foreign companies to set up a subsidiary there. Another reason why many 
foreign companies want to be located in the United States is the access to the most 
advanced scientific knowledge and the regions surveyed had in common that they hosted a 
number of the world’s most advanced scientific research. But academic institutions have 
become increasingly aware of their bargaining position, particularly regarding the 
intellectual property they accumulate, which makes it at times difficult for private 
companies to collaborate with them. Interviews documented that not only for academia, 
patents have become both a bargaining chip and a roadblock. In both capacities, intellectual 
property claims have become instrumental to the functioning of the current 
biotechnological innovation regime.  
 
For the technology supply side of this regime, federal support programs were considered to 
fulfill a useful role circumscribed to the early stages of a company. State programs had a 
similar effect – if any - only for Maryland, the least mature of the surveyed biotechnology 




   
 
more important for their growth. In fact, VC was the booster for creative destruction in the 
biotechnology industry as investors’ speculations on future value was more important than 
current profits. Nowhere has this become more obvious than with the genomics industry. 
But after a brief rise towards stellar market valuations, this avant-garde within the value-
added chain of drug development came to a crashing halt as the technological hopes could 
not render real products and profits. At the end of the day, these imperatives continued to 
be dictated by large pharmaceutical corporations’ blockbuster logic according to which a 
drug worth pursuing has to be worth a billion dollars of sales a year. 
 
So if VC was the booster, the cash of pharmaceutical companies was the fuel for the long-
term journey of biotech companies. For most firms, this journey was to become an 
outsourced research laboratory – bearing the brunt of the risk if a product was not approved 
by the FDA – but with the hope for huge remunerations if successful. Outsourcing R&D 
risks to new biotechnology firms and the rise of biotechnology as a research sub-unit 
coincided with other organizational innovations. Together with new organizational entities, 
such as virtual drug companies and contract research organizations, biotechnology firms 
became part of a taylorist set-up for pharmaceutical R&D. This more networked alternative 
replaced the old fordist, hierarchical organization of previous pharmaceutical R&D 
endeavors, while not challenging the market power relations. So far, the biotechnology 
revolution did not take place. 
 
While biotechnology as an industry therefore became solidly embedded in the market 




   
 
embedded in geographically circumscribed clusters. Clusters provide proximity to 
scientific knowledge, capital, and other companies. This combination makes clusters 
particularly attractive for foreign companies that want to profit from institutional arbitrage 
for biotechnology: To be present in the scientifically most advanced regions of the country 
with the most lucrative market – the United States.  
 
The interviews pointed into two different directions with regards to the importance of 
governmental support for their industry: Small companies emphasized the support provided 
by NIH and federal grant schemes such as the SBIR program. The closer a company comes 
to a marketable product the more predominant does the role of FDA as the ultimate arbiter 
of a company’s fate in the market become. In between, federal policies impact access to 
capital, particularly venture capital and Intellectual property rights. These ‘enabling 
policies’ together are more important than the actual level of direct subsidies. Zooming in 
on these themes, the following chapters will therefore look into the neoliberal 
underpinnings of government interventions that helped the biotechnology industry 
flourishing. Specifically, chapter 5 will address policy mechanisms for the supply-side, 
such as research funding, patenting, technology transfer, venture capital financing, and 
regulatory approval. Chapter 6 will then describe how the American healthcare market with 
its unregulated prescription drug pricing came about and how the biotechnology industry, 





   
 
Chapter 5: The Invisible Hand of the Government 
 
„Es ist so schwer, den Anfang zu finden. Oder besser: Es ist schwer, am Anfang 
anzufangen. Und nicht (zu) versuchen, weiter zurückzugehen.”  
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Über Gewissheit, 1970)  (1970) 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
According to the VoC paradigm, the United States as a liberal market economy would 
provide a comparative institutional advantage for a rapidly innovating industry such as 
biotechnology. Such industries would profit from the shape of institutions of the political 
economy, such as the financial systems, the models of corporate governance, industrial 
relations, education and training, as well as inter-company relations. Yet the interviews in 
the previous chapter with biotechnology actors highlighted that the shape of these 
institutions does not capture the whole range of how institutional support structures for 
their business work. For example, biotechnology innovation is both creative destruction but 
also a very slow-moving process. Moreover, the clustering of finance and science, remains 
unaccounted for. At the same time, the interviews highlighted the importance of a number 
of ‘enabling policies’, government interventions that helped the biotechnology industry 
flourish.  
 
This chapter will provide a historical perspective on key policy areas mentioned, such as 




   
 
regulatory oversight. My aim is not to provide a complete chronological account of all the 
developments that may have contributed to the genesis of the biotechnology in the United 
States. Instead, I will highlight key political developments that created an institutional 
support structure conducive to a comparative advantage for the biotechnology industry in 
the United States. Looking at the evolving neoliberal regime that helped biotechnology 
innovation flourish in the United States, the chapter will confirm the claim that free-market 
rhetoric was regularly trumped by economic stimulus politics (claim 2). 
 
I will therefore analyze the institutional support structure, the public groundwork, which 
private biotechnology actors willingly and ably exploit when claiming entrepreneurialism. I 
will argue that those actors – researchers, companies, universities, and investors - who were 
at the forefront of the scientific and technological developments of biotechnology could 
take advantage of a scientific infrastructure that was created over more than a century of 
United States’ federal government policies. Although many of these policies had no direct 
impact on the substantive part of science and technology that is at the basis of 
contemporary biotechnology, they created the organizational and institutional foundation 
for the sciences to come.  
 
Some history is therefore necessary to understand why and how the America’s system of 
innovation was so susceptible to neoliberal reorganization that gained momentum by the 
late 1970s. The biotechnology industry came into being at this critical historical juncture as 
technological achievements coincided with the ascent of a neoliberal political and 




   
 
supply-side of the economy. Support for developing and commercializing advanced 
technologies played a key role in this new agenda, which also comprised the provision of 
generous federal funding for public research; policies to allow its commercializing by 
private actors; the mobilization of new for-profit, private resources; and a general 
regulatory environment conducive to the needs of business. All this was not devised 
exclusively to benefit biotechnology, but it created an institutional comparative advantage 
for the biotechnology industry to flourish first and foremost in the United States. And, as 
chapter 2 illustrated, the long-lasting effect of this original comparative advantage is felt 
even today. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: To begin with, section 5.2 traces the evolving 
infrastructure for scientific research in the United States. Two developments led to an 
institutional comparative advantage for biotechnology in the United States: First, an 
ideology of ‘making the peaks higher’ has led to the clustering of scientific infrastructure. 
This organizational premise not only informed different waves of military build-up, but it 
also continues to be visible in today’s geographic clustering of the biotechnology industry. 
Second, from its early beginnings, science and technology policies promoted 
entrepreneurialism among not-for profit institutions and scientists. 
 
After World War II, the reconversion of these military resources for civilian purposes 
ushered in a division of labor, in which publicly funded basic research would be made 
available to for-profit actors who carried out applied research for commercialization. This 




   
 
evolution of the NIH into the world’s largest organization for medical research, which will 
be tackled in section 5.3. The NIH not only increased the resources for biomedical 
research, it also institutionalized funding mechanisms based on peer review, which 
continued to allocate more resources to already existing clusters of excellence.  
 
Eventually, the crisis of the post-World War II model of organization of the American 
society also reached science and technology.  Although considerable federal resources 
continued to be directed to basic research, corporate actors complained that the state would 
become uncoupled from the needs of the private industry and its priorities for R&D. 
Section 5.4 therefore discusses the neoliberal turn of science and technology policies of the 
1980s. To bolster American high-tech competitiveness various policies to accelerate 
development and commercialization of new technologies were devised. Legislation was 
adopted to encourage scientific entrepreneurs. As a result, patenting of federally funded 
research, as well as its out-licensing to the private sector were successfully taken up by 
biomedical researchers and corporate actors.  
 
Moreover, the neoliberal preoccupation with the supply-side of the economy also 
benefitted biotechnology firms’ never-ending need for capital. As a consequence of 
financial deregulation of the 1980s, new financial mechanisms were created that helped 
previously inaccessible funds to enter the speculative funding of high-technology ventures. 
Section 5.5 will address the policy changes that gave rise to these new financial vehicles, in 





   
 
An equally important regulatory issue for the biotechnology industry is the question of 
intellectual property protection. Section 5.6 investigates the importance and the sui generis 
character that the protection of intellectual property rights has enjoyed in the United States. 
Although patent laws have at times been lenient towards copying inventions, by the end of 
the 20th century the neoliberal paradigm considers strong patents inevitable to promote 
entrepreneurial activities. Specifically important for the biotechnology industry continues 
to be the issue of the patentable subject matter, as for instance organisms, tissues, and 
genetic information have not been easily subsumed under the logic of patent law. 
Ultimately, I will explain how the flexible, pragmatic, pro-commercialization approach of 
the American patent law turned out to be a key institutional comparative advantage for the 
biotechnology industry in the United States. 
 
In a similar vein, from its early beginnings the United States’ approach to regulate the 
safety of biotechnologies came down on the side of what is pragmatic and promotes 
commercialization. Section 5.7 will elaborate how, reacting to the first gene splicing 
experiments, a commercialization-friendly approach based on the product, not the process, 
became the yardstick for biotechnology regulation in the United States. This also provided 
a crucial comparative institutional advantage for producing and commercializing 
genetically modified crops in the United States first.  
 
Yet the most crucial regulatory hurdle for launching products in the United States of the 
biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry is the Food and Drug Administration 




   
 
The FDA was challenged and underfunded by the neoliberal changes prescribed to federal 
bureaucracies by the Reagan administration. The agency had to endure until a new 
administration and Congress decided for an overhaul in the 1990s. I will discuss how 
reforms of the FDA administration streamlined the drug approval process in favor of the 
needs of the industry it was supposed to regulate. This transformation is also telling about a 
regulatory agency can turn from an impediment to an international comparative advantage.  
 
Lastly, section 5.9 will conclude on the key aspects of the institutional support structure 
that profit the biotechnology industry in the United States. As the analysis has been mostly 
limited on the supply side, this section will also provide a segway to the next chapter, 
which will be tackling the influence of the United States healthcare system on the 
biotechnology industry. 
 
5.2. Making the Peaks Higher 
5.2.1 Early Beginnings that Count 
From its first origins, the scientific infrastructure of the United States can best be 
characterized by its uneven geographic distribution of centers of excellence. This evolving 
infrastructure for scientific research in the United States could become an institutional 
comparative advantage for biotechnology in that country for two reasons: First, different 
waves of ‘making the peaks higher’ have led to the clustering of scientific infrastructure 
that continues to be visible also in today’s geographic clustering of the biotechnology 
industry. And second, from early-on science and technology policies promoted 




   
 
culture of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, this created a culture of science 
entrepreneurs that paved the way for their transition into a for-profit-mode when neoliberal 
supply-side policies encourage them to do so in the 1980s.  
 
Historically, America’s institutions of higher education evolved throughout several cycles 
of built-up: From the first elite colleges, all located on the East Coast, to educate gentlemen 
in the ways of theology, languages, and the classics; the Morrill Land Grant Act47 of 1862 
which granted each state federal land to use if for the establishment of a public college in 
the favor of agricultural and mechanical education; and the first designated research 
universities: In comparison with many European countries, the United States was 
considered to be a latecomer and before 1940 there were few areas in which American 
science was considered to be in the lead48. At that time, Germany’s research universities 
had gained worldwide leadership in natural science. In the United States, the foundation of 
Johns Hopkins University, modeled after the German universities, was the breakthrough 
for a new kind of organization that allowed scientists to concentrate on their research rather 
than teaching. By the beginning of the twentieth century, there were fifteen universities that 
resembled today’s blueprint for a research university: Johns Hopkins, Stanford and 
Chicago, which had been founded as research universities according to the German model; 
Ivy-League colleges such as Yale, Princeton, Penn, Harvard, and Columbia, which evolved 
into centers of scientific excellence; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and 
Cornell, which developed as land-grant institutions; and state universities in Illinois, and in 
                                                 
47 Public Law 37-108. 
48 For an overview of the history of the United States development in science and technology see Dupree 




   
 
 Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin and California, which had scientific and engineering 
research at their core (Crow and Tucker 2001). This distribution of centers of scientific 
excellence is noteworthy, because these research universities became the main recipients as 
a more structured funding for scientific and technological research evolved. 
 
More than once this increase in funding dovetailed with a military build-up. The first 
watershed was World War I (Geiger 1986) because in addition to rallying more resources 
towards science and technology, it also established the practice of contract research, 
concentrated in a few research universities. This setup allowed scientists to remain at their 
home institution rather than work in a central government research facility (Kleinman 
1995, p. 18). These trends were exacerbated by funding patterns established by 
philanthropic foundations, particularly those of the leading industrialists of the turn of the 
century, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie. Initially, the philanthropic boost for 
science had been more a collateral of the general assistance to higher education. For 
example, in 1892 a gift of $800,000 by John D. Rockefeller single-handedly jumpstarted 
the University of Chicago. And while there was no direct links and strings attached to this 
support,  
 
“it is important to note that even at this early date universities, and thus scientific 
research, were intimately linked to the economy, and the interests of universities were 





   
 
Over time, however, the focus of philanthropy shifted towards research. In 1902, Andrew 
Carnegie established the Carnegie Institution of Washington with a donation of $10 
million. At that time, this sum was not only equal to Harvard’s endowment it also 
surpassed the combined financial resources of all American universities that were 
dedicated specifically for research. Carnegie’s new institution was set up to “encourage 
investigation, research, and discovery” by giving opportunities to the “exceptional man” 
with the aim to overcome America’s “national poverty in science” and to “change our 
position among nations” (Kevles 1992, p. 195).  
 
Philanthropic foundations established certain principles for the decades to come. In 
addition to contributing to the concentration of research in already superior institutions, 
foundations also contributed vast resources directly to science. Particularly the engagement 
of the Rockefeller Foundation to support selected fields that would directly contribute to 
the ‘welfare of mankind’ had a decisive impact on American physical and biological 
sciences. In the worlds of the Foundation’s Board Member Wickliffe Rose, funding hat to 
be concentrated to “[m]ake the peaks higher” (Geiger 1986, p. 11).  
 
When Rose’s approach was taken over by Warren Weaver, who became Rockefeller 
Foundation’s director of natural sciences in the early 1930s, this had two lasting 
consequences: First, Weaver’s vision and the allocation of resources, particularly to the 
Californian Institute of Technology (Caltech), marshaled a paradigm shift in biological 
research by employing physical and chemical sciences, all of which ultimately coalesced in 




   
 
biology on the molecular level, would later become the key to the commercialization of 
biological knowledge by the biotechnology industry (Kay 1993; Kevles 1992). Second, 
Rockefeller Foundation support reinforced already existing patterns of excellence for R&D 
and training in few, selected institutions profited universities such as Stanford University, 
MIT, Harvard, and Rockefeller University in New York. The ideology of ‘making the 
peaks higher’ created entities that have always had a business-oriented streak rather than a 
mandate to create ‘knowledge for the sake of knowledge’ (Kleinman, p. 36)49. 
 
Whereas the Rockefeller Foundation almost single-handedly remodeled the field of 
biology, the demands from ‘big physics’ could ultimately be met only by big government 
support (Kevles 1987, 1992). Federal engagement in science and technology was forever 
changed by the strong defense buildup during World War II, and particularly the research 
that was at the basis of the atomic bomb. The Manhattan Project to build an atomic bomb 
spent over $2 billion, employed many of the most eminent scientists and procured vast 
experimental production facilities from some of the nation’s technologically most advanced 
companies. In addition to these expenses, the federal government spent another $2 billion 
on other military R&D (Hart 1998, p. 128). Throughout the years 1943-1945, more than 37 
percent of the United States’ GDP were spent for military purposes (Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) 2009). The presence of such massive defense programs and the absence 
of a comparable civilian industrial R&D capacity had vast domestic consequences for the 
United States. It set the path for the distribution of wealth and power among its industry 
                                                 
49 It is interesting to note that natural scientists never contended the increasing hierarchy among them. 





   
 
sectors, classes, and regions, which later also had ramifications for the clustering of the 
biotechnology industry. 
5.2.2 Science, the Endless Frontier After WWII 
After World War II, a shift in research policy was intended to redirect the massive means 
for the military buildup toward civil ends. This was the core argument of the report 
“Science – The Endless Frontier” by Vannevar Bush (1945), who as director of the Office 
of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) oversaw the Manhattan Project. 
Government science policies would have to be redirected to balance military security, 
public health, and economic welfare. Most prominently, the report featured the idea that 
also in times of peace, the promotion of science was indeed a proper concern for 
government. As the American government had always been engaged in the opening of 
frontiers – opening the seas to clippers and furnishing land to pioneers – it was within the 
American tradition that also the endless frontier of science should be made accessible by 
the federal government, because 
 
“[t]here are areas of science in which the public interest is acute but which are 
likely to be cultivated inadequately if left without more support than will come from 
private sources. These areas – such as research on military problems, agriculture, 
housing, public health, certain medical research, and research involving expensive 
capital facilities beyond the capacity of private institutions – should be advanced by 





   
 
When World War II came to an end, elite scientists under the leadership of Bush demanded 
that government guarantee its support for basic research, because this was the necessary 
foundation for a strong economy. Given the wartime success of military sciences, in 
particular the Manhattan Project, scientists’ demand could muster vast support throughout 
society. Bush and his colleagues saw no need for government to fund applied or technology 
research, which they thought would put government into direct competition with industry. 
Conversely, private corporations were in favor of government funding for basic research, 
which was not profitable for firms who feared that ‘free riders’ would benefit from the 
research they funded (Kleinman 1995, p. 188). To some extent, this division of labor 
between the public and the private sector was indeed established. The quarter century after 
World War II was remembered by scientists as a ‘golden era’ of federal research funding, 
particularly after the lifting of the McCarthyite security restrictions in the middle of the 
1950s:  
 
“It was a time not only when money was freely available but when it was distributed in 
an apolitical manner and could be freely spent primarily in accord with [scientists’, 
VL]  professional judgement.” (Kevles 1992, p. 218). 
 
How a-political research can indeed be is a legitimate cause for contestation. As long as 
there are more ideas than resources to pursue them, every priority chosen and resource 
allocated will be at the expense of foregone alternatives50. Yet after WWII, the federal 
                                                 
50 In fact, there was also an alternative to Bush’s policy prescriptions, promoted by Senator Harry Kilgore 
(D-West Virginia), who wanted a coordinated scientific agenda administered by a national science 
foundation. Agenda and foundation should be democratically accountable to a board composed of different 




   
 
government did indeed become the prime patron for research and development. Towards 
this end, it also established an array of new institutions, such as the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) in 1946; the various armed services agencies consolidated in the 
Department of Defense (DOD) in 1947; and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1948 
(see 5.3 below), which were an umbrella for the National Cancer Institute, the new 
National Heart Institute, as well as other research activities within the Public Health 
Service. A latecomer to this was the National Science Foundation (NSF), which was 
founded in 1950 to become the flag ship agency for basic research and training in all 
scientific disciplines. Yet at that time all biomedical research was already based under the 
guidance of the NIH, whereas virtually every other field of research was overshadowed by 
the various defense agencies (Kevles 1992, p. 212).  
  
The Korean War quickly refocused the federal R&D agenda back to military needs. 
Defense spending rose to 14 percent of GDP in 1953 – the second-highest ever since WWII 
– and the DOD and AEC accounted for 80 to 90 percent of federal research monies. To a 
large extent military R&D expenditures went to those university campuses that were able 
to carry out basic research for military aims. This was the case, for instance, with MIT and 
its Research Laboratory in Electronics, which, at one point, had contracts with three 
different military agencies. Cold War research efforts were boosted again after 1957, when 
the launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite triggered the creation of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). As a consequence of the aerospace efforts, federal 
                                                                                                                                                    
the science agenda was the promotion of economic wellbeing through applied research. According to 
Kleinman (1995), however, the fractioned American state, its parties, and the various informal rather than 
formal entry points into policy influence, ultimately tipped the balance in favor of elite scientific organization 




   
 
research expenditures quadrupled until 1967. According to the rule of ‘making the peaks 
higher’ federal agencies’ grants and contracts – again – disproportionately favored the most 
advanced research universities. This federal military R&D support compounded the already 
existing geographical and institutional concentration of a scientific infrastructure that 
contributed to the clustering of the contemporary biotechnology industry.  
 
The state of California, which profited most from the different waves of military spending, 
demonstrates the lasting effect of these federal resource allocations. World War II changed 
the state from a resource-based economy into an advanced-technology economy heavily 
engaged in aircraft and battleship production. In 1963, California, with its large 
concentration of aerospace firms absorbed almost 39 percent of all federal grants and in 
1980, over 44 percent of all NASA contracts and over 25 percent of all defense contracts 
were awarded to Californian firms (Fosler 1988, p. 211). Until Ronald Reagan became 
governor of California in 1966, the state allocated the extra tax revenues to public 
infrastructure programs, including colleges and its state university system51. These earlier 
investments paid off later thanks to the path-breaking research that took place there: For 
instance, at the University of San Francisco, Herbert Boyer, together with Stanley Cohen 
from Stanford University, developed the technology for recombinant DNA, which was 
patented and later commercialized by the first biotechnology firm, Genentech. Also the 
newly-built university campus of the University of San Diego has since played an 
important role for the biotechnology industry clustering around them. The relevance of the 
UC system for the biotechnology industry seems to be uninhibited by the fact that the state 
                                                 




   
 
no longer prioritizes on higher education and by 2000 ranked only 42nd of all states in terms 
of general funding for education (Gittell and Sedgley 2000).  
 
Again by the end of the late 1970s, heightened attention for national security led to an 
increase in federal R&D budgets. The largest share went to defense-related R&D, which in 
the late 1980s accounted for 70 percent of the entire federal R&D budget (Kevles 1992, p. 
224). This increase in share was also the consequence of a relative decline in the budgets 
for non-defense purposes, such as health, the environment, natural resources, and energy. 
Moreover, due to the fear of international competition, particularly from Japan, the social 
utility of research was redefined as contributing to the country’s high-tech competitiveness. 
For this, a closer cooperation between academia and industry was advocated, and later 
translated into specific policy measures for technology transfer and commercial 
exploitation of scientific research. This neoliberal turn in science and technology policies 
will be presented in detail in Section 5.5 below. Yet before it is first necessary to address 
the specific role of the NIH. Not only have the NIH been at the center of these neoliberal 
policy changes, but they are also the most important federal institutional support structure 





   
 
 
5.3 Federal Funding for Biomedical Research – The Role of the NIH 
 
This recast of the history of the NIH illustrates on the one hand how this federal institution 
for health research has grown into a powerful system to stimulate and to fund basic 
biomedical research. On the other hand, NIH funding and support has continuously 
reinforced the clustering of biomedical research excellence.  
 
The history of federal health research started in 1887 in a one-room laboratory within the 
Marine Hospital Service. This Hygienic Laboratory was turned into the (singular) National 
Institute of Health (NIH) by the Ransdell Act of 1930. Seven years later, the National 
Cancer Institute was founded and the then plural NIH became the umbrella that 
accommodated also later founded institutes such as those for research on mental health, 
dental diseases, and heart disease. From a small entity, which had only two research 
institutions and a budget of $25 million in 1948, the NIH grew steadily. The extension of 
funding for medical research channeled through the NIH was in part the consequence of 
competition with other agencies: Immediately after WWII, the NIH was able to have 
wartime contracts transferred to its jurisdiction. Moreover, as the American society 
prospered, elected officials noticed that appropriating funds for health-related research 
never lost them a vote. As a consequence, there were targeted ‘big government’ 
interventions to ‘go to war’ against certain diseases. Most prominently, Richard Nixon 
declared war on cancer and Congress passed a National Cancer Act in December 1971, as a 




   
 
federal spending on the ‘War on Cancer’ amounted to over $50 billion so far, there are 
plausible arguments to see this war as a failure52. Yet these and other federally sponsored 
biomedical initiatives, such as the Human Genome Project, laid the groundwork for much 
of the contemporary biosciences. To date, the NIH has become a system of 27 research 
institutes and centers with an annual budget of $29 billion (see Figure 5.1). It is the most 
important public institution funding medical research, in fact the world’s largest 
organization of its kind. 
 













                                                 
52 A comprehensive account is presented by Goozner (2004). 




   
 
Moreover, the NIH also shaped the landscape for biomedical research because of the 
funding mechanisms it established. About 10 percent of the NIH’s budget are spent on so-
called intramural research conducted by scientists in the NIH’s own laboratories, most of 
which are in Bethesda, Maryland. More importantly, 80 percent of the NIH resources are 
awarded through a competitive, peer-reviewed grant procedure to thousands of research 
groups throughout the United States. The NIH’s grant-making function based on 
competitive peer review had the consequence that the competition urged researchers from 
early-on to obtain a business-like approach as funding cannot be taken for granted. Despite 
the level of competition – or rather, because of it - the best-equipped laboratories used to 
obtain the largest share of the grants. The allocation of NIH extramural resources has 
perpetuated already existing clustering of excellence in biomedical research: For example, 
from 1972 to 1981, a period during which a lot of the scientific basic research later 
commercialized by the biotechnology industry was generated, the top 20 institutions never 
received less that 51 percent of the total of extramural funds (National Institutes of Health 
1981, p. 90). More recently, the NIH funds became disseminated somewhat more 
egalitarian. In 2005, when the NIH awarded a total of $23.4 billion to extramural research, 















Table 5.1: 2005 NIH Awards to All Institutions by Rank 
Rank* Organization Number Amount  
($ million) 
1 Johns Hopkins University 1299 607 
2 University of Pennsylvania 1153 471 
3 University of Washington 997 462 
4 University of California San Francisco 988 452 
5 Washington University 855 395 
6 Duke University 795 391 
7 University of Michigan 975 386 
8 University of California Los Angeles 914 386 
9 University of Pittsburgh 969 386 
10 Yale University 868 337 
11 Columbia University 763 331 
12 SAIC-Frederick, Inc.* 1 328 
13 Harvard University 682 321 
14 University of California San Diego 681 309 
15 Stanford University 763 306 
16 University of North Carolina Chapel Hill 782 297 
17 Massachusetts General Hospital 694 287 
18 Case Western Reserve University 673 279 
19 Vanderbilt University 668 266 
20 University of Wisconsin Madison 670 257 
 Top 20 Total:  7,254 
*SAIC-Frederick, Inc. is a contractor that operates the government-owned laboratories at the NCI in 
Frederick, MD  
 
Source: NIH http://report.nih.gov/award/trends/Rnk_05_All.xls, retrieved April 8, 2009. 
 
On the other hand, looking at the geographical ranking of NIH award recipients, which was 
compiled for the last time in 2003, it seems that the old clusters of excellence, which 
dominated the allocation of resources for R&D already since World War I, continue to fare 
well. Research institutions and companies located in the five cities included in the 




   
 
Francisco, received more than $ 11 billion, 51 percent of a total of $ 21.6 billion of 
extramural funding in that year. (Table 5.2): In this sense, the NIH continues to make 
higher the peaks of already existing excellence in biomedical research.  
 
Table 5.2: NIH Domestic Institutions Awards City Ranking 2003 
Rank   City Number  Amount  
($ million) 
1 Boston 3,589 1,619  
2 New York 2,989 1,218  
3 La Jolla/San Diego 1,626 1,133  
4 Philadelphia 2,014 804  
5 Baltimore 1,831 764  
6 Seattle 1,441 730  
7 Los Angeles 1,422 606  
8 Chicago 1,431 544  
9 Houston  1,172 506  
10 San Francisco 1,097 494  
 
Source: NIH, http://report.nih.gov/award/trends/top100fy03.htm  retrieved on April 8, 2009 
 
Also the distribution of NIH funding to states fits into these well-established patterns: 
 
Table 5.3: Leading States—Total of NIH Funding, FY 2007 
Rank State Amount  
($ million) 
1 California 3,163 
2 Massachusetts 2,236 
3 New York 1,934 
4 Pennsylvania 1,399 
5 Texas 1,083 
6 Maryland    976 
7 North Carolina    931 
8 Washington    786 
9 Illinois    724 
10 Ohio    628 
 




   
 
In sum, over the years the NIH has grown into a powerful system to stimulate and to fund 
basic biomedical research, which continues to favor many already existing clusters of 
excellence. The next section is dedicated to those neoliberal shifts in politics and policies 
that made biomedical research funded by the NIH or other federal grants ready for 
commercializing by biotechnology industry actors. 
 
5.4 Neoliberal Policies Promoting Supply-Side Driven Technology 
Development 
 
5.4.1 Abandoning the Post-War Consensus 
Vannevar Bush’s model for the Post-World War II division of labor in science and 
technology, assumed that the state was responsible for financing basic research, whereas 
private corporations were responsible for applied research and marketing. Yet this compact 
began showing its strains as early as in the mid 1960s, when corporate actors complained 
that state-funded research would become uncoupled from the needs of the private industry 
and its priorities for R&D. To counter this criticism, the Johnson Administration adopted 
the State Technical Services Act of 1965, which should accelerate technology transfer 
between laboratory and the market (Smith 1990, p. 59). More importantly, while for the 
most part of the post-World-War-II era, the United States’ national investment on R&D 
was larger than those of all other OECD nations combined (Mowery and Rosenberg 1993, 
p. 29), subsequent administrations were confronted with a shrinking technological 
advantage between the United States and other industrialized countries, notably in Europe, 
and Japan. It seemed that creating military technologies, hoping they would spill over into 




   
 
and policies. Instead, to foster society’s wellbeing as a whole, the United States innovation 
system, comprised of industry, universities, and federal government, had to change 
considerably. 
 
By 1980, the approach towards science and technology was retooled with the overarching 
goal to strengthen the United States’ military and economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other 
nations. In line with the rising neoliberal ideological paradigm shift, the newly elected 
government of President Reagan by no means advocated for a hands-off role of the state. 
Rather, the state’s role was to provide a competitive advantage, to maximize the return on 
the nation’s R&D investment, and to ensure the long-term viability of the country’s science 
and technology base, on which private actors would then be able to capitalize. Against this 
backdrop, two policy initiatives turned out to be consequential: First, special funding 
programs for small innovative firms. Second, the transfer of technologies funded by those 
or other federal initiatives into the private sector. Both led to a remodeled, supply-side 
driven science and technology policy, which benefitted the unfolding of the United States 
medical biotechnology industry. And, as the interviews in the previous chapter highlighted, 
they continue to be relevant for the institutional advantage that biotechnology actors see the 
United States provide for their business also today.  
 
5.4.2 Federal Funding for Small Businesses to Carry Out Innovative Research 
The most important tool devised for channeling government monies into innovative, small 
firms was the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 198254. The law requires 
                                                 




   
 
federal institutes by law to set aside 2.5 percent of their extramural annual budget for a 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Since then, eleven federal 
departments and agencies, for example the Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Defense, and the Department of Health and Human Services, award a portion of their funds 
to small businesses to engage in R&D that has the potential for commercialization. To be 
eligible for an SBIR grant, businesses must be American-owned, independently operated, 
for-profit, and no bigger than 500 employees55. The purpose of the Act was to stimulate 
technological innovation; use small businesses to meet parts of federal R&D needs; and 
increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal research 
(Gardner 1994, p. 39). SBIR programs comprise three phases: a first phase that currently 
grants $100,000 for a period of up to 6 months to carry out a feasibility study as to whether 
a proposed research effort could ultimately lead to a commercial product; a second phase 
with up to $ 500,000 for up to two years, if the continuation of the first phase is likely to 
result in a commercial product or service; and a third, final phase during which the research 
funded by government is commercialized with non-governmental monies. 
  
SBIR grants are complemented by the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
program56, which fosters public-private sector partnerships and joint venture opportunities 
for small business and the nation’s premier nonprofit research institutions, such as 
colleges/universities, domestic nonprofit research organizations, and federally funded R&D 
                                                 
55 Information retrieved on April 13, 2009 from U.S. Small Business Administration: 
http://www.sba.gov/SBIR/indexsbir-sttr.html 
56 The requirements for and the structure of STTR grants are similar to SBIR’s, but STTR can provide more 




   
 
centers (FFRDCs)57. As many smaller companies interviewed pointed out in Chapter 3, 
theses federal grants often played a decisive role in moving a company forward. The most 
important federal institution for biomedical research, the NIH, disbursed 1811 such grants 
worth $626 million in 2008 alone. Moreover, this funding mechanism proves to be a 
reliable long-term opportunity available for small businesses to return to: over the last ten 
years, the NIH has granted over 18,000 awards worth almost $ 5.4 billion (Table 5.4).   
 
Table 5.4: NIH SBIR and STTR Grants 
Fiscal Year Number of Awards Award Amount 
(million $) 
1999 1560 327 
2000 1697 377 
2001 1777 437 
2002 1948 515 
2003 2131 564 
2004 2274 633 
2005 2020 649 
2006 1844 622 
2007 1799 634 
2008 1811 626 
Total: 18861 5,384 
 
Source: Table compiled by the author from NIH Office of Extramural Research website: 
http://report.nih.gov/reports.aspx?section=NIHFunding&title=Budget%20and%20Spendin
g Retrieved April 8, 2009. 
 
At the same time, the allocation of these grants continue to be distributed according to the 
patterns already established: Since 2000 California, Massachusetts, New York, and 
                                                 
57 One example for such an FFRDC is SAIC-Frederick, Inc., (see Table 5.1 above), which is a contractor-





   
 
Maryland are always among the top five receiving states of SBIR grants, and since 1999 


















Table compiled by author based on NIH data  
































































CA 103 1 100 1 106 1 108 1 113 1 106 1 90 1 75 1 58 2 55 1 
MA 78 2 75 2 76 2 74 2 74 2 67 2 69 2 63 2 61 1 52 2 
NY 32 3 31 4 24 4 30 4 27 4 29 4 25 4 18 4 16 4 12 5 
MD 31 4 35 3 38 3 39 3 41 3 37 3 29 3 27 3 19 3 19 3 
TX 26 5 29 5 19 6 27 5 24 5 19 7 15 7 13 7 13 6 10 6 
PA 26 5 27 6 30 5 22 6 22 6 21 5 21 6 16 5 12 7 10 7 
WA 20 7 18 7 18 7 19 7 20 7 21 5 22 5 15 6 14 5 17 4 
Top 
5 270  270  274  278  279  260  235  199  168  155  
Total 
SBIR 559  554  546  546  538  506  460  389  336  294  
Top 
5 
(%) 48.3  48.7  50.2  50.9  51.9  51.4  51.1  51.2  
50.





   
 
The SBIR/STTR program is an interesting case in point of how a neoliberal state plays a 
hands-on role in supply-side driven technological development: The underlying rationale 
for this program is threefold: first, similar to federally funded basic research, it supports 
R&D that may otherwise not be carried out. Second, and unlike basic research, it has a 
short-term focus with the endpoint of a marketable product being in sight in two and a half 
years. And third, it is structured as a competition between private businesses. In other 
words, the state finances private actors’ applied research, but on a competitive basis that 
does not interfere with already existing markets.  
 
5.4.3 Technology Transfer 
By the late 1970s, in light of the shrinking technological advantage between the United 
States and other industrialized countries, debates in the United States broke out about how 
innovations were transferred between the federal government, universities, and industry. 
Whereas the United States’ national investment on R&D continued to be larger than those 
of all other OECD nations, a substantial part of it was earmarked for creating military 
technologies. Yet these inventions no longer spilled over into civilian applications in a way 
that would safeguard the United States’ economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other nations, 
notably Japan. Also for non-military purposes, political debates addressing science and 
technology asked whether in an increasing international competition the American society 
could afford waiting until the long-term benefits of federally funded basic research would 
disseminate into society quasi-automatically. Therefore, a turn of research and technology 
policies was advocated in which ‘technology transfer’ stood central. This term was coined 




   
 
In other words: publicly created knowledge should be commercialized expeditiously by 
private actors, a process that continues to be central to the business rational of the 
biotechnology industry. 
 
The most important milestone in this regard was the Patent and Trademark Law 
Amendments Act of 198058. This bipartisan effort, more commonly known under the name 
of its two sponsoring senators Birch Bayh (D-Indiana) and Robert Dole (R-Kansas) 
stipulated that inventions made by academic scientists during federally-funded research 
were no longer the property of the government. Bayh-Dole established a uniform federal 
intellectual property policy that allowed universities, and other non-profit organizations, to 
reap the benefits from their federally funded research themselves. Institutions conducting 
research funded by federal monies became entitled to patent their discoveries, and to 
license them to investors and small business commercial partners. Since then, most 
American universities, certainly all relevant research universities, established a technology 
transfer office to engage in a multitude of commercializing activities. While research 
universities such as MIT and Stanford had been engaged in commercializing their research 
already earlier59, patenting of academic biomedical research was still contested on ethical 
grounds. Until 1975, for instance, Harvard University had in place a policy that refused to 
profit from faculty research in public health and therapeutics (Smith Hughes 2001, p. 547). 
Yet as a consequence of Bayh-Dole, the number of patents issued by the PTO to 
                                                 
58 Public Law 96-517. 
59 The oldest institution to patent university faculty’s innovations and to commercialize them is the Wisconsin 




   
 
universities alone has skyrocketed, from about 250 per year to more than 3,622 patents, 25 
percent of which for therapeutic and biomedical inventions60.  
 
At its time, the Bayh-Dole Act passed uncontested. First, it was actually not all novel and 
contained many elements similar to previous efforts (Henderson and Smith 2002). And 
second, it was limited to small businesses and non-profit organizations, so that the Act was 
spared from opposition of consumer advocates or antitrust lawyers61. But the Act proved 
most consequential in the transformation of the division of labor between academia and 
industry without which also the ascent of the biotechnology industry would have been 
inconceivable. Bayh-Dole was the fire signal to bring publicly funded research into the fold 
of private commercialization, an endeavor whose magnitude unfolded throughout the 
coming years of ‘Reagonomics’.  The philosophy of the Reagan administration in this 
respect was summarized by President Reagan’s science adviser, George Keyworth II, who 
contended that:  
 
“most academic and federal scientists still operate in virtual isolation from the 
expertise of industry and from the experience, and guidance of the marketplace.” 
(Krimsky 2003, p. 30) 
 
                                                 
60 Moreover, the technology transfer umbrella organization, the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM), reported, that in 2007 their members had also granted 5,109 licenses and options signed 
and set up 555 startup companies (Tieckelmann, Kordal, and Bostrom 2007).  
61 Likewise, few took notice when on April 10, 1987, President Reagan’s Executive Order 12591 lifted the 




   
 
Consequently, the new administration issued a slew of new policy initiatives to overcome 
this perceived malpractice. In 1981, for example, the Economic Recovery Tax Act62, a pre-
eminent case of President Reagan’s tax cut legislature, granted tax credits to companies 
that contributed research equipment to universities. Tax credits were also granted to 
Research and Development Limited Partnerships (RDLPs), (see 5.5 below), if these were 
established for the purpose of university-industry collaboration. In a similar vein, that year, 
the Office of Productivity, Technology and Innovation (OPTI) was established within the 
Department of Commerce. OPTI advocated the use of RDLPs at universities as a means of 
developing alternative sources of research capital and to limit their dependency from public 
funding. RDLPs should also accelerate the transfer and private appropriation – claiming of 
intellectual property – of federally developed and funded technology. 
 
The first technology transfer law explicitly targeting federal research institutions was the 
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 198063. Its aim was to improve the 
utilization of federally funded technology developments in academia and in federal 
research institutions by state and local governments, and the private sector. The Act’s 
Section 12 also stipulated the establishment of cooperative research centers between 
industry and universities, and the R&D collaboration between federal agencies and any of 
the government-operated federal laboratories with industrial organizations. 
 
                                                 
62 Public Law 97-34. 




   
 
The Stevenson-Wydler Act, its amendment, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 
198664, and the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 198965  made 
technology transfer a mission of government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) 
laboratories and their employees. The legislation explicitly support that federally funded 
research be licensed to industrial partners. Particularly important, the heads of GOCO 
laboratories are authorized to sign Cooperative Research and Development Agreements 
(CRADAs). CRADAs are contractual arrangements that enable a federal laboratory or 
research institution to engage in a joint R&D effort with a private company. While federal 
agencies are prohibited from financing industrial counterparts directly, federal funds can be 
used to support a joint R&D infrastructure. CRADAs assign the rights to any intellectual 
property emanating from the joint research to the private company, while the federal 
government retains the non-exclusive right to license it back (Mowery 2003, p. 189). 
 
Federal research laboratories, using CRADAs as a technology transfer mechanism, are 
coordinated under the Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer (FLC). 
FLC is a nationwide network that provides the forum to develop strategies and 
opportunities for linking laboratory mission, technologies, and expertise with the 
marketplace. As of 2000, there were almost 3000 CRADAs (Mowery 2003, p. 191). Each 
federal agency and laboratory is free to develop its own CRADA model. Again, 
particularly relevant for biomedical research are the practices of the NIH and its 
laboratories.  
                                                 
64 Public Law 99-502. 




   
 
Here, a controversy erupted that went right to the center of the problem of public funding 
for private profits. The reason was the so-called ‘fair pricing’ clauses of NIH CRADAs, 
which required corporate partners to put their ‘reasonable profit’ into a ‘reasonable 
relationship’ with the public’s investment in it (Guston 1998, p. 236). Conflict initially 
arose over the anti-retroviral drug azidothymidine (AZT), which was launched in 1989 the 
United States by the pharmaceutical company Burroughs-Wellcome under the brand name 
Zidovudine. The public and particularly AIDS Activists were condemning the high price of 
$ 8,000 to 10,000 per year per person for a drug that was developed together with NIH 
researchers with public money66. Yet in 1995 the NIH director Harold Varmus decided to 
abandon reasonable pricing clauses in its CRADAs, because  
 
“NIH’s primary programmatic mission…is in biomedical research, not in product 
pricing.” (Rowe 1995).  
 
Another set of tools emanated from the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 198867 
which, amongst other things, transformed the National Bureau of Standards into the 
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST). NIST, which belongs to the 
Department of Commerce, obtained far-reaching authority to breach the division of labor 
between public and private research. Specifically, NIST began supporting directly 
companies’ R&D as well as its commercialization.  
                                                 
66 A similar conflict erupted around another CRADA between the National Cancer Institute and the company 
Bristol-Myers Squibb that led to development of the cancer drug taxol (Goozner 2004, p. 188). 




   
 
Towards this end, NIST established the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) to 
encourage companies invest in longer-term, high risk research with potentially high 
payoffs. ATP shares the costs for R&D with companies, thereby accelerating the 
development of early-stage, innovative technologies and helping companies raise their 
competitive potential. From 1990 until 2004, ATPs for biotechnology amounted to a total 
of $449 million (NIST 2004).  
 
While CRADA and ATP were conceived to promote the United States’ international 
competitiveness with respect to promising, future technologies, both policy initiatives also 
had the purpose to convert the federal large-scale scientific efforts from military to civil 
ends68. Biotechnology profited from this federal conversion strategy. In a similar vein, 
patenting reform measures such as the Bayh-Dole Act, were not explicitly conceived to 
promote biotechnology. Yet in combination they became effective just at the time when a 
second generation of start-up companies was ready to enter the market. Following the 
example of the successful university spin-off of Genentech of the 1970s, the second 
generation of university spin-offs created a boom of newly found biotechnology firms 
throughout the 1980s. This boom became possible only because of important changes that 
occurred with regards to the extension of capital for the industry, to which I will turn next, 




                                                 




   
 
5.5 (De)Regulating the Provision of Capital  
 
As biotechnology actors in the previous chapter highlighted time and again, most start-up 
firms require substantial capital beyond what founders can bring to the table or what the 
(normally loss-making) activities of the company generate endogenously (see 4.3). Yet 
firms that have only intangible assets, while looking ahead of years without profits are 
unlikely to receive a normal loan from a bank or another debt financing. Venture capital 
organizations finance such high-risk, potentially high-reward start-up companies and obtain 
a share in the company while it is still held privately. A generally agreed-upon definition of 
venture capital is that it is  
 
“independently managed, dedicated pools of capital that focuses on equity or equity 
linked investments in privately held, high-growth companies” (Lerner 2002, p. 327). 
  
The VC industry was originally a purely American phenomenon that originated in the 
wealth management offices of business families such as the Rockefellers and Phipps. Yet 
the first genuine VC firm according to the abovementioned definition was established in 
1946, when MIT President Carl Compton, Harvard Business School Professor Georges F. 
Doriot, and some local Massachusetts business leaders founded American Research and 
Development Corporation (ARDC). Capitalizing on their location and institutional 
affiliations, these first venture capitalists made high-risk investments into start-up 
companies that were founded on technologies developed for World War II. ARDC 




   
 
business opportunities, recruited funds for them, and participated in their management. 
ARDC’s largest success throughout its 26 years of existence was the $70,000 investment 
into Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) in 1957, which was valued after DEC’s IPO at 
$355 million. As institutional investors at that time hesitated to invest into such funds, 
ARDC was structured as a so-called closed-end fund that was marketed mostly to 
individuals.  
 
One of the first steps that the United States government took to promote a professionally-
managed venture capital industry was the passage of the Small Business Investment Act of 
195869. The 1958 Act provided venture capital firms structured as Small Business 
Investment Companies (SBICs) access to federal funds which could be leveraged against 
privately raised investment funds. Yet for two decades the annual flow of resources into 
these VC funds never exceeded a few hundred million dollars annually. Resources poured 
into VC increased by the end of the 1970s, as a consequence of a number of significant 
policy changes. Most important was a change in policy at the U.S. Department of Labor 
with regards to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Through 1978, 
ERISA stipulated that pension managers invest with the care of a ‘prudent man’ and many 
fund managers abstained from investing in VC, because their engagement in early-stage 
companies could be conceived as imprudent.  Yet in early 1979, the Labor Department 
ruled that an allocation of a small fraction of a portfolio to VC funds may very well be 
considered prudent (Gompers and Lerner 2004, p. 37). Consequently, from 1978 to 1983 
the amount of VC invested increased from $414 million to $5,289 million and by 1986, 
                                                 




   
 
pension fund provided for 52 percent of all contributions (Lerner 2002, p. 330). One other 
important change that contributed to this development was the rise of the limited 
partnership model as the dominant organizational form for VC funds. Limited partnerships 
do not pay capital gains taxes, only the investors to it are taxable. As pension funds and 
other non-taxable investors increased their contributions to VC funds, these funds 
themselves became exempted from paying taxes. These political changes that boosted the 
VC industry are emblematic for the paradigm shift toward supply-side economics: Instead 
of the state collecting revenues that could then be distributed to stimulate the demand-side 
of the economy, the state foregoes these revenues and leaves it over to the private sector to 
make a new stream of finance available for the supply-side of advanced technologies. 
Undoubtedly, throughout its history, the biotechnology industry profited from this 
paradigm shift. 
 
Biotechnology firms’ never-ending need for capital also led to the creation of new financial 
mechanisms, the most widely used of which became known as research and development 
limited partnership (RDLP), which was first invented by a Wall Street lawyer. In the early 
1980s, as the biotechnology industry began taking off, RLDP’s became popular among 
start-up companies to fund clinical trials or production scale-up. RDLP’s helped startups to 
tap the capital of wealthy private individuals, which, in return for accepting the risk of their 
investment received royalties and stock options. Moreover, tax provisions allow these 
limited partners to obtain tax breaks, as their investment is considered R&D expenditure. 




   
 
needed even larger amounts of money, while at the same time new financial entities such as 
hedge funds allowed high-net-worth individuals even larger returns on their investment.  
 
More important than RDLPs for the long-term development of the biotechnology industry 
– and the VC industry as its sponsor - was the existence of effective stock markets, which 
are regulated in the United States by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Whereas for a start-up company, the IPO at a stock exchange provides the opportunity to 
increase its capital base for future operations, for VC firms it is the preferred forum to 
recoup profitably their investment. Fledgling biotechnology start-up companies often times 
cannot comply with the requirements for revenues, profits, and cash flow that traditional 
stock markets impose on companies to be listed. This ‘equity gap’ is filled by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). Originally 
established to trade in stocks that could not fulfill the rigid requirements of the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASDAQ 
turned into a fully computerized trading network in 1971 and is particularly used by 
technology startups. Also in Europe, fuelled by the technology boom of the 1990s, for 
instance in Germany a ‘Neuer Markt’ was launched in 1997 with the aim of matching 
NASDAQ as a stock market for innovative young companies. However, after losing 95 
percent of its value, the ‘Neuer Markt’ was closed in 2002. The absence of a clear path 
towards liquidity was considered the key bottleneck for the development of a VC industry 
in Europe (Boquist and Dawson 2004). By contrast, the long-term availability of a trading 
floor for high-tech, high-risk companies turned out to be particularly relevant for the 




   
 
comparison between these different stock markets confirms the argument made by the 
VoC-approach: The structure of financial markets in the United States as a liberal market 
economy indeed provide a comparative institutional advantage that is crucial for high-tech, 
innovative industries.  
 
5.6 Intellectual Property Protection  
5.6.1 General Considerations Regarding Patenting 
Whereas other forms of intellectual property right (IPR), such as trademarks and copyrights 
are relevant for other advanced industries, such as computer and information technologies, 
patents are the most relevant form of IPR for the biotechnology industry. According to 
Jasanoff (2005, pp. 203-4), patents played an indispensable foundational role in the 
development of the biotechnology industry, especially in the United States in three 
different ways: First, they created property rights for things that were previously outside of 
the realm for ownership claims. As a consequence, these newly commodified objects could 
be circulated and exchanged in markets. Second, since much of the early technological 
developments took place before there were any marketable, tangible products, patents 
provided the only evidence to investors that it was worth putting money into the fledgling 
technology. Third, patents created a guarantee that once there would be tangible outcomes 
and products, their commercialization would not be entangled in endless lawsuits. In sum, 
patents would order the increasingly complex web in which research subjects, researchers, 
universities, start-up firms, government and industry would engage to create and 





   
 
In this vein, I will highlight two reasons why the U.S. patent system has turned out to be a 
comparative institutional advantage for biotechnology firms in the United States: First, the 
historic role that patent protection has played in the United States. And secondly, related, 
the ways in which the U.S. patent system was mended to combine the general logic of 
patents with the needs of biotechnology’s new subject matter. Before these causes can be 
addressed, however, some general comments about the logic of patenting are necessary. 
 
By granting a patent, an individual claim for inventiveness, it is assumed that this reward 
for an individual will trickle up and promote society’s goods at large70. Patenting is 
therefore a reflection of the neoliberal creed to promote society’s well-being at large by 
granting favors to individual economic actors. In theory, the idea of a patent is to reconcile 
the legitimate reward for an inventor’s ingenuity with society’s benefit from new 
inventions. Without patent laws, it has always been argued, inventors would either keep 
their innovations as secrets for themselves, or they would just not invent at all. By giving 
innovators for a limited period of time a monopoly on the economic exploitation of their 
invention, they would be rewarded and could recoup their investment. At the same time, 
society at large would profit from the disclosure of the invention. By granting an individual 
an exclusive property right, it is hoped that when these individuals pursue their own 
interest in a competitive market, the fruits of their labor would become accessible to the 
general population and would benefit society as a whole (Usselman and John 2006, p. 103). 
 
                                                 
70 Such individualized view on knowledge production is by no means uncontested, as the vast body on the 




   
 
Obviously, the functioning of IPRs would not be conceivable without the crucial role of the 
state: Claiming intellectual property only makes sense when there is an overarching 
authority that makes the rules and enforces them – if need be, even, internationally. The 
development of patents therefore is a story about the functioning of the neoliberal state. 
Moreover, a patent, like any other kind of intellectual property protection, is a historically 
constructed artifact. There is nothing pre-ordained about what should or should not be 
protected. On the contrary, by defining what constitutes intellectual property, particular 
perspectives are given the benefit at the expense of others, so that certain things become a 
property and others remain freely available (Sell and May 2001, p. 468). Seen this way, 
intellectual property rights congeal in a legalized way for a certain period the political 
struggles about technological progress. Such struggles reverberate throughout the history of 
the U.S. patent system. They are also the reason why an evolving view of patents has been 
of key importance for the development of the biotechnology industry.  
 
5.6.2 The History of U.S. Patent Law  
The evolution of the United States patent law is characterized by contingencies as well as 
contestations and contradictions. When looking at the history of intellectual property 
protection in the United States, three issues stand out that also reverberate in contemporary 
debates about biotechnology patents: First, there is the issue of monopoly. Over time, the 
balance between the interest of the public and the inventor has shifted back and forth and – 
as the case of patenting of DNA sequences demonstrates - continues to be a contested 
issue. Second, there is the question of relevance of patents for trade. The logical 




   
 
trade has made the United States government take different positions at different times, yet 
its interventions have regularly reverberated on the international and global level71. Third, 
there is the question of what can be patented. Problems pertaining to the subject matter for 
which patents could be granted had to be resolved and living matter, the object of 
biotechnological interventions, turned out to be particularly conflict-ridden.  
 
The United States was among the first nations that developed a body of laws to protect the 
intellectual property of inventors. It is quite indicative of the industrious and economical 
nature of the newly-found nation that intellectual property rights were the only fundamental 
rights to be enshrined in the Constitution. Whereas rights such as free speech and freedom 
of religion, which were central to the debate of the framers, only amended the Constitution 
in a separate Bill of Rights, the U.S. Constitution, in Article 1 grants Congress the power  
 
“to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts by Securing for limited Times the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries72.” 
 
The first United States Patent Law, adopted in 1790, was administered by Secretary of 
State Thomas Jefferson. And although this indicated the concern of the new government 
for the progress of sciences and technological inventions, relatively few patents were 
issued. In fact, at that stage of economic development, patents were detrimental for the 
young nation that was trying to catch up with a rapidly industrializing Europe. The United 
States’ first Secretary of the Treasure, Alexander Hamilton, concerned himself with the 
                                                 




   
 
fledgling nation’s dependence on manufactured British imports. Unlike many of his 
contemporaries who were informed by Adam Smith’s classical liberal beliefs that 
manufacturers would grow in the just pace and size without government support, 
Hamilton’s “Report on the Subject of Manufactures“ (1817) drew up a mercantilist 
program to promote development of the domestic manufacturers. Government support for 
the economy, Hamilton argued, was not only necessary, but  
 
“it is the right of every independent nation to pursue its own interest, in its own way” 
(Hamilton as quoted in Ben-Atar (1995, p. 412)).73  
 
Yet in the second half of the 19th century, changes occurred that altered the utility of a 
weak patent system for the United States: First, key technologies had become so complex 
that simply importing machinery and skilled workforce would no longer be sufficient to 
master a new technology (Chang 2001). Second, American companies started to obtain a 
competitive technological advantage over foreign companies (Sell 2003, p. 65). 
Corporations, such as the Edison Company, therefore lobbied the United States 
government to establish an internationally reciprocal patent regime that would allow 
companies to transfer their knowledge through an organized and enforceable licensing of 
patents. The second half of the 19th century, however, was an era of economic liberalism 
and intellectual property protection was seen at odds with the notion of free trade. Only in 
the aftermath of a global economic crisis of 1873 did the violation of free-market-
                                                                                                                                                    
72 Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8, clause 8. 
73 Hamilton’s adviser Tench Coxe even went one step further and came out publicly in favor of industrial 




   
 
principles become more palatable. As the protectionists won over free-traders in general, 
intellectual property was still considered a trade restriction, but this was no longer seen as a 
problem as long as it served the national interest (Sell and May 2001, p. 483). And 
internationally, the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property for the 
first time established transboundary rules and procedures for patenting. 
 
Domestically in the United States, however, the push for patent protection became 
contested during the late 19th century. As a reaction to the increasing control of economic 
life through trusts, holdings, and other interlocking ownership structures, Congress passed 
several antitrust laws (Noble 1977, p. 88). While the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 
proved to be mostly symbolic74, the Act added to the general feeling that even if patents 
were monopolies only for a limited period of time, they were monopolies nonetheless and 
their benefits had to be justified (Kaplow 1984). Substantively more important towards 
limited patent protection was the passage of the Clayton Act of 1914, which forbade so-
called tying clauses. Such tying clauses were a kind of a vertical restraint, which extended 
the reach of a patent on unpatented articles that are used in conjunction with a patented 
invention75. After the adoption of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court subsequently struck 
down tying arrangements arguing that they were inconsistent with the overriding principle 
of free competition.  
                                                                                                                                                    
time for the young nation to be creative about how to “borrow some of their inventions” (Coxe quoted in 
(Ben-Atar 1995, p. 396). 
74 The Act prohibited contracts, combinations, or conspiracies to establish monopolies in interstate or foreign 
commerce. Only eight law suits were instituted between 1890 and 1911, four of which were against labor 
unions. Moreover, it did nothing to prevent corporations from merging, which was exactly what happened at 
an unprecedented scale during that period.  
75 The Clayton Act was a reaction to the 1912 Supreme Court ruling Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. (224 U.S.1 




   
 
 
In fact, America’s jurisprudence conceived of patents as monopolies for much of the 
twentieth century. Judicial attacks on the scope and validity of patents in addition to the 
enforced antitrust (anti-monopoly) legislation made American businesses rethink the 
economic value of patent protection (Sell and May 2001, p. 487). As a consequence, 
companies developed a cavalier approach towards infringing competitors’ patents. For 
example, when the Eastman Kodak company in 1976 aimed at developing an instant 
camera to compete with Polaroid, Kodak issued an internal directive that  
 
“[d]evelopment should not be constrained by what an individual feels is potential 
patent infringement” (Silverstein 1991, p. 307).  
 
The beginning of the 1980s marked a swing-back of the pendulum, once again as a 
combination of technological and ideological transformations. Advancements in fields such 
as information technology and biological sciences, as well as ideological shifts caused by 
the emphasis of private rights and property under the new Reagan administration, raised the 
importance of patent protection at the expense of free competition. As a consequence, 
important anti-trust stipulations were abandoned, such as the tying clause of the Clayton 
Act. The Act was increasingly considered as a serious impediment to America’s 
international competitiveness, because it prohibited most forms of joint venture among 
firms in the same industry, which was felt to hinder intra-industry R&D joint ventures. 
Intense business lobbying efforts to remove this antitrust barrier and to increase national 
                                                                                                                                                    




   
 
competitiveness led to legislative changes stipulated by the National Cooperative Research 
Act76 of 1984 (Barben 2007, p. 116). 
 
Institutionally, the turn in favor of intellectual property protection was supported by the 
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982, a single ‘patent 
court’ that freed the overburdened court system from IP rulings. In the 1983 ruling for 
Smith International v. Hughes Tools77, the Court heralded a paradigmatic shift by 
stipulating that public policy favors the protection of rights secured by valid patents and 
that public policy favors the innovator, not the copier (Kastriner 1991, pp. 13-14). 
Moreover, in 1986 the CAFC ruled in favor of Polaroid suing Kodak for infringing its 
patents for instant cameras. The ruling not only restored the company’s monopoly over the 
United States market for instant photography, but in general it demonstrated that the time 
of cavalier patent infringements was no longer an economically viable option, because the 
costs for the infringer may run up to amounts that could wipe him out (ibid.). 
 
American corporations took this as a sign that intellectual property was a system of 
protection, exclusion and opportunities for extraction of monopoly rents vis-à-vis 
competition and diffusion of knowledge. As technology-intensive industries increasingly 
stood the center of countries’ competition with each other, patents and intellectual property 
                                                                                                                                                    
licensing agreement. 
76 Public Law 98-462. With hindsight, given the current practice of biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industry to invent around each others’ patents, one of the reasons that business leaders brought to the public 
hearings is particularly interesting: The reform of antitrust laws to allow for R&D joint ventures was 
necessary because otherwise, unnecessary and wasteful duplication of research can hinder U.S. industries’ 
ability to remain competitive in the world economy (Hemphill 1997). 





   
 
turned into a key concern at the juncture of trade with technology policies. Throughout the 
1980s a paradigmatic redefinition took place, as a consequence of which patents were no 
longer considered to be hindering, but rather promoting free trade (Sell and May 2001, p. 
489). This somewhat paradoxical logic argues that the liberalization of international trade 
requires the monopolization of what now becomes the most important factor of production: 
knowledge. It can best be understood as a neo-mercantilist turn: Unlike the old 
mercantilism that tried to shield domestic infant industries from external competition, the 
global protection of knowledge by intellectual property is a way to preserve the most 
advanced industries when they enter the competition in global markets (Bifani 1989). 
 
Since the 1980s, therefore, United States’ trade liberalization policies became intertwined 
with the protection of intellectual property rights. This nexus was at the core of the 
Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations, which ultimately led to a General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1992. The hallmark for biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries was the 
inclusion into the WTO establishment of an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). TRIPS was the result of a self-selected group of a 
dozen American firms78, coordinating with like-minded companies from Europe and Japan 
in a ‘trilateral group’ and set out a blueprint for the TRIPS agreement, for which the United 
States trade negotiators successfully lobbied (Sell 1999).  
                                                 
78 Coordinated in the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) were Bristol Myers, CBS, Du Pont, General 




   
 
5.6.3 Patentability Matters 
Despite these international ideological drifts, in the United States the domestic legal basis 
for patent protection did not really change. Requirements for patentability are stipulated by 
the United States Patent Act of 195279, according to which patents have to meet four 
distinct requirements: First, the invention has to be of patentable subject matter. In other 
words, an innovation has to be ‘a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter’ 
(Section 101). Second, the invention had to be ‘new’. The proof of ‘novelty’ is based on the 
distinguishable claim with regards to other patents and already disclosed inventions at the 
time of invention (Section 102). Third, the invention must be ‘useful’. This ‘utility’ 
requirement implies that the invention has to show a working that renders some results. 
Finally, the invention must be ‘non-obvious’. This means that an invention cannot be 
patented if it is obvious to ‘a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains’ (Section 103). 
 
Questions of novelty, utility and non-obviousness have always troubled the courts and 
patent lawyers. By the end of the 1970s, however, the scientific and technological progress 
in biology required a clarification as to whether or not biological matters and processes are 
a patentable subject matter. A solution emerged through the court system after an employee 
of General Electric, Ananda Chakrabarty, construed a micro-organism through molecular 
(although not recombinant gene-splicing) techniques that was able to digest crude oil. 
Because of this feature, which is not found in any naturally occurring bacteria, the 
invention was believed to have significant potential for the treatment of oil spills and 
                                                 




   
 
consequently, Chakrabarty filed a patent application. His claims were three-fold: First, on 
the process to produce the bacteria, second, on the way it is applied, and third, on the 
organism itself. The patent examiner allowed the first two, while rejecting the third claim, 
because micro-organisms are “products of nature” and, as living things, not patentable 
subject matter under U.S. patent law. Chakrabarty’s appeal for patenting the organism was 
struck down by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals, stipulating that 
laboratory-created micro-organisms are not products of nature, but as living things 
nonetheless exempt from patentability. Yet the next higher Court of Customs and Patents 
Appeal CCPA reversed the patent examiner’s decision, contending that the mere fact that a 
bacteria is alive was without significance for the patent law. As the PTO appealed, the case 
was referred to the U.S. Supreme Court. In its 1980 landmark 5-4 decision Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, the Court decided that man-made living organisms – in fact, “everything 
under the sun that is made by man” – was patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court 
pointed out that “the relevant distinction” established by the author of the patent law 
Thomas Jefferson (and later reaffirmed by Congress) in the Patent Act, “was not between 
living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and 
human-made inventions80.” While asserting the traditional distinction between nature and 
invention, the Supreme Court placed modified organisms such as Chakrabarty’s bacteria in 
the sphere of the invention.  
 
The ruling was of fundamental importance for biotechnology as it occurred at a time when 
the fledgling technology and industry strongly needed confirmation. In particular, it 
                                                 




   
 
guaranteed investors to the young industry that their investments were matched, if not by 
products, but at least by some enforceable legal titles. Diamond v. Chakrabarty opened the 
door for the commercial applicability of biotechnology. But by treating the patentability of 
microorganisms as a purely technical issue that could be handled with the existing laws, the 
Court effectively closed another door before it was opened: The question namely, whether 
it should not be the task of Congress to assess the adequacy of the patent law in relations to 
new developments in the life sciences (Jasanoff 2005, p. 49). Moreover, the Chakrabarty 
decision became part of a larger regulatory regime specific to the United States, which 
from early on considers biotechnology and genetic engineering in terms of the products 
(which are patentable) and not in terms of the processes (which may bear risks), an issue 
that will be revisited in section 4.8. 
 
The Chakrabarty verdict was not the only case in which imminent questions regarding the 
ownership of evolving technologies were depoliticized by leaving them over to the court 
system and its ruling on intellectual property protection. Another important case was 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California 81, which addressed the question whether a 
patient, who also happens to be a research subject, owns his own cells if they are turned 
into a research commodity. The claimant, John Moore, was a patient at the University of 
California in Los Angeles (UCLA) where he was undergoing treatment against leukemia. 
Without Moore’s prior informed consent, two researchers established a cell line from his 
excised spleen, patented it and licensed it to a private company. The court ruled for Moore 
on the issue of the research physicians’ financial duties and that research unrelated to a 
                                                 




   
 
patient’s health must be disclosed prior to the treatment. At the same time, however, the 
court denied Moore’s ownership rights in his own cells. These cells, according to the court, 
were not unique, whereas the extraction of proteins from these cells was unique enough to 
grant the researchers a patent. According to the court ruling, granting property rights to the 
human sources of biological material would introduce uncertainties that could be 
detrimental to academic research. Instead, the ruling introduced certainties with regards to 
the division of rights: informational rights for the patient and property rights for the 
researcher (Jasanoff 2005, p. 215). As a consequence, this pragmatic compromise fit 
comfortably with the imperatives of neoliberal economic thinking: Fostering 
entrepreneurship that leads to product innovation was a desirable outcome in its own right, 
even if it infringed on other rights, such as the undivided autonomous ownership of an 
individual over his/her body.  
 
Subsequently, a whole new range of opportunities for commodification by means of 
intellectual property rights arose when biological techniques moved from the cellular down 
to the molecular level. Whereas the above cases, or the patenting of transgenic animals 
such as the infamous Harvard Oncomouse82, created a public stir, the patenting of human 
DNA sequences that started by the 1980s was hardly noticed. Initially the PTO treated 
DNA sequences as chemicals (Eisenberg 2006) and the scientific community did not 
oppose this patenting of DNA sequences until 1991.  
                                                 





   
 
Then, at the beginning of the Human Genome Project, NIH researchers in the laboratory of 
a certain J. Craig Venter filed for patent applications on several hundred DNA fragments. 
These fragments, known as complementary DNAs (cDNAs) or ‘expressed sequence tags’ 
(ESTs), are parts of the DNA’s nucleotide sequence that become visible when a gene is 
translated into a protein, which in itself does not say anything about the function.  
 
Many scientists, including James Watson who was then the director of the NIH’s genome 
program, objected on principle to the patentability of such partial genetic information. At 
the same time, the biotechnology industry was split. Some companies endorsed the NIH’s 
patents on ESTs as long as the federal agency would not favor any one company over 
another with licensing agreements. Yet others contended that the government must not 
control a product to whose development it has contributed little. For example, the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association contended that government devising policies 
with regards to ownership and licensing of gene sequences would inevitably be detrimental 
for R&D of new medicines in this country (Eisenberg 1992). In both cases, therefore, the 
contention was not ownership of these sequences per se but ownership or control by the 
government.  
 
The mounting controversy was temporarily defused when in August 1992 the PTO rejected 
the Venter/NIH claims because they failed to meet the standards for non-obviousness and 
novelty. Subsequently, in February 1994, under its new director Harold Varmus, the NIH 
declared to withdraw all patent applications on ESTs, which by that time had multiplied to 




   
 
NIH’s continuing efforts to patent ESTs (Kevles and Berkowitz 2001), whereas, also in 
1992, Venter left to head the new Institute for Genomic Research with a corporate partner, 
Human Genome Sciences (HGS). HGS, like Venter’s next company, Celera, founded in 
1998, upped the ante and filed patents for thousands of ESTs. Although their function was 
unknown, throughout the 1990s the PTO considered these sequences patentable because 
they would meet the criteria of novelty and of utility as biochemical probes or generally as 
research tools. Hence, genomics companies such as HGS, Celera, Incyte, and others, filed 
thousands of patents on sequences of unknown function.  
 
Tension rose again when Celera and other companies announced to use ESTs to identify 
new genes, extrapolate their function through computerized searches for functions of genes 
with similar structure in already publicly available databases of the Human Genome 
Project, and claim utility patents for their ‘new’ genes. One counter-reaction from 
corporate actors interested in commercializing gene-sequence related technologies was the 
establishment of the SNP Consortium (see 2.6 above). On the other hand, also the 
international biomedical research community became increasingly uneasy about the drive 
towards commodification of the human genome. In March 2000, Aaron Klug and Bruce 
Alberts, the presidents of, respectively, the Royal Society of London and the National 
Academy of Sciences in the United States, publicly declared that guessing gene functions 
by computerized searches of genomic databases was a trivial matter that may satisfy 
current shareholders’ interest, but did not serve society well. Emphasizing that these results 
would not warrant patent protection, they demanded that “the human genome itself must be 




   
 
orchestrated in conjunction with a joint declaration by U.S. President Clinton and U.K. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair in March 2000, who agreed to move data from the Human 
Genome Project as quickly as possible into the public domain.  
 
Efforts of the scientific community and changes in political climate eventually pushed the 
PTO to specify its position on the patentability of gene fragments. In January 2001, the 
PTO issued new guidelines according to which patents would be issued only for sequences 
that are used in identifying structures of predicted biological function (U.S. Patent And 
Trademark Office (USPTO) 2001). While this decision still allows for a very broad 
understanding of what types of DNA sequences can be patented, it reversed a practice of 
companies filing for a patent as soon as an EST was sequenced. Subsequent EST patent 
applications were rejected by the PTO and rejections were upheld before the CAFC. Many 
of the old patent applications, if challenged, would most likely not meet the new thresholds 
for utility and may therefore have been abandoned (Davis et al. 2005). And while a recent 
study indicated that nearly 20 percent of human genes were associated with at least one 
U.S. patent (Jensen and Murray 2005), there is evidence that the number of patents being 
applied for and granted peaked between 2001 and 2002 and is declining ever since 
(Hopkins et al. 2007). 
 
How should these developments be interpreted? The legalistic reading of them argues that 
these rulings are part of a broader, general change in patent law that took place since the 
Chakrabarty decision: The Federal Circuit started granting patents to subject matters 




   
 
them, gene sequences of known biological structure and functions are now considered as 
inventions that become patentable as long as they are ‘useful’ (Eisenberg 2006)83. My own, 
political reading is that these changes in patent law reveal much about the increasingly 
complicated tasks that the neoliberal state has to play. The rules of law should establish a 
level-playing field for the competition among private actors pursuing their economic self-
interest in the hope that this will promote society’s well-being at large. This balance is 
politically contested and requires periodical readjustment. For example, the state may have 
to intervene when some private actors’ pursuit of economic self-interest became too 
successful so that it threatens to block off the development of certain goods that are 
deemed economically pre-competitive. This was the political reason to keep the sequence 
of the human genome public. Another reason for intervention may be that different 
groupings of important private actors are at loggerheads. This was the case in a recent 
Supreme Court ruling84 that pitted the pharmaceutical industry against the computer 
industry. Court rulings are less politicized and generate less friction than for instance 
legislative means to settle these discrepancies. They can therefore be updated faster to keep 
pace with technological advancements, which is an institutional comparative advantage for 
the United States and its biotechnology industry.  
 
                                                 
83 The economic reading of what ‘useful’ means was highlighted in chapter 4: Many genomics companies 
saw the value of their genetic information depreciating after it turned out that the way from a gene to a 
commercial product – in most cases a drug – was much more complicated and lengthy than initially hoped. 
84 KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). The Court came down on the side of the computer industry and 
decided that the combination of two existing technologies was too obvious for enjoying patent protection. 
Such follow-up patenting is a common practice for pharmaceutical – and biotechnology companies, which 
often seek new patents for minor modifications to existing inventions, such as combining two medicines with 




   
 
The United States patent system seems to have a comparative advantage relevant for 
biotechnology actors on at least two other accounts: First, there is evidence that patents in 
the United States are considerably cheaper than in other advanced capitalist economies85. 
Second, a patent in the United States becomes publicly revealed not at the point of its 
filing, but only when it is granted, which may be many years later. This way, companies do 
not have to disclose their technological advancements, but can instead file strategic patents 
around their inventions that create roadblocks for their competitors86. Given these 
advantages, it is therefore no surprise that the United States remains the country with the 
highest activity of patent claims relevant for the biotechnology industry87.  
 
In conclusion, patent laws are an example for how neoliberal ideology of state intervention 
for market-based solutions is put into practice. The evolution of the U.S. patenting 
framework became part of the comparative institutional advantage that set the scene for an 
early commercialization of biotechnologies in this country. Following a similar line of 
inquiry, the next section will analyze the overall regulatory framework for biotechnology in 
the United States. Specifically, it will be analyzed what steps the government in the United 
States undertook – or not – to regulate new biotechnologies, and whether or not this 
contributed to the country’s comparative institutional advantage.  
 
                                                 
85 According to the OECD, a patent in the United States costs € 10,330, compared with € 49,900 in the 
European Union costs and € 16,450 in Japan (Lawrence 2008).  
86 One strategy that generates sea mines rather than roadblocks pursies so-called ‘submarine patents’: 
Companies secretly file a patent application and keep it pending until another company invests heavily in the 
same technology. Then, if the patent is brought to be issued, the investing company is forced to either 
redesign its product or pay licensing fees to the patentee. 
87 A recent analysis of some 15,000 patent families claiming human DNA sequences showed that if one or 
more patents were granted, 94 percent of the cases were coming from the USPTO, whereas the European and 




   
 
5.7 Regulating Biotechnology in the United States 
 
Similar to the adaptations of the patenting laws, also the regulatory process had to catch up 
with the progress made in biological sciences: Shortly after Stanley Cohen and Herbert 
Boyer, together with others, published their path-breaking article about the transfer of DNA 
between species (Cohen et al. 1973), scientists themselves asked whether these techniques 
bore a hazardous potential that had to be curbed. As a consequence, the National Academy 
of Sciences asked one of the pioneers of biomolecular research, Paul Berg, to lead a study 
committee for potential biohazards. The eleven elite scientists, all of which had already 
been actively involved in the field, published a report in 1974, which is generally 
considered to be the starting point for public debates about genetic engineering88. The Berg 
Report called for a voluntary moratorium of research until certain types of hazardous risks 
were better understood and precautionary measures designed to prevent them (Berg 1974).   
 
While this one-time and exceptional moratorium lasted for only about half a year, it 
sparked increasing global awareness about the need to regulate this new field of biological 
sciences. The issue was revisited in February 1975 at a conference in Asilomar, CA. This 
meeting of U.S. and foreign scientists, sponsored by the NIH, the NAS and the NSF, 
allowed a self-selected academic avant-garde – thereby excluding other social actors – to 
define risk in their own terms. In Asilomar it was agreed to substitute the memorandum 
with a first framework of regulatory principles based upon which research should progress. 
As could be expected from a meeting of biologists, the problems and solutions they 
                                                 





   
 
formulated were kept on a technical level. Moreover, despite the international participation, 
there was no doubt that the leading role – given the state of scientific affairs – had to be 
played by United States agencies. And since the NIH was the world’s leading 
governmental biomedical research sponsor, it was the logical institution for governmental 
oversight. Consequently, in June 1976 the NIH issued its ‘Recombinant DNA Research 
Guidelines’, by which the United States became the first country to establish a regulatory 
framework for recombinant DNA research (Gottweis 1998, p. 91). The NIH, familiar with 
control of scientists by scientists through a peer review process, established an 
interdisciplinary Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC). The RAC, which only 
later included also non-biologists, in fact almost immediately gave a go-ahead sign, 
because the NIH, in the words of its then director Donald Fredickson, felt that  
 
“[t]he additional hazards are speculative and therefore not quantifiable. In a real 
sense they are considerably less certain than are the benefits now clearly derivable 
from the projected research.” (U.S. Department of Health 1976, p. 27904) 
 
In other words, benefits were certain, risks were not. This belief informed the first 
regulatory framework, which contained a number of characteristics that turned out to be 
decisive for the path that biotechnology took in the United States: To begin with, as the 
U.S. was the first country to have such framework, this provided a first-mover advantage 




   
 
federally funded researchers, but not for those from the private sector89. The private sector 
could participate in a voluntary compliance program, to preempt eventual future public 
concerns (Barben 2007, p. 181). Most importantly, regulation remained to be a technocratic 
act of scientists for scientists: In the late 1970s, a number of bills were introduced in 
Congress to provide a guideline for biotechnology research and address its hazardous 
potential. These efforts came to a halt with the failed initiative of Senator Stevenson (D-
Illinois) in 1980. As a result, in the United States biotechnological research unfolded within 
a regulatory framework that has not been set up by elected officials, neither did it take 
seriously into account opinions others than those of the research community (Krimsky 
1982). What this meant in practice was that the NIH handled its guidelines in a flexible, 
cooperative manner. This allowed the organizations and scientists that carried out 
recombinant DNA research to request lighter regulation as science progressed. As a result, 
already in 1978 the NIH guidelines were substantially loosened by vastly extending the 
experiments for which no registration was necessary.  
 
But as technological progress gained further momentum, the NIH-RAC review process 
ultimately turned out to hinder the commercialization of biotechnologies90.  
                                                 
89 This division of regulation continues until today and is part of the current debate about stem cell research 
(see 7.3 below). 
90 One highly contentious case was of a genetically modified anti-icing bacterium that would increase the 
frost resistance of commercial crops such as strawberries. The RAC’s decision that such bacteria were safe 
was overturned by a federal court of appeals on the ground that the NIH had not carried out the necessary 





   
 
devised a ‘Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology’ that redistributed 
the responsibility for articulating and enforcing regulation among three different federal 
agencies (Jasanoff 2005, pp. 51-52): The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) became 
responsible for environmental applications and impacts, including pesticides; the FDA for 
new foods, animal drugs, and pharmaceuticals; and the USDA for new crops and animals. 
For policy purposes, biotechnology was henceforth considered as just another industrial 
process that supplied familiar classes of products. Merely using rDNA techniques, which 
so far were lacking any known hazardous attributes or consequences, would not make a 
harmless product dangerous. By executive order it was decided that regulation of 
biotechnologies should rely on existing laws applied in familiar types of reviews carried 
out by already established agencies. In other words, the institutional setup already at hand 
was considered to be sufficient to control also any new risks that the new classes of 
biotechnological products may bring about. 
 
The general assessment of the technologies based on product, not the process, was 
reiterated by a high-level report of the National Research Council (National Research 
Council 1989). It added considerable authority to a narrow regulatory framing in the 
interest of those who aimed for an expeditious commercialization of the new technologies. 
By narrowing down the perception of risk, the regulatory framework yielded a competitive 




   
 
Union, rDNA risk assessment and regulation continues to be a matter of risks of the 
process91.  
My study does not address the agricultural applications of biotechnology92, where the 
United States’ lenient and accepting regulatory framework provided a comparative 
institutional advantage crucial for the large-scale introduction of genetically modified, and 
commercially valuable crops, such as corn, soybean, cotton, and tomato93. As highlighted 
by the interviews in the previous chapter, the crucial regulatory agency for biotechnology’s 
medical applications is the FDA, to which I will therefore turn next. 
 
5.8 The Regulatory Approval by the FDA 
 
As mentioned above, the U.S. regulatory regime towards biotechnologies and genetic 
engineering is based on the evaluation of the product and not the process. Hence, drugs that 
are produced by recombinant DNA techniques follow the pathway towards regulatory 
approval similar to conventional chemically synthesized drugs. The following account of 
the FDA’s role therefore does not distinguish between the origins of the drug but focuses 
on the agency’s internal mechanisms and the external political pressures.  
 
                                                 
91 For an historic overview of the evolving European regulatory policies see (Gottweis 1998, pp. 105-152). 
This different interpretation of risk also made genetically modified crops an unresolved trade conflict issue. 
In May 2002, the Bush Administration initiated action at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the 
European Union’s (EU) moratorium, or freeze, on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), arguing that the 
E.U.’s moratorium was illegal, non-science-based and “harmful to agriculture and the developing 
world.”(U.S. Trade Representative 2003). 
92 For an overview of the political economy of agricultural biotechnology see (Pistorius and van Wijk 1999). 
93 In 2008, the United States grew about as much GMO crops, 62.5 million hectares, as the rest of the world 





   
 
To date, the FDA is in charge of regulating a number of products other than drugs94. As the 
FDA regulates a broad range of industries – from small biotechnology firms over 
pharmaceutical companies and food corporations – it has been estimated that the agency 
regulates products accounting for about 20 to 25 percent of every dollar spent by U.S. 
consumers (Ceccoli 2004, p. 4). The agency regulates food-related products such as dietary 
supplements; medical devices such as pacemakers; biologics such as vaccines and blood 
products; animal feed and drugs; cosmetics; and radiation-emitting products such as cell 
phones. By their very nature, many of these products belong to the most heavily regulated 
items on the market. While this is hardly a sign for unfettered competition so dear to 
market-led ideals, this section describes how principles of deregulation nevertheless held 
sway at the FDA. As a consequence, the FDA underwent changes that streamlined its 
procedures for drug approval to bring them more in line with the needs of the industry that 
it regulates. Unlike the sea-change that occurred thanks to supply-side economic policies 
throughout the 1980s, the neoliberal turn at the FDA occurred only by the 1990s.  
  
From Aspirin to Zoloft, to date the FDA acts as the gatekeeper determining what drugs 
become legally available in the United States95. The core of the FDA’s business is the 
approval of new molecular entities (NMEs), which refers to any drug that has active 
ingredients that have never been approved for application in the United States. In addition 
to approving NMEs, the FDA also handles the new or expanded use of an already approved 
drug for another medical indication, or supplementary substances that may enhance the 
                                                 
94 This section draws on the historical account provided by Ceccoli (2004). 
95 The consequences of this gatekeeper function cannot be overestimated. As the case of the cancer drug 




   
 
efficacy of already existing products. Throughout its history the FDA underwent several 
administrative reorganizations as well as name changes. Yet its mission has always 
contained the two components of law enforcement and consumer protection. As early as 
1880, the federal government and the Department of Agriculture’s Division of Chemistry 
started to concern themselves with the purity of foods and drugs. USDA’s Bureau of 
Chemistry had the mandate to protect consumers from fraudulent, impure, or mislabeled 
substances. The mandate was enshrined in Congress’s Pure Food and Drug Act of 190696, 
but gained little regulatory traction97. Several administrative changes led to the renaming of 
the agency as Food and Drug Administration in 1931. More importantly, in the 1930s a 
marketed product, the so-called Elixir Sulfamilamide, turned out to be a toxic substance 
that killed more than 100 Americans, thereby exposing the weaknesses of the existing drug 
legislation. This was rectified by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) adopted in 
1938, which established a centralized regulatory apparatus. The Act for the first time 
required pharmaceutical manufacturers to demonstrate to the FDA the safety of their 
products prior to commercialization.  
 
Sparked by another medical incident, this time mainly in Europe, where the side effects of 
a sleeping pill based on the substance thalidomide led to limb deformities in newborns, the 
FDA’s role in overseeing drug approval was strengthened by the so-called Kefauver 
amendments in 1962. The sponsor, Senator Estes Kefauver (D-Tennessee), initially 
                                                                                                                                                    
declining regulatory approval for a specific drug can send the entire industry into a tailspin, taking down 
investors, insider traders, and even home improvement icon Martha Stuart. 
96 Public Law 59-384. 
97 Also in 1906, Upton Sinclair’s book “The Jungle” created a public outcry about the meat processing 




   
 
concerned himself less with safety but more with the profits that drug companies could 
accrue throughout the 1940s and 50s, when the ‘therapeutic revolution’ and the ‘golden age 
of drug discovery’ led to a plethora of new drugs (see 2.3). Yet as part of the bargaining 
process that ultimately led to its adoption, the 1962 Amendment lacked drug pricing 
provisions (Ceccoli 2004, p. 76). But the amendment had far-reaching consequences in 
other ways, as it required from drug companies a ‘proof of efficacy’ in clinical trials to 
demonstrate the drug’s effectiveness according to the claims of the manufacturer. 
Moreover, the amendments also devised a mandatory, multi-tiered approach for drug 
approval: First, a so-called investigational new drug (IND) application prior to the clinical 
testing on humans. Second, the so-called new drug application (NDA). Only afterward 
could a new drug be marketed to the general public. In sum, the regulatory authority and 
responsibility of the FDA became strengthened (Ceccoli 2004 pp. 78-79). The FDA was 
also authorized to develop its own efficacy standards based on substantial evidence, which 
were codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in 1969. These efficacy standards 
stipulate that there have to be at least two well-controlled clinical trials plus one 
confirmatory trial to establish efficacy and trial designs including the use of blinded 
studies, randomization, and placebo controls. Ever since, the regulatory approval of a new 
drug consists of a preclinical testing, three different clinical tests and a post-approval 
testing (Table 5.6). 
                                                                                                                                                    
business, consumers increasingly became reliant upon a system of testing and quality approval. Science 
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*Median review period for regular applications in 2005, according to US FDA (2006). 
Adapted by the author from Wierenga and Beary (1995). 
 
As the entire approval process can easily span an entire decade, the requirements have 
become contested by industry representatives and their acolytes as an impediment to 
introducing new drugs. Enhanced safety provisions and the centralized regulatory 
restriction of FDA approval were criticized to create a slowdown in drug approval that 
generated a ‘drug lag’ in the United States relative to other countries. On the other hand, 
the former FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy argued that ‘drug lag’ was a global 
phenomenon. After the 1940s and 50s were bringing the ‘low hanging fruits’ of drug 
development to the market, the basic knowledge in the industry was exhausted by the 
industry by the 1960s (Kennedy 1978). Yet free market advocates, such as researchers and 
policy analysts affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) fuelled the debate 




   
 
both pharmaceutical innovation and public health98. These concerns resonated well with the 
increasingly anti-regulatory zeitgeist of the 1980s, and Congress, which was initially 
mixed, picked up this criticism in the 1980s, chastising the agency for moving too slowly 
(Ceccoli 2004, p. 93). In fact, the agency was urged to do more with less. While 
appropriations to the FDA had increased throughout the 1970s, they began leveling off 
through the mid 1980s when the Reagan administration downsized the federal bureaucracy. 
Reagan included in his 1985 budget proposal that the FDA levy user fees on the industry. 
However, as he wanted to use the money to reduce the deficit in the federal budget rather 
than increasing the agency’s regulatory capacities, the proposal could not muster support 
from either industry or Congress and ultimately failed (Ceccoli, p. 109). Last but not least, 
patient organizations, particularly AIDS activist groups such as ACT Up, increasingly 
urged the authorities to expedite their procedures and legalize experimental drugs for 
treating life-threatening illnesses99.  
 
A new regulatory period started with the adoption of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act 
(PDUFA)100 in 1992, which modified the drug approval process in significant ways. First, 
administrative changes allowed for a fast-track approval of experimental drugs to expedite 
the development of new medicines. Second, Congress made the future appropriations of the 
agency dependent on meeting certain performance standards during the review process.  
                                                 
98 See for instance Grabowski (1976), Grabowski and Vernon (1983), and Peltzman (1974).  
99 For a summary of the role of AIDS activism see Siplon (2002). 




   
 
Third, the law required the FDA to levy fees on firms that request product approval so that 
this would generate resources to hire additional reviewers to expedite the process. As the 
PDUFA included a sunset clause after five years, the user fee had to be reauthorized, which 
indeed happened in 1997, 2002, and 2007. Other changes that accommodated the 
requirements of the pharmaceutical industry followed suit, for example the FDA 
Modernization Act of 1997101. The Act added official industry representatives to FDA 
advisory committees, which turned an at times adversary relationship between the regulator 
and the regulatee into a collaborative partnership. The Act also enshrined a new philosophy 
with regards to the protection of public health. Instead of solely keeping unsafe medicines 
off the market, promoting public health also entailed the timely approval of new drugs. 
Accordingly, the modified mission statements asks that the FDA  
 
“shall promote the public health by promptly and efficiently reviewing clinical 
research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated products in a 
timely manner.” (U.S. House of Representatives 1997, p. 27) 
 
These changes turned out to be successful in bringing more drugs to the market in shorter 
time. The General Accounting Office (GAO) found that PDUFA funds allowed the FDA to 
increase the number of new drug reviewers by 77 percent in the first eight years of the Act, 
while over the same period the median approval time for non-priority new drugs dropped 
from 27 months to 14 months (U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 2002). Moreover, 
over the period 1987 to 1996, the percentage of products first marketed in the United States 
                                                 




   
 
rose from 20 percent to 43 percent, thereby making the country the worldwide leader in the 
approval of new medicines (Kaitin and Healy 2000, pp. 12-13). The FDA’s competitive 
position improved to an extent that Japanese and in European policy started considering the 
agency as a best-practice model according to which the own regulatory practice should be 
reformed. The shift of the FDA from a regulatory hurdle towards a comparative 
institutional advantage for drug-developing industries is emblematic for the transformation 
of neoliberal, competitive nation-states. It also shows that, where regulatory approval 
involves a government agency, crucial coordination efforts also in a liberal market 
economy such as the United States is based on informal lines of communication: 
Unimpressed by the European Commission’s announcement to streamline its 
pharmaceutical approval process in the hope to bring research back to Europe, Dr. Janet 
Woodcock, the Director of FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, stated that the 
FDA’s competitive status would not be threatened. The real advantage of the FDA, in her 
view, was its consulting process with the industry and with companies throughout the 
entire drug development process (Michaels 2001). 
 
In a similar vein, two other important changes lowered the authority of the FDA in favor of 
the industry whose products it regulates. To begin with, in 1997 the FDA granted 
pharmaceutical companies the right to advertise their products directly to consumers. This 
practice has greatly altered the relationship between doctors and their patients. Its effects 
on public health in the United States became fiercely debated (Findlay 2000). Second, FDA 
regulations now allow pharmaceutical firms to promote, and doctors to prescribe, 




   
 
is cleared by the FDA, it can be described by the doctors in any way he sees fit. In fact, 
many of today’s top-selling drugs deviated from their original career. For example, Pfizer’s 
top-selling antidepressant drug Prozac was initially marketed as an appetite suppressant. 
Viagra, by the same company, was initially developed as a hair loss remedy. On the other 
hand, such off-label prescriptions can lead to adverse side effects of the drug102. In both 
cases, the FDA deviates from practices of regulatory agencies in other countries (Ceccoli, 
p. 152).  
 
These regulatory practices of the FDA have affected positively the institutional 
comparative advantage that the U.S. healthcare market provides for pharmaceutical 
companies to carry out their business in a profitable way. Yet they have also become a 
reason for concerns. For instance, at a hearing for the continuation of PDUFA in 2002, 
Congressman Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) criticized the acting FDA Commissioner Lester 
Crawford for bragging about the agency’s performance:  
 
“I grew up thinking the FDA was there to protect safety and not to play a role in 
enhancing the U.S. market share. You are a regulatory body, and you are not a 
subsidiary of the drug industry…I wonder where is the separation and who is in 
control? Is the FDA in control or is it the industry that it regulates in control?” (U.S. 
House of Representatives 2002) 
 
                                                 
102 The intended and unintended side effects of prescribing drugs for various indications as soon as they are 




   
 
While the changes of the FDA’s regulatory practices will be revisited in the concluding 
chapter, one ideological paradigm shift should be pointed out already here: Given the 
FDA’s origins and its twofold mandate of law enforcement and consumer protection, 
traditionally the FDA had concerned itself with preventing drugs from entering the market 
that should not be approved. But drug safety is an inherently relative concept. The risk of a 
particular medicine always has to be gauged against the benefits. As we have seen, a 
combination of pharmaceutical interest representatives and AIDS activists urged the FDA 
to make new drugs available to the public sooner and to expedite the drug review process. 
Reacting to these concerns, the FDA struck a different balance between risks and benefits 
that expands the definition of public health promotion. Read this way, the FDA 
acknowledged that public health is also in peril when consumers do not have access to new 
and effective therapies. Yet this understanding focuses on the technology supply side 
alone: It equals market approval with access and ignores whether the price of a new drug 
may be the decisive bottleneck towards new and effective therapies. As the 1962 Kefauver 
amendment demonstrated, it has not been politically feasible to extend the FDA’s mandate 
to include such concerns. The next chapter will analyze how the absence of price caps for 




This chapter took a historic view on key aspects of the institutional support structure that 
profit the biotechnology in the United States. It demonstrated that despite the dynamism of 
the industry, the creative destruction, and the rhetoric of market competition, historically 




   
 
foundation for the sciences to come. Time and again, the politics of economic stimulus 
trumped the rhetoric of free markets (claim 2). 
 
The industry came into being at a critical historical juncture when scientific advancements 
coincided with neoliberal economic concepts to promote the supply-side. Throughout the 
1970s the ascent of biological sciences and neoliberal ideologies were not limited to the 
United States. But by the 1980s, the institutional support structure already in place received 
a boost from resource mobilization for the supply-side of these new technologies. This 
created an institutional comparative advantage for the biotechnology industry to rise first 
and most vigorously in the United States. As expected from a liberal market economy, the 
rule of law, especially sophisticated intellectual property protection, as well as elaborate 
capital markets are key components to a favorable institutional support structure for a fast-
past innovative industry such as biotechnology. Here, the role of the state is more of an 
arbiter that has to readjust regulatory efforts. Yet other ingredients, specifically the 
scientific infrastructure, came about only as a result of substantial federal support efforts, 
often times in conjunction with military build-up.  
 
Historically, the different waves of defense spending helped solidify clusters of scientific 
excellence that arose among a fragmented landscape of institutions of higher education. 
Wealthy entrepreneurs and their philanthropic outlets, especially the Rockefeller 
Foundation, aimed at ‘making the peaks higher’. They funded research universities to 
overcome America’s scientific and technological deficit vis-à-vis European nations and – 




   
 
World War II and the massive efforts to build an atomic bomb showed the need for 
concerted federal intervention in science and technology. Clustering and ‘making the peaks 
higher’ were important organizational decisions that favored not only research universities 
but also a few of the land grant universities, in particular MIT, initially established to 
disseminate agricultural and mechanical knowledge.  
 
After World War II, the reconversion of these military resources for civilian purposes 
ushered in a division of labor, in which publicly funded basic research would be made 
available to for-profit actors who carried out applied research for commercialization. This 
setup also profited the development of biomedical sciences. Most important was the 
evolution of the NIH into the world’s largest organization for medical research. NIH not 
only increased the resources for biomedical research, it also institutionalized funding 
mechanisms based on peer review, which continued to allocate more resources to already 
existing clusters of excellence.  
 
Eventually publicly funded research became increasingly scrutinized to deliver commercial 
value at a time when the United States was challenged to keep its leadership in 
international competition. Starting in the late 1970s, the neoliberal understanding gained 
traction that the increase in global competition required the state to promote domestically 
the advancements of new technologies. In the 1980s various policies to strengthen the 
supply-side of such technologies were devised. For instance, profit incentives for 
researchers were introduced by allowing them to patent federally funded research, and to 




   
 
biomedical researchers and business actors in a number of locations in the United States. 
As the interviews in the previous chapter confirmed, the competitive first-mover advantage 
could keep its momentum and is still present due to the clustering of the biotechnology 
industry in a number of regions in the United States.  
 
Moreover, independent from the location within the United States, there were important 
policy measures that promoted the competitive advantage of the country’s fledgling 
biotechnology industry as a whole. A regulatory environment conducive to speculative, 
risk-taking entrepreneurial activity helped with the provision of venture capital as well as 
with stock markets that allowed the VC industry and other investors to recoup their stakes 
in this new industry. Equally important for the comparative advantage of the institutional 
support structure for biotechnology in the United States is the question of patenting. 
Starting with the U.S. Constitution, the protection of intellectual property meandered 
between favoring at times inventing and at times copying. At the end of the 19th century, a 
political movement against the increasing influence of powerful corporate actors led to the 
adoption of anti-trust legislation. By contrast, at the end of the 20th century, the neoliberal 
view of promoting individual entrepreneurial activity prevailed.  
 
Specifically for the newly arising biotechnologies, pivotal decisions were taken by 
Congressional legislative efforts, but became de-politicized in the court system. Once 
relegated to courts, key biotechnology-related decisions have not taken up principled 
concerns but have rather come down on the side of what is pragmatic and promotional 




   
 
regulatory framework, which assesses the risks of biotechnologies on the product and not, 
as in Europe, on the process.  
 
While this put the United States into a comparative institutional advantage with regards to 
the commercialization of genetically modified crops, the pivotal gatekeeper for launching 
biomedical products in the U.S. market is the FDA. Here the starvation of federal 
bureaucracies prescribed by the Reagan administration had an ironic, unintended 
consequence. Overwhelmed and underfunded, the FDA became less conducive to the needs 
of the pharmaceutical manufacturers. Pressured also by social actors such as the AIDS 
rights movement, the FDA broadened its mandate for the promotion of public health by 
approving new treatments and drugs faster. It took until the early 1990s before the agency 
successfully streamlined the drug approval process in favor of the needs of the industry it 
was supposed to regulate. Here we see how the neoliberal state has shifted its functions: 
The institution is transformed from being conceived as a regulatory hurdle into a support 
structure. Streamlined regulatory provisions are conceived as international competitive 
advantage for businesses in search for ‘regulatory arbitrage’. Hence, the transformation of 
this key regulatory institution is not so much an example for free-market rhetoric, but 
rather for politics to promote economic activity.  
 
As the FDA changed its approval philosophy to make access to drugs easier, the question 
of whether this may not also be a matter of their pricing was deliberately kept out of the 
FDA’s mandate. Since also the NIH made it a point not to interfere with market 




   
 
controls provides a comparative advantage for the biotechnology industry in the United 
States (claim 3). The next chapter will therefore analyze how the United States privatized 
healthcare system came about and what the effects are for the pricing of prescription drugs 




   
 
Chapter 6: Healthcare in the United States: Of Price-Setters and 
Price-Takers 
 
6.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter outlined how institutions of the American political economy 
contributed to a comparative institutional advantage for the generation and 
commercialization of biotechnologies in the United States. Yet any analysis merely from 
the supply side would still be bound to and confirm a neoliberal perspective on the political 
economy of the biotechnology industry. Therefore, this chapter will address the 
institutional setup of the demand side for biotechnologies. In theory, demand for these 
technologies can be defined in many different ways. In practice, however, as confirmed by 
the interviews in chapter 4, it is the demand from the American healthcare system that is 
crucial. This chapter will therefore ask how and why the United States healthcare system 
provides such an exceptional incentive structure for the biotechnology industry. The 
answer will confirm claim 3: As the biotechnology industry matured and became fully 
embedded in the blockbuster drug business logic of pharmaceutical companies, the 
unparalleled incentive structure and the revenues provide for by the fragmented United 
States healthcare system became increasingly important. The absence of federal price 
controls for prescription drugs has become a crucial comparative advantage for the 
biotechnology industry in the United States.  
 
The absence of federal drug pricing oversight is one of the many consequences of the 
evolution of the American healthcare system. Historically, the provision of health services 




   
 
been relegated to the second tier. Most of these developments predate the rise of the 
biotechnology industry. Yet a brief recapitulation of this history is important to understand 
why over time a complicated mix of private and public activities has developed into a 
labyrinth of conflicting incentives. The historical background is also necessary to 
understand why this institutional setup turned increasingly hard to reform. For their part, 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry have a vested interest in not reforming the 
current system, because it leaves the pricing of prescription drugs largely unregulated. 
 
To prove my third contention that America’s healthcare system is a key component of the 
country’s comparative advantage for fostering the biotechnology industry, this his chapter 
is organized as follows: Section 6.1.1 will address some of the basic dilemmas that occur 
when providing health as a marketable good. There is a conflict between deciding on what 
treatment is necessary and at what cost. The institutional setup to mediate this conflict lies 
at heart of any nation’s healthcare system. Unlike any other wealthy industrialized country, 
in the United States political decisions have regularly preferred market-based solutions. 
Section 6.2 will therefore put the outcome of these market-led health policies in an 
international perspective. Key data for health statics will be presented to illustrate that in 
international comparison with other wealthy, industrialized nations, the United States relies 
more than any other country on private health insurance, while at the same time having the 
highest expenditures on healthcare, including drugs.  
 
Yet the fact that the United States does not have a universal healthcare system is not only 




   
 
America’s market-based healthcare system was established in contrast to Social Security, 
the country’s public, universal provision of a pension. The political momentum that 
allowed President Roosevelt’s New Deal administration to establish Social Security was 
not sufficient to bring about a universal healthcare system at the same time. After this 
failure, private health insurance emerged as a wholesale alternative to public health 
insurance after World War II (6.3.1). An institutional division of labor emerged which saw 
the private sector in the lead and the public programs picking up the slack. A case in point 
was the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 (6.3.2).  
 
Important for the arguments this study investigates, section 6.4 explains how, once this 
system was in place, healthcare reform has become an increasingly difficult endeavor. With 
private health actors becoming the price-setter, political interventions to curb cost hikes 
became increasingly necessary, but had mixed results (6.4.1). Ample room will then be 
given to the failed initiative of President Clinton for healthcare reform in 1993/4 (6.4.2). 
On the one hand, this episode illustrates how the American healthcare system, despite 
broadly acknowledged shortcomings with regards to coverage of the population and the 
increasing costs, has turned into a labyrinth of insurmountable and contradictory vested 
interests. On the other hand, the rejection of the Clinton reform proposal became a rallying 
point for the biotechnology industry, which for the first time organized its interests in a 
coherent and institutionalized manner. In the aftermath of President Clinton’s failure and 
with no chances for comprehensive healthcare overhaul, the issue of prescription drug 
prices became a central point of contention. Here the generally fragmented and constricted 




   
 
leverage to curb prices for prescription medicines (6.4.3). As these costs continued to rise, 
the extension of prescription drug benefits to one of the most needy parts of society – 
Medicare recipients – became a political issue. The next section (6.4.4) therefore explains 
how the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 deliberately abstained from 
establishing the federal government as the largest purchaser – and price-setter – of 
prescription drugs. The market-based solution that Congress adopted instead is another 
example for why laissez-faire solutions are never inevitable or natural outcomes, but 
always politically fabricated. By giving preference to a private solution instead of an 
overarching public effort, American politicians once again paid tribute to neoliberal 
ideology.  
 
The MMA was formulated in line with the interests of biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industries, which demonstrated their political clout during the legislative reform efforts. 
Section 6.5 therefore takes a look at the machinery that biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industry established to represent their interests vis-à-vis political decision makers in 
Washington. Relevant for the arguments put forward in this study is not interest group 
lobbying per se, but rather on which issues. The lobbying efforts and the political 
wrangling of biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries to shape the MMA in their favor 
therefore reveal how relevant America’s fragmented healthcare market without any 
federally invoked price cap has become for these businesses. Moreover, their interest group 
representation is also a factor to be reckoned with in subsequent U.S. healthcare reform 
debates that started under the new administration of President Obama in 2009. Section 6.6 




   
 
and the comparative institutional advantage that it presents for the biotechnology industry. 
Exceptionally high prescription drug prices have led to a call for a bigger role for 
government. The prospect of these and other challenges to the blockbuster drug regime that 
could become consequential also for the biotechnology industry are ultimately addressed in 
the final chapter 7.  
6.1.1 The Dilemmas of Healthcare Markets 
In theory, markets bring together a vast number of sellers that compete with each other to 
sell homogenous commodities to a vast number of buyers, who can make rational, well-
informed choices about their purchase, for which they pay the full price. Although very few 
real markets live up to this standard in actuality, health economists have repeatedly stressed 
the particular insufficiencies that healthcare markets are fraught with (Donaldson and 
Gerard 2005; Zweifel and Breyer 1997). To begin with, if confronted with a debilitating 
disease or death, the notion of rationality looses its utility. People are making sacrifices and 
pay whatever they can to obtain the health goods and services they consider necessary. In 
the language of economists, prices for these goods and services are inelastic of demand. 
And since the costs of medical services are high and the need for them is uncertain and 
unevenly distributed, it makes sense for a risk-averse individual to obtain insurance. Yet 
such insurance adds another layer of complexity to the imperfect, asymmetrically 
distributed, information that is the general dilemma of the healthcare market: Doctors know 
more than patients do about treatment options. Patients in turn know more about their need 
for care than insurers do. This creates three central dilemmas to finance medical care: 
agency, moral hazard, and adverse selection (Hacker 2002, p. 181). The agency dilemma 




   
 
without having proper information about the quality. For the insurers, by contrast, the 
agency dilemma stems from the fact that the party that receives the payment - the doctor - 
is the same that discovers the problem, decides which services the patient needs, and also 
sets the price for the treatment. How could the insurance company be confident that a 
service was not delivered because the doctor knew that the patient had an insurance policy 
(Madison 2005, p. 47)? From the viewpoint of an insurer, this leads to the dilemma of 
‘moral hazard’. Once insured, the individual has fewer incentives to prevent risk-taking 
behavior, and also has considerable less interest in constraining the price for a treatment. 
The third dilemma, adverse selection, results from asymmetrical information between an 
individual and the provider of health insurance. The insurance provider has an interest to 
offer coverage only to healthy individuals, whereas these individuals may opt out of health 
insurance to save the money. With healthy individuals opting out, the premiums for the 
insured have to be higher, thereby precluding low-income and high-risk people from 
coverage. Therefore, adverse selection makes it impossible that private action of 
individuals and insurers leads to the public good of broad-based health insurance coverage. 
 
Over time, all advanced industrialized nations have been confronted with these moral 
dilemmas. At the heart of the medical politics problem is the question, who should 
reasonably best mediate the abovementioned agency problem while controlling costs? 
Should it be the market, the medical profession, or the state? Driven by politics, economic 
concerns, and efficiency considerations, different answers have been given in different 




   
 
most distinct in its vast reliance on private market services, as well as with regards to the 
overall level of prices. 
  
6.2 The U.S. Healthcare in International Comparison 
 
American exceptionalism in healthcare rests on four pillars: First, the United States spends 
more than any other country on health. In 2005, when the other wealthy industrialized 
nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
allocated, on average, 9 percent of their GDP to health, the United States spent 15.3 percent 
(OECD 2007, p. 89). Also per capita, the United States outspends any other industrialized 
nation by far. In 2005, the country devoted $ 6,401 per capita to health (see Figure 6.1 
below). Remarkably, this amount was not only 20 percent higher than the health 
expenditures of the next country, Luxemburg, but it equated to more than two and a quarter 













   
 
Figure 6.1 Health Expenditure Per Capita, Public and Private, 2005  







































































































































































































































































Public expenditure on health Private expenditure on health
 
1: 1995-2004; 2: 1997-2005; 3: 1998-2005. 
Source: (OECD 2007, p. 87) 
 
Second, the share of private health spending – by individuals and private insurance 
providers – is higher than anywhere else. Unlike all other OECD countries, in which public 
health expenditures account for the major share, the United States is the only country in 





   
 
Third, the United States is the only advanced industrialized nation that does not have a 
publicly guaranteed universal or near-universal level of healthcare coverage. In the United 
States currently only about 27 percent of the population – the elderly, poor and disabled – 
are covered by publicly financed health care. Another 59 percent are covered by private 
health insurance, leaving 14 percent of the population – some 48 million- without any 
coverage at all (OECD, 2007, p. 97). 
 
Fourth, and most relevant for surveying the biotechnology industry, the United States has 
the highest expenditures for pharmaceuticals. In 2006, the global market was worth $608 
billion, of which the United States alone accounted for $274 billion, about 45 percent 
(OECD 2008, p. 58). And although pharmaceuticals represent a smaller budget of the U.S. 
healthcare expenditures than the average of OECD countries (13 versus 17 percent), the 
United States nevertheless outspends the rest of the OECD by far on drugs: Compared with 
the average of all OECD countries, which in 2005 directed 1.5 percent of their GDP to 
pharmaceuticals, the United States spent almost a quarter more (1.9 percent). Americans 
also account for the highest annual per-capita-spending on drugs - $ 792 - which was 86 
percent above the OECD average (see Figure 6.2). Moreover, the United States was also 
unique in that less than a quarter (24 percent) of pharmaceutical costs were public 
expenditures, whereas more than three quarter were private (OECD 2007, p. 93). Last but 
not least, costs in the United States for pharmaceuticals have risen disproportionately faster 
than elsewhere. Since 1995, throughout the OECD, expenditures for drugs have risen by an 
average of 4.6 percent annually, which is higher than the annual 4 percent increase in total 




   
 
pharmaceutical expenditures have grown almost twice as fast as general health 
expenditures (7.1 versus 3.6 percent, ibid.).  
 
Figure 6.2: Comparison OECD Pharmaceutical Expenditures, 2005 
Pharmaceutical Expenditure Per Capita, 
2005 (US$ PPP)  
Pharmaceutical Expenditure as  
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Figure 6.3: Real Annual Growth in Pharmaceutical Spending and Total Health 
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In many regards the United States’ high expenditures on healthcare do not translate in 
longer or healthier lives: Whereas in 2005 the OECD average life expectation at birth was 
78.6 years, it was 77.8 years in the United States (OECD 2007, p. 21). In terms of infant 
mortality, America’s rate of 6.8 per thousand is the fourth highest among OECD countries. 
In part, this lower performance is a result of the United States’ discrepancy in health 
provisions between those who have access to health insurance and who do not103. A 
comparative analysis between the United Kingdom, which has a national health care 
                                                 
103 Moreover, these discrepancies are overshadowed by other inequalities such as gender, age, and ethnicity 




   
 
system that covers every individual, and the United States, points into a similar direction. 
The study found that Americans, at all points of the socio-economic spectrum, are 
significantly less healthy than their English counterparts (Banks et al. 2006).  
 
In conclusion, these data corroborate the findings from the interviews in chapter 4: Its 
profitability and fragmentation turns the United States healthcare market into a 
comparative institutional advantage for biotechnology actors. The system that provides 
Americans with healthcare, including drugs, is generally less comprehensive in terms of 
coverage of the entire population, and relies less than any other on public healthcare. And 
although it is more expensive, it is not necessarily better than the system in comparable 
affluent industrialized nations. Taken together, these features of the American healthcare 
market have created an exceptional incentive structure for pharmaceutical companies and 
for medical biotechnology. To understand why this is the case, as well as whether there are 
prospects for change, I will next look at the history of the United States health insurance 
system. 
 
6.3 History of US Healthcare: The Dominance of Private Healthcare 
6.3.1 Early Legislation and Reform Efforts 
Obviously the provision of healthcare services in the United States predates the 
biotechnology industry. This brief historical overview illustrates how a privatized, market-
led health system became established and entrenched. Time and again, political decision 
relegated the public sector to the second tier: Instead of directly providing health-related 




   
 
deliberately stepped back and handed over tasks to private actors. As a consequence, these 
actors turned out to be the price-setters, whereas the public became the price-taker. Time 
and again, political interests became more entrenched, and the hurdles to abandon this path 
continued to rise. This political dynamic continues to date, when a maturing biotechnology 
industry has turned into an organized political actor with a vested interest to upkeep the 
institutionalized status quo.  
 
Whereas historically a sick person would pay a doctor a fee for his services, the first, 
privately organized, collective financing of medical care in the United States was 
conceived during the Great Depression. Employers increasingly began offering health 
insurance to their employees as an attempt to calm down a radicalized workforce and to 
prevent unionization. Particularly consequential turned out to be a Texan hospital 
prepayment plan, later labeled ‘Blue Cross’. Thanks to its special charter and tax exempt 
status in state after state, Blue Cross quickly grew into a nationwide system of voluntary 
insurance that was self-consciously and successfully presented as the private alternative to 
governmental involvement in healthcare104. 
 
A decisive watershed for the future of national health turned out to be the elimination of 
healthcare from the Social Security Act of 1935105. This legislation initially included 
                                                 
104 Blue Cross Publications of that time herald the Founding of Blue Cross as a linkage of patriotism and 
voluntarism: “The Blue Cross Plans are a distinctly American institution, a unique combination of individual 
initiative and social responsibility. They perform a public service without public compulsion.” And: “Private 
enterprise in voluntarily providing hospital care within the reach of everyone is solving the public health 
problem in the real democratic way. The continued growth of the Blue Cross Movement might well be 
considered the best insurance against the need of governmental provision for such protection.” (quoted in 
Rothman (1997, p. 31)). 




   
 
compulsory, state-by-state program for health insurance, which was fiercely opposed by 
the medical profession organized by the American Medical Association (AMA). Against 
these opposing forces Roosevelt decided to drop health insurance from the bill and invest 
his political capital on the passage of the other elements of the Social Security Act to 
alleviate the burdens of poverty, unemployment, and old age. As a consequence, Social 
Security and a pension system for all Americans over age 65 developed into the most 
valued federal program. Conversely, the decision against a similarly encompassing health 
insurance bill set America’s healthcare on a path that has been hard to change until this 
day106. Four issues stand out: 
 
To begin with, health insurance became established as a service that was based on 
employment. Promoted by medical providers, employers and insurers, companies 
increasingly enrolled their employees in private group hospital and physician plans. This 
trend was backed in 1939 by a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service that allowed the 
deduction of fringe benefits from the employer’s taxable income. This decision became 
crucial as during World War II, labor became scarce. Because the National War Labor 
Board prohibited wage increases, employers competed for workers with fringe benefits 
such as healthcare. By the end of World War II, the number of Americans enrolled in 
work-related healthcare had tripled and, by 1950, more than half of all Americans were 
covered by private health insurance, which became the core healthcare provision in this 
country (Hacker, p. 232).  
                                                 
106 Proposals for a universal healthcare continued to fail repeatedly at a time where Social Security became 
rooted and expanded. These intertwined but ultimately divergent paths led to a setting in which private 




   
 
 
Secondly, after World War II the political struggle about health insurance became 
embroiled in the climate and rhetoric of the Cold War. President Truman’s repeated efforts 
to introduce national healthcare were defeated by a coalition of companies, insurers, and 
the medical profession. Together with conservative politicians these allies mobilized anti-
communist fears and labeled Truman’s national health program as ‘socialized medicine’107, 
a catchword that has survived until today.  
 
Thirdly, after the defeat of Truman’s health initiatives, and in light of the anti-union Taft-
Hartley Bill passed in 1947, organized labor increasingly focused on negotiating health 
plans for their members. These plans became an important organizing tool for unions to 
safeguard their members’ loyalty. While collective bargaining agreements between 
employers and organized labor led to relatively comprehensive private health insurance 
within a firm or an industry, these arrangements undermined the larger goal of healthcare 
protection for a broader constituency (Hacker, pp. 231-2). Not only did unions’ interest in a 
national healthcare solution decrease, but it was even feared that such a solution may 
compromise the achievements of the unions for their members - another argument that 
reverberates in contemporary health reform discussions.  
 
Lastly, while a growing number of the population became covered by private health 
insurance, the market leader Blue Cross was increasingly attacked by other private, 
                                                                                                                                                    
alternative to public health insurance. The argument of the “Divided Welfare State” was eloquently made by 
Jacob Hacker (2002) on whose work this section is based. 
107 In the words of the AMA: “If we can get ten million more people insured in the next year and ten million 




   
 
commercial insurers. Unlike Blue Cross, which charged everyone in the same community 
the same rate, the private contenders divided the population into subgroups based on risk 
and charged different rates. Blue Cross had to follow suit, and as a consequence, the risk 
pool became more and more fragmented and stratified. Throughout the 1950s, as 
employers and organized labor increasingly subscribed to health plans based on different 
fees for different risk levels, affordable health insurance became problematic for those left 
behind in a community risk pool that held a greater proportion of poor and marginally 
employed, of chronically sick and disabled people, and of the elderly (Madison 2005, p. 
61).  
 
Such developments notwithstanding, President Eisenhower preferred not to meddle with 
the public-private mix that already existed. His most consequential initiative was the 
creation of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) in 1959. Rather than 
have the government assume the health risk and related costs for its employees, under 
FEHBP the government contracted out healthcare to private plans and only oversaw the 
enrolment, and the payment of a fixed amount towards the premiums that these private 
providers charged. At its time, the FEHBP was the largest voluntary employee group health 
insurance program in the world. Equally important, however, by outsourcing federal tasks 
to the private industry, a precedent for numerous healthcare reform proposals was set that 
reverberates until this day: Alternatives modeled after FEHBP were presented throughout 
the discussions about Medicare in the 1960s; FEHB was rediscovered and served as a 
template for the Clinton administration’s failing Health Security Plan in 1993; FEHBP also 




   
 
6.4.4 below), which extended the role of private health plans towards the management of 
prescription drugs (Hacker, p. 242). And also in the political struggle to reform healthcare 
under the administration of President Obama extending the coverage through private health 
insurance was offered as an alternative to the so-called ‘public option’ (see 7.8 below). 
 
6.3.2 The Passage of Medicare and Medicaid 
As employment-based health insurance became the core provision for healthcare, the gap 
between those covered and those left out widened. It became obvious that those who were 
not covered by a work-based health plan or too poor to afford alternative insurance, as well 
as those too old, disabled, or chronically ill, would not be served by the voluntary health 
insurance system. The need to cater to those left out gained momentum and a window of 
opportunity for major reform opened after Lyndon B. Johnson’s landslide victory in the 
1964 election. Unlike Roosevelt in 1935, Johnson decided to spend his political capital on 
passing national healthcare legislation. As a result, Medicare and Medicaid, national 
healthcare programs for the elderly and the poor, were adopted as part of the Social 
Security Act of 1965108. At the same time, however, these programs not only reflected the 
restricted options for healthcare reform back then, but they also perpetuated the 
impediments for extensive healthcare overhaul until today.  
 
Medicare was a federal hospital insurance program and a physicians’ insurance plan for all 
citizens over 65 at little expenses to themselves. Medicare was conceived as a self-
sustaining program financed by general income tax revenues in line with those for Social 
                                                 




   
 
Security. That connection was intentional, not only for administrative purposes, but also to 
profit from Social Security’s popular reputation as an ‘earned right’ to which workers were 
entitled due to the contributions they had made during their working years (Rothman, 1997, 
p. 84). In theory, Medicare stipulated to pay physicians for their services based on the 
vague proposition that charges had to be ‘customary and reasonable’. In practice, the 
unintended consequence of this legislation was an in-built cost-hike and physicians’ 
incomes increased immensely after the adoption of Medicare. Moreover, Medicare was 
exclusionary in terms of what was covered and who was eligible. For example, it did not 
provide assistance with prescription medications. This caveat turned out to be 
consequential for contemporary senior citizens who have been affected by the steep 
increase in prescription drug prices. At the time of its adoption in 1965, however, this was 
less of a problem as prices for prescription drugs were still low. The bigger challenge then 
was to extend coverage towards other parts of society that private health insurers had no 
interest in, such as the unemployed, the chronically ill, or children. 
 
Partly rectifying such shortcomings, partly as an afterthought to the Medicare legislation, 
the Social Security Act of 1965 also passed Medicaid. Medicaid for the first time provided 
publicly financed health coverage for low-income families with children and low-income 
aged (some of which also obtain Medicare) or disabled individuals. Financed jointly by the 
federal and by state governments, most responsibility for defining eligibility and service 
provision criteria, and for administering the program, was devolved to the states. Although 
adopted in 1965, Medicaid was not available in every state until 1982. Today, Medicaid 




   
 
Medicaid is financed by public means, but its services are mostly provided by private 
entities, predominantly Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) which are remunerated 
for their services. In 2006, the overall financial outlays of Medicaid services were $304 
billion. Two groups with special care needs, the elderly, many of them in nursing homes, 
and the disabled make for 70 percent of Medicaid’s expenditures, while accounting only 
for a quarter of all Medicare beneficiaries. Provision of prescription drugs through 
Medicaid is not mandatory and outlays for medicines account for less than 6 percent109. 
However, all states have some mechanisms for at least partial coverage of prescription 
drugs and further below (see 6.4.3) I will explain how they have turned into passive price-
takers of what the private sector dictates.  
 
In sum, these first governmental programs did not prove to be a stepping stone towards 
national health insurance, but rather a dead end alley for the extension of benefits. By 
providing some healthcare coverage for the elderly, the disabled and the poor, these 
programs relieved the private insurers from the potential financial burden that coverage of 
the most vulnerable segments of the population would have implied, thereby re-manifesting 
the centrality of the private insurance system. While Medicaid outsourced the provision of 
services to private actors, Medicare created an incentive structure that paved the way for 
increasing healthcare costs for the public at large. Hacker therefore concludes that   
 
                                                 




   
 
“[t]he federal government had first built up the technological prowess of the medical 
complex, then become a generous subsidizer of private health insurance, and then 
finally stepped in as a largely passive financier of private medical care itself.” (p. 247) 
 
This institutional setup does not benefit all members of American society equally, but it 
turned out to be advantageous for the pharmaceutical industry and, in its tailwind, 
biotechnology.  
 
6.4 Challenges to Reform Healthcare 
6.4.1 Cutting Costs 
With another opportunity for comprehensive health insurance extension foregone, 
throughout the 1970s the debate about healthcare was dominated by increasing healthcare 
costs. Federal health outlays quadrupled from 0.4 percent of GDP in 1965 to 1.6 percent in 
1974 (Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 2009, Table 16.1.)110. This time, the 
political odds were stacked against the medical profession. Doctors had initially profited 
from the defeat of national health insurance and the alternative based on businesses 
enrolling their employees in private health insurance plans. Yet this private set-up put the 
medical profession at odds with other private actors, such as corporations and private 
insurers. Unlike in other industrialized countries where health care costs were supervised 
by a federal institution or policy, in the United States cost control was left over to market 
forces. Exacerbated by an economic crisis in the 1970s, companies became increasingly 
conscious of their expenditures for their employees’ health insurance.  
                                                 




   
 
 
The response of cost-conscious insurance leaders was the establishment of managed care 
vehicles, such as HMOs. These prepaid group plans integrate the finance and the delivery 
of medical care. For patients, only visits to professionals within the HMO network are 
covered by the policy. The HMO also clears prescriptions and other care needs before they 
are covered and an in-network primary physician handles referrals. Doctors, organized into 
panels, either received a salary or a fixed fee per patient treated. In both cases HMOs 
should generate cost cuts by incentivizing doctors for treating less, and not, as under the 
previously prevalent fee-for-service model, for treating more.  
 
In the mid-1980s, 95 percent of all employees enjoying work-related health insurance were 
covered by a fee-for-service agreement. By 2000, HMOs and managed care had come to 
dominate the field and 92 percent of employment-sponsored health insurance is conveyed 
by a managed care plan. Moreover, more than 36 states provide Medicare services through 
managed care. Yet as it turned out, managed care did not achieve the cost savings that its 
proponents had promised: By the early 2000s, health care costs were on the rise again, 
increasing more than three times the rate of general inflation, indicating the short-lived 
nature of the restraints that managed care wielded over cost hikes. Likewise, the style of 
care management turned out to be unsustainable. Rising complaints by patients and doctors 
led to a backlash against managed care so that many restrictions on health care utilization, 
such as gatekeeping requirements, and the restricted access to physicians and hospitals, 




   
 
other rationalized care schemes, such as Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) and 
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) plans111.  
 
6.4.2 The Clinton Healthcare Reform Failure 
Managed care as a tool for cutting costs also stood central in President Clinton’s proposal 
for health insurance overhaul, the Health Security Act of 1993, in which the federal 
government was considered to be the ultimate arbiter in a so-called ‘managed competition’. 
Clinton’s proposal of ‘competition within a budget’ wanted to achieve universal health 
insurance through competing private plans.  Americans would purchase insurance through 
regional purchasing cooperatives set up by states, which would also monitor the 
competition among them (Hacker 1997, p. 4). This complex proposal also included an 
employer mandate to pay 80 percent of their employees’ premium, the elimination of 
Medicaid, government subsidies for small companies and unemployed, and a cap on 
insurance premiums as well as the total budget. While explicitly rejecting a Canadian 
single-payer system of national health insurance, states could establish their own single-
payer system if desired (Rushefsky and Patel 1998, p. 67). During the Congressional 
deliberations of the Act, several alternative reform plans were presented: some were 
modifications of the Clinton approach, others were single-payer plans, while others relied 
on more voluntary mechanisms, such as tax breaks. Clinton’s plan was unable to muster the 
political momentum to be passed before the elections in 1994 and failed. 
 
                                                 
111 PPOs encourage patients to choose doctors, hospitals, and other providers that participate in the plan by 
increasing the patients’ co-pay if they use ‘out-of-network’ providers. By contrast, EPOs are similar to an 
HMO in that a patient has to select a primary care physician who will be responsible for meeting health care 




   
 
As a consequence of the Clinton administration’s failure to overhaul health care, 
throughout the next decade only incremental changes were being implemented. In 1996 
Congress adopted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), which 
limited the periods during which patients with preexisting conditions could be withheld 
coverage. The Act also made it easier for employees losing group coverage to purchase 
individual health insurance. And in 1997, Congress enacted the State Children Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP), to aid children in low- and moderate-income families who did 
not qualify for Medicaid (Oberlander et al. 2005, pp. 11-12). 
 
On a general level, the logjam of reforming healthcare in the United States is exemplary for 
one of neoliberalism’s central shortcomings: the provision of a public good such as health 
by private actors. On a specific level, there are different reasons for the Clinton Health 
Security Act’s spectacular failure112. Some authors concluded that American political 
institutions are structurally biased against such kind of comprehensive health reform 
(Steinmo and Watts 1995). By contrast, Jacobs (1995) highlight that comprehensive health 
care reform failed because of the established patterns of health policy that empowered 
stakeholders of the status quo: Those with insurance, the medical profession, and the 
providers of advanced technologies. At the same time, inertia turned out to be preferred 
over changes, even by those who were considered to be the winners. For instance, HMOs 
were considered to be profiting from Clinton’s drive for cost cutting and efficiency 
improvement.  
                                                 





   
 
But HMOs opposed the proposal as they feared governmental regulation and the 
requirements to insure poor people. Likewise, large businesses stood to gain from the 
Clinton initiative as they tried to control cost escalation. At the end of the day, however, 
their main lobbying organ, the Business Roundtable opposed the plan, due to a default 
resistance against governmental social intervention and the pressure from businesses such 
as the pharmaceutical industry with a vested interest in the status quo (Jacobs 1995, p. 
149). In sum, the failure of the Clinton reform initiative demonstrated that although the 
financing structure for healthcare was disliked by most stakeholders, the medical system in 
place had created such a labyrinth of conflicting interests that the basis to find common 
interests and common goals for change remained diminished.  
 
Two factions eager to keep the status quo were the pharmaceutical industry and, for the 
first time with an own voice, the biotechnology industry113. The two industry’s resistance 
against Clinton’s healthcare reform was based especially on two suggested provisions in 
the reform bill: First, to establish a National Health Board that could investigate 
‘unreasonable’ introductory drug prices. And second, to grant Medicare the prerogative to 
obtain from pharmaceutical companies a 15 percent rebate on drug companies’ average 
nationwide drug prices (Fox 1993). Even if implemented, these provisions had not granted 
the government an actual provision to control drug prices. Nevertheless, industry 
representatives and investors argued that also a ‘de facto price setting’ would undermine 
                                                 





   
 
the industry’s financial security114 as it would curtail the resources available for research. 
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies joined a common line of defense, arguing 
that their products only accounted for seven percent of healthcare expenditures115. Yet they 
were also aware that these expenses, given the healthcare system as it was, were often paid 
for directly out of patients’ pockets. Consequently, their industries were prone to criticism, 
particularly from the elderly, whose need for prescription drugs remained uncovered by 
Medicare. Industry representatives therefore urged their trade organizations to develop 
jointly a  
 
“politically salable Medicare outpatient prescription-drug program” (Spalding 1993).  
 
As the section below (6.4.4) illustrates, this advice was indeed heeded. Similar to keeping 
the cake and eating it at the same time, these industries succeeded on extending the 
coverage (meaning: having new customers) while retaining a maximum of autonomy over 
prices. But before tackling the reform of Medicare in 2003, it is first necessary to address 
the relationship between health insurances and costs for prescription drugs. The ways in 
which the agency and moral hazard dilemma are bridged are a consequence of America’s 
institutional set-up for private service-based healthcare. 
                                                 
114 The quote by Fox (1993) of a financial analyst at that time summarizes the line of argumentation that is 
used until today: “If you want to kill this industry, put price controls on drugs...They will definitely drive 
investors into different industries.” 
115 Also during, the healthcare reform debate of 2009 (see also 7.8), industry representatives point out that 
drug expenditures account for only 10 percent of healthcare costs. Yet they make no reference to the reasons 




   
 
6.4.3 Health Insurance and the Pricing of Prescription Drugs  
Why do Americans pay a higher price on prescription drugs than anyone else in the world? 
The answer points to the core of the country’s framework for medical politics: It is because 
of the fragmented, private-actor-centered healthcare market that has no unified oversight of 
drug costs. Governments in several other large pharmaceutical markets, notably in Europe 
such as France and Germany, place a restriction on the price for a particular drug. Others, 
such as the United Kingdom, impose a ceiling on the amount of profit that a company can 
earn from a particular medicine. And the majority of OECD countries apply external 
benchmarking of pharmaceutical prices in other jurisdictions to limit prices of drugs at 
home (OECD, 2008, p. 103). Unlike OECD countries with a national health insurance 
system, the federal authorities of the United States do not apply international comparisons 
or any other overarching mechanisms to control drug pricing. Instead, there is a patchwork 
of internal comparisons based on reference pricing at work, sometimes applied by private 
insurers, sometimes by the federal health programs, and sometimes by both. Despite a 
complicated network of regulations, these measures have not prevented the United States 
from having one of the highest prices – 30 percent above OECD average - for prescription 
drugs (OECD, 2008, p. 32). Ultimately, it is this absence of federal price controls in 
America’s privatized healthcare that provides a comparative advantage for the 
biotechnology industry in the United States (claim 3). 
 
As about two third of Americans have private health insurance coverage, the first look 
should go to the cost curbing measures of these actors. Many private health insurances 




   
 
pharmaceutical benefits management (PBM) firms. Some of the largest PBM firms 
represent several million insured individuals and have considerable market power. For 
PBM firms the most common cost cutting measure is charging differential co-payments for 
originator drugs and for generic versions. Another commonly applied cost-management 
tool, used by about half of US pharmaceutical benefits management firms, is a so-called 
therapeutic interchange (Hoadley 2005). It involves the dispensing of a chemically 
different, but cheaper, drug that is considered to be therapeutically equivalent in that it 
produces the same therapeutic outcomes and has a similar safety and toxicity profile as the 
original drug. In the United States, 90 percent of employees with private health insurance 
are in plans with a tiered co-payment scheme for generic, preferred and non-preferred 
drugs (ibid.). 
 
By contrast, the power of the U.S. government to regulate prices is restricted to some 
federal purchasing schemes. Most importantly, the four largest federal government 
purchasers, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Department of Defense, the 
Public Health Service, and the Coast Guard bargain with drug producers over a so-called 
‘Big Four Price’ (Roughhead et al., 2007). These federal purchasing schemes limit the 
prices manufacturers can charge, using those obtained by competing private plans as a 
benchmark. Since most of these plans pool fewer patients than the federal purchasing 
schemes, which together provide coverage for about 20 percent of the U.S. population 
(OECD 2008, p. 98), this further fractioning of the demand side strengthens the bargaining 





   
 
In this context, the VHA is particularly relevant, because it is one of the largest healthcare 
systems in the United States116. Financed primarily through general taxation, the VHA is 
owned, operated and managed by the U.S. Veterans Administration. The VHA provides a 
range of health benefits to U.S. military veterans, including hospital, physician and 
prescription drug services. In 2006, 7.9 million veterans were enrolled with the VA health 
system. In addition, after a restructuring in 1997, the VHA also became the largest single 
U.S. purchaser of prescription drugs. Until 1997, the VHA operated on a decentralized 
basis, with weaker negotiating powers and larger price differences for certain 
pharmaceutical products purchased by different VA facilities (OECD, 2008, Fn 8, p. 118). 
After the consolidation of the VHA and the establishment of one single national formulary 
for prescription drugs, savings of 16 to 41 percent, depending on the drug class, could be 
achieved through shifts in prescribing behavior and price reductions from manufacturers 
(Blumenthal and Herdman 2000). Tendering of medicines to drug manufacturers played 
another crucial role in cutting the VA’s costs for drugs too. The VA estimates, that between 
1995 and 2003, national contracting of pharmaceuticals saved over $ 1.5 billion (Sales et 
al. 2005). 
 
Medicaid, another important federal program, has no obligation for outpatient pharmacy 
benefits. Nonetheless, today all states have some outpatient pharmacy benefits and 
Medicaid spends over $34 billion on prescription drugs. To save costs Congress included in 
the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA’90) the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. 
                                                 
116 Moreover, and somewhat paradoxical, nowhere does America’s healthcare system come closer to the 





   
 
This program requires pharmaceutical companies who wish their products be covered by 
Medicaid to grant the federal government a discount on outpatient drugs dispensed to 
Medicaid patients. Manufacturers must agree that the price charged to Medicaid will not 
exceed the Average Manufacturer Price (AMP)117 reduced by a rebate percentage. The law 
then requires states to provide coverage of all FDA-approved medications made by 
manufacturers who have made rebate agreements (OECD, 2008, p. 99).  
 
Yet Medicaid is an example for why federal structures, historically relegated to the second 
tier, have now become – willingly and unwillingly – a passive price-taker of what the 
private sector decides. Overall bargaining power is also tilted by the fact that U.S. public 
and  private purchasers of drugs generally do not publicize the discounts they obtain from 
drug companies (OECD 2008, p. 143), which puts the latter in a more powerful position. 
To counter the corporations’ bargaining advantage, states have entered multi-state rebate 
agreements for Medicaid with pharmaceutical companies. Yet there are also bilateral 
agreements between large pharmaceutical companies and states. A particular case is the 
arrangement struck between Florida and Pfizer. In exchange for having its key drugs 
included in Florida’s preferred drug list to be reimbursed by Medicaid, Pfizer, instead of 
agreeing on a rebate, subsidized disease management and patient education programs 
(Bowe 2003). Moreover, there are drugs, such as the antipsychotic medication Zyprexa, for 
which 70 percent of sales go to government agencies and excluding that medicine form 
Medicaid’s preferred medication list can render considerable savings for some states.  
                                                 
117 The AMP is the price paid to a manufacturer for pharmaceuticals distributed through retail and mail-order 




   
 
In many cases, however, drug makers – using patients’ advocacy groups that they fund 
themselves – wield sufficient power on state legislatures to protect their business from such 
cost cuts (Harris 2003).  
 
Another side effect of the lack of an overarching federal pricing regime in the United States 
is that even if some public programs successfully negotiate a rebate from drug companies, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers compensate for it with an overall increase in prices. For 
instance, as a reaction to the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers simply raised the comparative bar, namely the prices that they charged non-
governmental wholesale purchasers118. This mixed outcome on drug costs of the Medicaid 
reform of the early 1990s is another example for how fragmentation of the market and no 
federal oversight of prescription drug costs in the American healthcare system made the 
American healthcare market prone to unprecedented hikes in costs for prescription drugs 
that benefited the makers of these products. 
6.4.4 Struggles Around the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 
The question whether the government should have a role in drug pricing resurfaced a 
decade later in discussions about reforming Medicare. The VA restructuring demonstrated 
that a system with a single purchaser has greater power to obtain price concessions from 
pharmaceutical sellers. Yet in 2003, when Congress had to decide about legislation to 
reform Medicare and include prescription drug benefits, the opportunity for cost cutting by 
strengthening the bargaining power of the federal entity was deliberately foregone. Instead, 
                                                 
118 According to a study of the Congressional Budget Office, wholesale rebates fell from an average of more 




   
 
the adopted legislation outsourced the prescription drug benefits to private, competing, 
entities, each of which with a smaller basis than the whole pool of Medicare beneficiaries.  
 
When Medicare was established in 1965, it was initially meant to provide health insurance 
to individuals age 65 and older, irrespective of their income or medical condition. The 
program was expanded in 1972 to grant coverage to people with permanent disabilities and 
individuals suffering from end-stage renal disease, and in 2001 to cover people with Lou 
Gehrig’s disease. The growing share of the population qualifying for Medicare – from 9.2 
percent in 1960 to 12.4 percent in 2005 (OECD 2007, p. 13) – was also reflected by 
increasing costs. By 2003, Medicare accounted for $244 billion, more than 11 percent of 
the entire federal budget (Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 2003, p. 40). Yet it 
had also become increasingly obvious that despite this hike in expenses, Medicare 
recipients were lacking one important aspect of healthcare coverage: Prescription drugs, 
which had been excluded from Medicare’s original scope. At a time when drugs were 
cheap, Medicare recipients could pay for them out of pocket. Over time, however, the price 
hikes for prescription medicines affected this group disproportionately more. Due to their 
vulnerable health, Medicare beneficiaries – as of 2008, 38 million Americans age 65 and 
older, as well as 7 million people below that age with disabilities – are disproportionately 
heavier drug users too. Moreover, many Medicare beneficiaries live on modest incomes, 
relying on Social Security as their primary source of income119. 
 
                                                 
119 46 percent of all Medicare recipients have an income below 200 percent of the federal poverty line ($ 
20,800 per individual and $ 28,000 per couple, in 2008), and 38 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries live 




   
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the unresolved issues of the failed healthcare reform effort of 
1993 was the question of prescription drug benefits for Medicare recipients. On December 
8, 2003, President Bush signed into law the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and 
Modernization Act120 (MMA). This Act, which went into effect in 2006, presented the most 
sweeping overhaul of the Medicare program since its inception. At an estimated price for 
the federal budget of $40 billion annually for the first ten years, the MMA added 
prescription drug benefits as a fourth category to Medicare (Part D)121. With more than 40 
million Americans receiving Medicare benefits, pooling their needs for prescription drugs 
under one administrative roof potentially could have turned the federal government into the 
most powerful purchaser of drugs in the United States. And as the single largest buyer of 
drugs the government could have wielded its bargaining power to curb prescription drug 
expenditures for Medicare recipients. Yet influenced by the pharmaceutical and the 
biotechnology industry and as the result of a long and fierce political battle that will be 
described further below, the Bush administration and Congress chose otherwise. They 
followed the example of President Eisenhower mentioned above (see 6.3.1), who 
outsourced healthcare for federal employees to private plans and have the federal budget 
pay for it.  
 
In this spirit, the MMA established competition among private prescription drug plans, in 
which Medicare recipients, paid for by federal monies, can enroll.  
                                                 
120 Public Law 108-173. 
121 The other three parts are Hospital Insurance (A), Supplementary Medical Insurance (B) and Medicare 




   
 
Highlighting the sancticity of market-led competition, the text of the MMA explicitly 
stipulates the noninterference on the side of the Medicare administration:  
 
“In order to promote competition…, the Secretary— 
‘‘(1) may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and 
pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and ‘‘(2) may not require a particular formulary or 
institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.”122 
 
While federal subsidies encourage plan participation and better enrollee benefits, the 
individual plans negotiate drug prices with manufacturers to provide lower prices to plan 
beneficiaries. Such private prescription drug plans were estimated to save the average 
senior who, without drug coverage spent $1,285 annually on medicine, as much as $300 
per year (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2005). 
 
As of October 2006, almost 26 million Medicare recipients were enrolled in a Part D plan 
for prescription drugs. Plans vary widely in terms of the list of drugs covered, cost-sharing 
requirements, and requirements for prior authorization. Yet they are similar in that all of 
them still require considerable co-payment from enrolled Medicare recipients: For 2009, 
there was a $295 deductable and a 25 percent coinsurance up to the initial coverage limit of 
$2,700 for annual prescription drug costs. This is followed by a coverage gap (‘doughnut 
hole’) up to $6,154, which enrollees have to pay completely out of pocket. If the 
                                                 




   
 
prescription drug requirements exceed this amount, enrollees pay 5 percent, the plan 15 
percent, and Medicare the remainder (Kaiser Family Foundation 2009).  
 
Despite its short life, some consequences of the MMA have already surfaced. As intended, 
Medicare recipients see their costs for prescription drugs reduced. Seniors who enrolled in 
a Part D plan for prescription drug coverage spent less than those who did not. At the same 
time, Part D offered less protection from high prescription drug costs than for instance 
employer plans or the VA123, which do not have the MMA’s ‘doughnut hole’ coverage 
restrictions. Government officials reported for 2006 that approximately 3 million of 23 
million Medicare Plan D beneficiaries reached the point at which this gap in coverage 
occurred (Lee and Levine 2006). As importantly, the MMA has established a low-income 
subsidy mechanism for enrollment, but, since participation in Plan D is voluntary, 
particularly low income seniors seem to be foregoing coverage for prescription drug costs 
(Neumann et al. 2007). 
  
Savings of about 4 percent in private spending for prescribed drugs were offset by an 
increase in public expenditures on prescription drugs, which rose from 2 percent in 2005, 
the year before Medicare Part D went into effect, to 18 percent in 2006. In part, this shift of 
burden had been intended. Yet overall, the Act did not turn around the cost increases 
caused by prescription drugs. In 2006, the year that the MMA went into effect, overall drug 
spending rose by 4.5 percent in real terms in 2006 after a 2.2 percent increase in 2005124. In 
                                                 
123 A comparative study found that Medicare Plan D patients are paying almost 60 percent more for the top 20 
drugs than veterans under their coverage by the VHA (No Bargain: Medicare Drug Plans Deliver High Prices  
2007). 




   
 
2009, Medicare Part D is expected to account for $61 billion – 50 percent higher than 
initially budgeted – and account for 12 percent of Medicare’s total budget of $507 
billion125. One study came to the conclusion that rather than cutting costs, the increasing 
role of private plans as a result of the MMA has led to cost increases of Medicare of about 
$11 million (Biles, Pozen, and Guterman 2009)126. 
  
Therefore, while the MMA did alleviate difficulties to obtain prescription drugs for senior 
citizens and people with disabilities, it did not solve the problem – neither individually, nor 
for society. Prohibiting the government from negotiating drug prices, the MMA, again, 
turned the government into a passive price-taker of whatever costs the makers of 
pharmaceuticals charge. How could such a ‘giveaway to the drug industry’ (Newhouse, 
Seiguer, and Frank 2007) happen? Taking off from the passage of the MMA, the next 
section will analyze the extent to which pharmaceutical and biotechnology influence the 
political debate about high drug prices in the United States.  
 
6.5 Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry’s Interest Representation 
 
Over the years biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies have built an effective 
machinery to represent their interests vis-à-vis political decision makers in Washington. 
Relevant for the arguments put forward in this study is not lobbying per se, but rather on 
                                                                                                                                                    
 http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3343,en_2649_33717_40902299_1_1_1_1,00.html, retrieved 
5/18/2009. 
125 Prescription drug coverage under MMA’s Part D will be largely financed (79 percent) through general 
federal revenues (Kaiser Family Foundation 2009, p. 16). 
126 The study also suggested that, instead of subsidizing private plans with federal monies, that amount had 




   
 
which issues. The lobbying efforts and the political wrangling of biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries to shape the MMA in their favor reveal how relevant America’s 
fragmented healthcare market without any federally invoked price cap has become for 
these businesses (claim 3). 
 
How do these industries vent their positions and wield influence? Compared with other 
industries, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are not among the main 
contributors to electoral campaigns: Their total financial contributions for all federal 
elections between 1990 and 2010 amounted to $170 million, ranking only 17th and for 
2008,127 contributed $29.1 million to the election cycle of 2008, ranking only 20th. On the 
other hand, the pharmaceutical industry is the top industry with regards to lobbying efforts: 
From 1998 to 2009, pharmaceutical and health product companies, including 
biotechnology firms, allocated $1.6 billion to lobbying, $235 million in 2009 alone128. 
Another study, published by the Center for Public Integrity, concluded that pharmaceutical, 
medical device and other health product manufacturers almost tripled their lobbying 
expenditures between 1998 and 2007 from $67 million to $ 189 million129. While the top 
company listed is the biotechnology firm Amgen, among the top lobby spenders were 
transnational pharmaceutical companies headquartered in Europe, such as Roche, Sanofi-
Aventis, and Novartis.  
                                                 
127These data do not distinguish between pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. For example, the largest 
donor in this category was Pfizer, followed by Amgen. See 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=H04 (visited August 9, 2009). 
128 See http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=H04&year=2010 




   
 
This reiterates the centrality of the U.S. market for the destiny of the globally operating 
transnational pharmaceutical business. 
 
Table 6.1: Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Lobbying Expenditures 2007  
Rank Company/Organization Amount 
(million$) 
1 Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America 22.7 
2 Amgen Inc. 16.3 
3 Pfizer Inc. 13.8 
4 Roche Holding AG 9.0 
5 Sanofi-Aventis 8.4 
6 GlaxoSmithKline 8.2 
7 Johnson & Johnson Inc. 7.7 
8 Biotechnology Industry Organization  7.2 
9 Novartis AG 6.6 
10 Merck & Co. 6.6 
11 Bristo-Myers Squibb Co. 6.0 
12 Abbott Laboratories 4.6 
13 Eli Lilly and Co. 4.3 
14  Boehringer Ingelheim 4.1 
15 AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals 4.1 
16 Bayer Corp. 4.1 
17 Genzyme Corp. 2.7 
18 Wyeth 2.5 
19 Teva Pharmaceuticals 2.3 
20 Baxter Healthcare Corp. 2.2 
 
Source: Center for Public Integrity. 





   
 
In addition to individual companies, the above table also lists lobbying expenditures of 
interest group organizations: The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) is the interest 
group organization of the biotechnology industry in the United States, and the world's 
largest biotechnology trade organization. It came into being in 1993, when two rivaling 
biotechnology trade associations merged: The Association of Biotechnology Companies 
(ABC), which represented mainly small start-up companies, and the Industrial 
Biotechnology Association (IBA), lobbying for more mature firms. To date, BIO has more 
than 1,200 members worldwide. Members include entrepreneurial companies developing a 
first product, Fortune 100 multinationals, state and regional biotechnology associations, 
service providers to the industry, as well as academic centers. BIO members are involved 
in the research and development of health-care, agricultural, industrial and environmental 
biotechnology products130. BIO grew considerably over time, increasing its staff from some 
twenty to more than 150 employees and its annual budget from less than $3 million to over 
$52 million. Consequently, BIO has become a lobbying force in Washington to be 
reckoned with (Fox 2006). Similar to many other industry interest group representations, 
BIO has been headed by political insiders: Carl. Feldbaum, the BIO President from 1993 to 
2005, had previously been chief of staff to Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA). Jim Greenwood, 
BIO’s current president, had been a Republican from Pennsylvania in the U.S. House of 
Representatives from January 1993 through January 2005. As a senior member of the 
Energy and Commerce Committee, Greenwood was engaged in health care legislation, 
such as the MMA. Greenwood brought with him legislative experience as well as a new 
team of political insiders. 
                                                 




   
 
 
Predating the change in personnel, BIO’s marching order for the Medicare reform debate 
was already adopted in 1999:  
 
“BIO strongly believes that pharmaceutical benefit options should be offered to 
beneficiaries in the context of an overall, market-based reform of the Medicare 
program… BIO believes that Medicare benefits - including coverage for prescription 
drugs and biologics - should be delivered through a decentralized, pluralistic market 
structure that encourages meaningful competition in order to preserve patient choice, 
improve quality and encourage innovation. Government regulation should be limited 
and market-based delivery mechanisms should be utilized. Explicit or indirect price 
controls that stifle innovation must be avoided.” (BIO 1999) 
 
Consequently, BIO lauded the passage of the MMA in 2003 as its “most significant 
legislative victory to date,” because the Act included BIO’s market-based principles. 
Moreover,  
 
“[p]assage of this historic legislation marked the culmination of more than four years 
of federal government relations, grassroots and communications efforts.” (BIO 
2004)131  
 
                                                 
131 Its successful lobbying strategy is summarized in another BIO publication, which has the telling title: “The 




   
 
The real prize for pushing the MMA through Congress, however, does not go to BIO, but 
to the pharmaceutical industry and their trade organization, the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)132. PhRMA is much smaller in membership than 
BIO, but its 31 member corporations and 20 associate members comprise all the leading 
global pharmaceutical companies, headquartered in the United States and elsewhere133. 
Irrespective of their representation through BIO, a number of large biotechnology firms, 
such as Amgen, Genentech, and Millennium Pharmaceuticals, are also a member of 
PhRMA. Pharmaceutical companies initially would have preferred having no Medicare 
prescription drug legislation at all. Yet increasing public concern made them change 
tactics. Instead of blocking legislation wholesale, pharmaceutical companies tried to 
influence the legislative process in such a way that the law adopted would increase 
prescription drug access without government price controls (Stolberg and Harris 2003).  
 
This became more possible after the 2002 election led to a Republican majority in both 
chambers of Congress. Influential Democratic healthcare legislators such as Edward 
Kennedy saw their hopes for a federally run prescription drug plan dwindling. 
Nevertheless, negotiations in 2003 still had Senate and House of Representatives present 
bills with significant differences. Under the Senate bill, the federal government would 
provide prescription drug coverage in any region where fewer than two private insurance 
plans were available.  
                                                 
132 See http://www.phrma.org/ 
133 In fact, in April 2009, PhRMA elected the CEO of the Anglo-Swedish multinational drug company 




   
 
The House bill prescribed the government pay subsidies to private insurers to induce them 
to offer coverage, but would not directly provide such coverage itself. Throughout these 
negotiations, Congressman Billy Tauzin, (R-LA), became a vocal opponent of government 
involvement in Medicare reform134. Tauzin shepherded his views for the 2003 Medicare 
drug bill first through the House-Senate Conference and later through the House of 
Representatives135. Tauzin was criticized for leaving the House of Representative to 
become the head of PhRMA, yet he was not the only one engaged in this bill who left 
public office for private industry. For example, Thomas Scully, Administrator of the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and the administration’s lead negotiator 
for the MMA, left his government job ten days after the MMA was signed to become a 
Senior Counsel at Alston & Bird, a lobbying firm where he is focusing on health care 
regulatory and legislative matters. At least 15 congressional staffers, congressmen and 
federal officials who were involved in ushering the MMA through Congress subsequently 
left government for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. 
 
While lobbying efforts and revolving doors may come as no surprise to Washington 
observers, they are relevant in this context, because they point to the crucial role that price 
controls have come to play for the modus operandi of the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry. The MMA is another example for why laissez-faire solutions are 
never inevitable or natural outcomes, but always politically fabricated.  
                                                 
134 He scolded the Democrat’s vision of Medicare as “the government does it all…The government provides 
the benefits, and no one else—no competition, no reform.” (Quoted in Pear (2003)). 
135 For a journalistic account of the longest roll call in the history of the House of Representatives see “60 





   
 
By giving preference to a private solution instead of an overarching public effort, American 
politicians once again paid tribute to neoliberal ideology. But as the MMA has not averted 
crises of accessibility or rising healthcare costs, the saga of healthcare reform and drug 




In international comparison, the healthcare system of the United States is exceptional in a 
number of ways: The country allocates more resources to health than any other wealthy 
nation, but it does so in a way that relies predominantly on private insurance coverage. 
Federal programs for particularly vulnerable groups of society, such as the elderly and 
people with disabilities, have not turned into a Trojan horse for ‘socialized medicine’. On 
the contrary, a division of labor according to which federal healthcare is limited to those 
individuals generating the highest costs, manifested the preeminence of private health 
providers.  
 
This provision of healthcare by the American variety of capitalism has turned into a 
comparative institutional advantage for pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry in the 
United States. Whereas all advanced industrial nations face the challenge of how to 
mediate between healthcare needs and costs, the United States is the only country in which 
politicians deliberately and repeatedly opposed state regulation and granted the market the 
upper hand. Since a national system for healthcare was not included in the Social Security 




   
 
private employment-based private insurance. Additional federal programs, starting with 
President Eisenhower's health insurance for federal employees, and especially Medicare 
and Medicaid, all outsourced the provision of healthcare, either partially or completely, to 
private actors and relegated the public hand to paying the bill afterwards. 
 
The evolving healthcare system with its division of labor between the private and the 
public created an incentive structure most favorable for pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies. Unlike other wealthy countries with a national health insurance system, in the 
United States there is no central agency or policy in place to control prices for healthcare 
services and products, including drugs. Instead, by limiting the role of government, a 
patchwork of reference pricings is applied, sometimes by private insurers, sometimes by 
federal health programs, sometimes by both. The whole healthcare system of the United 
States can best be described as the private sector being the price-setter, whereas the public 
becomes the price-taker. What market advocates see as a blessing, more competition 
among private actors, has worked out the opposite way: With private health insurance in 
the drivers’ seat and public health provisions as a sidekick, prescription drugs are more 
expensive than in most industrialized countries, while more than 40 million citizens remain 
uninsured today.  
 
The institutional setup of healthcare provision has profited the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry. Yet beginning with President Clinton’s failed proposal to 
overhaul healthcare, these industries were able to influence reform efforts according to 




   
 
accepting lower prices for more patients, so far pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies have opted for a limited scope of coverage with less regulation of prices by 
public authorities. Following through on this strategic and ideological roadmap, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries’ political leverage was instrumental for the 
making and passing of the Medicare reform bill that outsources prescription drug benefits 
to private insurances. 
 
By advancing an agenda of market-led solutions for public health needs, these industries 
both profited from and exacerbated a neoliberal political zeitgeist. However, with a global 
economic crisis ongoing, neoliberal laissez-faire policy prescriptions have lost their 
hegemony. The current market-based healthcare system in the United States can no longer 
be taken for granted, not in the least because corporations have identified the competitive 
disadvantage that an employment-based system presents for them. At the time of writing it 
is not clear whether or not reform efforts of a new administration under President Obama 
will succeed. If so, it will most likely fall short of a comprehensive overhaul of American 
healthcare. Yet pressure on the current practice of prescription drug pricing in the United 
States, and, in its tailwind, the business prospects of the biotechnology industry, will 
almost certainly increase. The next and final chapter will therefore address these and other 






   
 
Chapter 7: Side Effects of America’s Biotechnology Innovation 
Regime 
 
“The biggest risk facing the biotech industry is the prospect of increased price controls 
and access regimes – a risk that could threaten the survival of the industry…High 
prices, especially in the US market (the last major market entirely free of price 
controls) makes biotech innovation possible. The possibility of price controls in the US, 
plus the escalating cost of development would change this paradigm forcing the sector 
to seek new development strategies or to invest less in R&D.”  




This study made the following claims: First, a biotechnology revolution has not taken place 
so far. Instead, the creative destruction that characterizes the biotechnology industry has 
been co-opted by the pharmaceutical industry’s blockbuster drug logic. Second, the history 
of political interventions of the U.S. government has led to a clustering of the 
biotechnology industry in certain regions in the United States and to a competitive 
advantage for the biotechnology industry located in the United States vis-à-vis other 
countries in general. Politics to stimulate economic competitiveness trump free-market 
rhetoric. Third, as part of America’s market-driven healthcare system, the absence of 
federal controls over prescription drug prices is a crucial comparative advantage for the 





   
 
In this concluding chapter, I will first recapitulate some of the main findings from the 
interviews with corporate actors as they relate to these three main claims (7.2). 
Subsequently, I will discuss a number of ramifications that the current biotechnology 
innovation regime in the United States has. I will first focus on stem cell research, 
biotechnology’s latest harbinger of hope for tailor-made human medicines, which seems to 
play out a number of the same dynamics that characterized the ascent and decline of 
genomics (7.3). Two consequences of the current market-driven innovation regime cannot 
be addressed in-depth here, but are too important to be left out. These are respectively the 
side effects of the increasing commodification of knowledge production (7.4), and the 
hegemonic position that the United States could obtain thanks to globally binding legal 
mechanisms (7.5). I will then go back to the core of the current market-driven model in 
which biomedical innovation is occurring in the United States. First I will take a more 
theoretical look on the evolving relationship between the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry, which also revisits the question of how revolutionary the effects 
of biotechnology for medicine indeed have been (7.6). Next I will address the increasing 
political pressure in the United States on the economically successful blockbuster drug 
model. Irrespective of the impact of biotechnologies on developing new drugs, large 
pharmaceutical companies have turned into highly sophisticated marketing machineries 
(7.7) Subsequently, the most recent efforts to reform healthcare in the United States will be 
scrutinized for the role and position that the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry 
play in it (7.8). The chapter will conclude with an outlook for the biotechnology innovation 
regime in the United States at a time in which the hegemony of neoliberal, free-market 




   
 
7.2. Biotechnology Innovation Regime in the Eyes of the Biotechnology 
Actors 
 
Throughout the interviews, it became apparent that in many ways, the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries are not completely different, but rather complementary. A clash 
of organizational culture between old, sclerotic, bureaucratized Big Pharma and new, 
nimble, and nifty biotechnology firms is part of the latter’s gospel. Past cultural clashes 
became virulent throughout the interviews for instance, when biotechnology actors 
reported on the exodus of staff after being taken over and integrated into the hierarchy of 
Big Pharma. Today, large pharmaceutical firms generally have become more hesitant to 
integrate fully an acquired biotechnology firm. Large drug companies do not want to 
destroy the value for which they paid so dearly and instead manage their biotechnology 
acquisitions at arm’s length. As a result of the often mentioned vivid exchange of human 
resources among both industries – some caused by mergers and acquisitions, others by the 
life cycle of companies – there is not so much talk about clash, but rather conversion. In 
this regard, there is no difference whether the buyer is an international or an American 
company. Moreover, there is also the conversion among large pharmaceutical companies 
themselves. Corporations such as Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, and Roche all try to emulate 
the innovative nimbleness of biotechnology companies by splitting up in-house R&D into 
competing clusters of innovative excellence.  
 
Yet a clash, albeit less over culture but over business models, did indeed occur at the end of 
the 1990s. For a while genomics companies appeared to turn the table of the drug 




   
 
seemed to own the Holy Grail for drug development, only to discover that the way towards 
gene-based medicines was much more arduous and unpredictable than initially proclaimed. 
Big pharmaceutical companies started reconsidering their approach towards genomics after 
the litigations against the drug Vioxx, which almost bankrupted its producer Merck. Vioxx 
turned lethal because it was marketed to a much larger population than medically 
reasonable. Whether or not in the future such malpractice will be prevented by genomics or 
by a different marketing practice remains to be seen. In any event, there is a lesson to be 
learned from genomics about the contradictions between scientific and business 
imperatives that will be worthwhile remembering when taking a look at biotechnology’s 
most current hope: Stem cell research.  
 
The interviews also highlighted an important twist in the division between research ‘for 
profit’ and ‘not-for-profit’. Scientific development relevant for the biotechnology industry 
was facing a dilemma: On the one hand, scientific advancements require the free exchange 
of ideas. Cutting-edge research in particular depends to a large extent on tacit knowledge, 
which is not readily transferable via codified sources. And the more certain knowledge 
becomes tacit, the more does its transfer depend on personal, face-to-face-interaction. 
Biotechnology companies wanting to profit from the exchange of tacit information 
therefore want to be present in clusters with a lot of ‘free buzz’. These informal rather than 
contractual exchanges point to an important limitation of the VoC approach for 
understanding the biotechnology industry. VoC suggests the dominance of contractual, 




   
 
explain how companies in the surveyed clusters enjoy a comparative institutional 
advantage by being immersed in a cluster with tacit knowledge.  
 
At the same time, while everybody wants to profit from the free-floating of ideas, the 
willingness to provide it is decreasing. Even if people do meet in person, sharing of 
knowledge – tacit or otherwise – becomes less likely when individuals or entities such as 
universities or companies are entitled to exclusive ownership of such knowledge. 
Intellectual property therefore not only becomes a bargaining unit based upon which 
businesses are funded, but it becomes also a roadblock. In this regard, the transformed role 
of universities turned out to be particularly consequential. Traditionally seen as institutions 
whose primary purpose is to generate knowledge for the larger public good, universities 
have become increasingly motivated by the protection of intellectual property and the 
collection of licensing fees for their inventions. 
 
While academic research is now often conducted with profit considerations in mind, 
conversely, a vast amount of biotechnology research is carried out by companies that will 
never make a single penny of profit. For those companies that ‘burn’ money, adding long-
term value is more important than short-term profitability. This loss-making process can be 
perpetuated for as long as some investor continues to add fresh money, speculating on a 
future value that will earn him a huge enough profit. Ultimately, the boom and bust cycles 
of the biotechnology industry are an example that in every speculative process, a 
realignment of expectations and reality leads to the destruction of a lot of capital. 




   
 
to the restructuring of the industry. Creative destruction also means that, while some 
companies may be going out of business, others merge, and people who created the 
knowledge move on and may start elsewhere. People engaged in the biotechnology 
industry are fully aware that, where there are some big winners, there are normally a lot of 
small and big losers. While taking the risk of being at times one of the latter, the ultimate 
aim is of course, to be part of the former.  
 
The interviews also pointed to the ambivalent functions that the neoliberal state has to play. 
Neoliberalism does not deny a role for the state, but rather, asks for a state being more 
active in some respect, while being hands-off in others. For the majority of interview 
partners laissez-faire equaled governmental pro-market intervention. Many biotechnology 
industry representatives, while on the one hand demanding that the state stay out of their 
business, on the other hand highlighted the importance of US federal intervention for the 
wellbeing of the industry. Whereas small companies appreciated the support provided by 
NIH and other federal SBIR grants companies closer to a marketable product worked 
towards a favorable verdict by the FDA. As it turned out, the sum of federal ‘enabling 
policies’ on access to capital, particularly venture capital and intellectual property rights, 
were more important than the actual level of direct subsidies.  
 
Clustering also reflects the inbuilt contradiction of the neoliberal state being pro-active 
active in some respect, and hands-off in others. Clusters are not only in competition with 
each other, but they also have their individual strengths and weaknesses. Many 




   
 
have other advantages as well. Successful biotechnology clusters allow the industry to 
profit from cross-industry and institutional interconnections. For example, San Francisco 
has the information technology industry of Silicon Valley, San Diego the military industry, 
Boston the agglomeration of the most prestigious research universities, and Maryland 
federal institutions such as the NIH. These linkages and competitive advantages had to do 
with a path dependence of past politics and specific policies ‘to make the peaks higher’. 
And while biotechnology actors expressed their willingness to take advantage of such 
policies, they are not really acknowledged as playing a steering role in the allegedly free 
market competition.  
 
Lastly, but most importantly, free-market competition and non-intervention are most 
vocally claimed with regards to prescription drug pricing. As the interviews illustrated, the 
biotechnology industry acknowledges that the American healthcare system enables them to 
charge premium prices for prescription drugs. While all these corporate activities make 
sense from the viewpoint of the individual companies, the question again is what are the 
consequences for society at large? How has, for example, the ascent of the biotechnology 
industry affected the drug development process? I will try to answer these questions in 
section 7.6 below. Yet I will first zoom in on some other consequences of the market-
driven innovation paradigm for biotechnologies: Stem cell research; the commodification 
of biomedical sciences; and the global dissemination of the United States’ paradigm by 




   
 
7.3 The Future of Stem Cell Research 
 
There is an important lesson to be learned from genomics also for biotechnology’s latest 
promising scientific advancement: Stem cell research. On the one hand, these techniques 
have raised hopes that this new line of investigation will lead to therapies and, ultimately, 
cures for an array of diseases from Alzheimers to Diabetes to Parkinsons. On the other 
hand, there has been a broad discussion about ethical implications, particularly of human 
embryonic stem cell research (Holland, Lebacqz, and Zoloth 2001), as well as the 
regulatory criteria under which the administration of President George W. Bush provided 
federal funding for such research (Lehmann 2001). Half a decade later, and tainted by the 
scandal of a South Korean researcher who fabricated data on cloning human embryonic 
stem cell lines, the question remains: How beneficial will stem cell research be? In the 
United States, in absence of an overarching federal support program, several states have 
taken the initiative to provide funding136. By far the most comprehensive support is being 
marshaled by California, which, in 2005, passed Proposition 71 to create the California 
Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM). Financed by issued state bonds, the state will 
distribute nearly $300 million annually in stem cell funds for 10 years to California 
universities and research institutions. In contrast with earlier biotechnology-related 
exuberances, this time, protagonists have made sure not to oversell the expectations 
(Longaker, Baker, and Greely 2007). Researchers agree that there is still a lot of scientific 
legwork to be done before there will be approved therapeutic procedures and that this new 
                                                 




   
 
approach is at least one or two decades away from widespread commercial application 
(Cookson 2009). 
 
Stem cells offer a variety of different treatment options, and particularly when derived from 
an individual’s own body, bear the potential for tailor-made therapies. Similar to genomics 
this would again be in conflict with the blockbuster drug model. It is therefore noteworthy 
that also large pharmaceutical companies have started to invest in stem cell research. For 
example, in 2008, Pfizer launched an independent research unit ‘Pfizer Regenerative 
Medicine’, focused exclusively on using stem cells to develop new medicines. Endowed 
with more than $100 million over the next 3 to 5 years, one of the first deals signed was 
with the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) in Madison, Wisconsin. The 
deal allows Pfizer to license WARF’s human embryonic stem cell patents for the 
development of new drug therapies. Previously, GlaxoSmithKline (UK) had signed a $25 
million four-year deal with Harvard University, and the venture funds of the Swiss 
multinationals Novartis and Hoffman-LaRoche founded a Spanish company testing stem 
cells (Siva 2009). While the feasibility of individualized treatment based on stem cells 
remains to be seen, for the time being Big Pharma’s engagement in this new field of 
science are geared towards more short-term, tangible aims, such as applying stem cells for 
drug testing. Science is important, but as it was the case with genomics, the successful 
introduction of new biotechnologies does not depend so much on their scientific potential 
but rather on their potential to be molded into a marketable product. This makes it more 
likely that also stem cell research would rather be co-opted to become an integrated part of 




   
 
medicine. And while stem cell research received a short-term boost when President 
Obama’s Executive Order of March 2009 liberalized the conditions for federal stem cell 
funding, the calculations of the most prominent market actors, such as Big Pharma and VC 
funds will be far more consequential for the long-term prospects of these new techniques. 
 
7.4 Scientific Knowledge as a Commodity: The Tragedy of the Anti-
Commons 
 
In this study, intellectual property rights have been highlighted on various occasions: 
Actors from the biotechnology industry in chapter 4 explained the relevance of patents for 
the business models they pursued. And chapter 5 described how a strong and elaborated 
intellectual property regime has become a signature of the American neoliberal state. Legal 
and political strife occurred on a number of occasions when relevant factions, for instance 
within the scientific or the business community, contended that the United States’ patent 
regime for biotechnologies was overreaching. This was for instance the case with the 
patenting of unspecified sequences of the human genome. In the following, such concerns 
will be deepened and brought to a more systemic understanding of the commodification of 
knowledge.  
 
There are good reasons to believe that the reality of academia has never lived up to a 
Mertonian, normative notion of science as being untainted by other than scientific 
factuality137.  
                                                 




   
 
That idyllic situation may not even have occurred during the ‘Golden Age’ of Post-World-
War II research, when many biomedical scientists were engaged in basic, not-for-profit 
research that received constantly increasing federal resources, for instance to win the ‘War 
on Cancer’. But even if academic research was indeed locked up in the ivory towers of 
America’s institutions of higher learning, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and related 
legislation to promote the commercialization of research changed this for once and all. As 
intended, the Act fostered commercialization of academic research, but it also had some 
unintended side effects.  
 
In 2003 alone, American universities earned $1.3 billion from patented research 
(Anonymous 2004). The top tier of patented biotechnologies generate double if not triple 
digit millions of dollars in annual licensing fees138. Some see entrepreneurialism as a 
general proof of for success of the American research university (Crow and Tucker 2001). 
For others the adoption of economic development as main part of universities’ mission 
elevated academic institutions from ‘secondary’ to ‘primary’ importance (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff 2000). But while this ‘entrepreneurial’ university is contested within the 
academic community for reasons that hark back to the Mertonian ideal (Krimsky 2003), it 
is also criticized by corporate actors for different reasons. For instance, some of the 
interview partners from the private sector complained about the inaccessibility of research 
universities’ technologies because of their rigid IPR management. Criticism is not only 
related to spinning off technologies into the for-profit sector. Already in the late 1990s, the 
                                                 
138 In 2006, the most profitable single technology deal, worth $157 million, was New York University’s 





   
 
NIH complained that the ways universities guard their intellectual property are endangering 
the free exchange of basic research tools. Universities, the NIH contended,  
 
“have no duty to return value to shareholders, and their principal obligation under the 
Bayh-Dole Act is to promote utilization, not to maximize financial returns.” (quoted in 
Press (2000))  
 
In general, the proliferation of ownership claims threatens to stifle the free exchange of 
ideas. While every individual actor wants to profit from the ‘buzz’ of tacit, publicly funded, 
and freely available knowledge, nobody wants to create it. Corporate guidelines prohibit 
the exchange of ideas that may be proprietary. And companies do not apply for federal 
grants, because they fear that the peer review process would disclose proprietary 
information to their competitors. One rather unintended consequence of the increase in 
proprietary knowledge seems to be that it undermines a characteristic strength of 
biotechnology clusters: Knowledge spillovers due to close geographic proximity. What is 
at work here is the ‘greed gene’ in reverse: Unlike the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 
1968), which explains why people selfishly overuse shared resources, the ongoing 
proliferation of intellectual property rights in biomedical research has created a ‘tragedy of 
the anti-commons’: Too many owners can block each other so that resources (knowledge) 
become under-utilized (Heller and Eisenberg 1998).  
 
Proprietarization of basic research in universities has contributed its share to this tragedy of 




   
 
interest has within the current pharmaceutical innovation regime. For example, it is by now 
well documented how the influx of corporate monies into academic biomedical research, 
such as the clinical testing of drugs, has led to conflicts of interest (Angell 2009). Meta-
analyses of drug efficacy studies found that research funded by pharmaceutical companies 
were more likely to have outcomes in favor of the sponsors than studies that were funded 
otherwise (Lexchin et al. 2003). The academic literature is biased towards studies that 
prove drugs efficient, also because reporting failures is not in the interest of corporate 
sponsors (Kondro and Sibbald 2004).  
 
Also, the results of heads-on-comparisons between similar but different treatments, for 
instance with different me-too drugs, are generally not publicized. Such comparative trials 
are too costly to be funded out of existing institutional budgets. Pharmaceutical companies, 
while having an interest in such comparisons, have no incentive to publish the results about 
their copycat drugs’ efficiency (or lack thereof). Drug firms therefore increasingly redirect 
expenditures from academia to CROs and have such comparisons carried out 
confidentially. CROs not only promise to save costs, but they provide various types of fee-
for-service research and have become firmly established within the transformed global 
drug development architecture. Most importantly, conflict of interest may be an issue for 
academic institutions, but it is not for CROs. They are predominantly concerned with 
delivering a service on time and under budget.  
 
The way CRO’s manages a clinical trial for its client – normally a biotechnology or a drug 




   
 
client to pick and choose among the most favorable outcomes. And since the information 
derived from such testing is proprietary, the larger scientific community will not be able to 
learn from the failures. Finally, on behalf of drug companies CROs are conducting a 
number of post-approval (Phase IV) studies on drugs, which are often times thinly veiled 
marketing efforts to get physicians used to prescribing these medicines. CROs illustrate 
that the problem of knowledge commodification is not limited to for-profit research and the 
infringement of this principle into the academic sphere. Rather, CROs are an indispensible 
part of the current innovation regime with regards to the drugs that are produced, the 
scientific knowledge that is not produced, and the marketing that is pursued. In this sense 
they exemplify the “structural consequences of a wider commercialization imperative” 
(Mirowski and Van Horn 2005, p. 514) of neoliberal policy provision. My study focuses on 
the United States and highlights how the imperative of market mechanisms works along the 
entire innovation process, from the beginning of scientific research until the end, when a 
drug is sold at a certain price. Given the preeminent position of this country in the global 
political and economic order, the innovation system has important consequences also 
beyond the United States, to which I will turn next.  
 
 
7.5 The Power of Patents and Markets 
 
To make knowledge a tradable commodity requires not only a sophisticated toolbox on the 
inside of a nation, challenges are even bigger when these intellectual achievements are 
supposed to be traded transnational. Also in this sense, as part of the neoliberal awakening 
America’s state has been by no means a hands-off, but interventionist for the sake of 




   
 
transnational corporations, among them Pfizer, Monsanto, and Merck, became instrumental 
for implementing intellectual property protection within the ongoing Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT). Aided by European and Japanese 
industry representatives, these corporations were able to formulate an agenda to modify 
international law to protect their markets (Sell 2003). Thanks in part to the ‘revolving door’ 
between the corporate and political sphere, the U.S. government acted as the most forceful 
representative of these corporate interests, so that an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was included when the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) was established as the outcome of GATT in 1994. Countries seeking WTO 
membership to gain access to global markets also had to abide by the TRIPS stipulations 
for intellectual property protection. As a consequence, the bar for intellectual property 
protection on the global level increased considerably. Especially developing countries were 
forced to implement domestic IP systems for a number of previously unregulated goods, 
such as plant species and medicines, which are crucial for the biotechnology industry. 
TRIPS has a multi-tiered timeline for implementation for industrialized, developing, and 
least developed countries and countries could include in their IP legislation various 
exceptions to patentability. Yet such technicalities become hard to manage for underfunded 
state bureaucracies. Consequently, the new intellectual property protection regime has 
become a contested issue, both on the theoretical and on the practical, political level.  
 
As comparative studies of intellectual property rights illustrate, over the course of history, 
countries that try to catch up with technological development have always preferred a 




   
 
enforcement of protecting their inventions (Chang 2001). Also the United States changed 
tack, and today coerces developing countries to fulfill a standard that was not even 
remotely observed when the United States was at the similar, or even more advanced, 
stages of development  (ibid., p. 293). But while throughout the 19th century, protection of 
intellectual property was considered incompatible with the idea of free trade, at the end of 
the 20th century, a paradigm shift occurred so that intellectual property became a central 
component of free trade. (Sell 2003, p. 186). Critics point out that despite the rhetoric of 
trade liberalization, the consequence will be a new mercantilism. Instead of preserving 
domestic markets for infant industries, it protects global markets for the owners of 
innovations in advanced technologies (Bifani 1989, p. 177).On the other hand, advocates of 
international IP agreements argue that developing nations would receive more foreign 
direct investment and technologies (see for instance Maskus (2000)).  
 
As a result of the leading role of the United States in multilateral regulation after 1945 as 
well as the hegemony of American trade negotiators in international forums, the United 
States managed to imprint its domestic understanding of IP protection on the international 
order established by TRIPS (Sell and May 2001, p. 485). Seen this way, also 
internationally the formation of patent laws and IP regimes should be read as a legalized 
way of congealing for a certain period the political struggles about technological progress 
(see 5.6). Also internationally therefore, constellations of political power are not set in 
stone and remain contested: Throughout the current round of negotiations on trade 
liberalizations, which started in Doha, Qatar in 2001, developing nations became more 




   
 
cases of national health crises. In August 2003, WTO members approved a decision that 
offered an interim waiver under the TRIPS Agreement. It allowed a member country to 
export pharmaceutical products made under compulsory licenses to least-developed and 
certain other countries (Fergusson 2006, p. 16). As the Doha round collapsed in 2008 on 
the issue of farm subsidies, there is currently no momentum for further alleviation of patent 
requirements within the WTO regime. Nonetheless, the heightened self-confidence of 
emerging global players such as China, India, and Brazil, as well as the increasing 
consciousness of a global non-governmental audience, make it highly unlikely that 
international trade negotiations will ever again be high-jacked by a self-select group of 
business interests that led to the original TRIPS Agreement. 
 
In part, this new political constellation is also the result of a number of high-profile 
backlashes against pharmaceutical companies that tried to extend their intellectual property 
protection in developing countries. For instance, when in 1997 the South African 
government made it legal to import anti-retroviral drugs from cheaper, generic sources, 
about three dozen pharmaceutical companies jointly filed a lawsuit against the government, 
stipulating that this so-called parallel importing was in violation of South Africa’s 
obligations under TRIPS. Due to the public, global outcry, the pharmaceutical companies 
decided to drop the lawsuit in 2001, but the damaging image of an industry that is hugely 
profitable while ignoring people’s welfare remained (Ceccoli 2004, p. 134).  
 
The problem of drugs for developing countries is, however, only in part a question of 




   
 
pharmaceutical companies follow, drugs are developed for US and Western markets, not 
for diseases of poor countries. Less than 10 percent of the worldwide expenditure on health 
R&D is devoted to the major health problems of 90 percent of the global population. There 
is an obvious lack of market incentives to develop drugs against diseases such as malaria, 
tuberculosis, sleeping sickness, and dengue fever. New models for R&D, such as public-
private partnerships and virtual drug companies try to rectify this deficit and rally financial 
and scientific resources, including biotechnology (Lehmann 2001). Most of these 
approaches transfer resources from the industrialized to the developing world and many are 
funded by philanthropic donors. Some, such as those funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, deliberately apply the metrics of the for-profit world to the non-profit sector. 
Yet as the public health system in many countries had been systematically dismantled by 
decades of neoliberal structural adjustment policies, ‘venture philanthropy’ interventions 
looking at short-term, quantifiable outcomes may not find the necessary absorptive 
capacity.  
 
Globally, the unequal access to drugs and medical treatment are the most drastic proof for 
how the biomedical innovation regime based on market principles has gone awry. Even 
more than on the national level, in absence of an overarching authority private 
entrepreneurial activity remains insufficient to fulfill broad health needs. Solutions are 
therefore even more complex than simply re-instating previously dismantled state 
capacities. Domestic scientific capacities would have to be built, but this only makes sense 
when accompanied by measures, such as reversing a global brain drain in health workers 




   
 
shift away from a neoliberal paradigm intrinsically geared towards supply-side driven, 
proprietary technological development. As biotechnology so far predominantly evolved 
within the ideology of ‘product’ solutions for complex societal problems, it remains to be 
seen whether the technologies could be used productively also under a different paradigm.  
 
7.6 Revisiting the Relations Between Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
 
Research on effects of the ascent of the biotechnology industry for the innovation regime in 
drug development has led to inconclusive outcomes as for the overall gains. For instance, a 
study by Lichtenberg (2006) looked at the effect of creative destruction on drug 
development. While not distinguishing between biologically derived and other drugs, it 
was found that in the United States there is a highly significant positive relationship 
between new priority drugs139 and the mean age at death. Looking at how creative 
destruction may have promoted the development of new drugs, the study found that 
pharmaceuticals that improve available therapies expand the total market of that 
therapeutics class. By contrast, drugs whose therapeutic qualities are similar to those of 
already marketed pharmaceuticals mainly reduce the sales of the already marketed product. 
Finally, sales of old drugs are reduced much more if new drugs are introduced by firms that 
have previously invented drugs in that class than by drugs from firms not yet present in that 
market. The findings of the study, however, are limited as the variation observed may be a 
result of marketing.  
                                                 




   
 
Moreover, Lichtenberg’s study covers a time, (1970-1991), during which the 
biotechnology industry had few marketable products.  
 
As for marketable products, direct comparisons and gains from biotechnology drugs are 
hard to come by. It has been argued that if there were more examples like Genentech’s 
recombinant human insulin, which substituted a similar substance produced differently, 
such head-on competition with Big Pharma would likely have a socially beneficial effect 
(Cockburn 2004). Biotechnology’s most tangible outcomes are the biological drugs 
discussed in chapter 2 (see 2.9). Biologics are even more expensive than other blockbuster 
drugs, and while some pharmaceutical companies struck marketing deals with 
biotechnology firms to exploit the potential of biologics, the segment is currently limited to 
15 percent of the U.S. prescription drug market.  
 
The vast majority of biotechnology companies function as a sub-industry in which different 
parts compete with one another. As a result of the restructuring of pharmaceutical R&D, 
hierarchical in-house research has given way for an increased upstream competition 
between different providers of technologies, processes, and therapeutic compounds. Drug 
firms have embarked on various ways of collaborations with small companies, many of 
them biotechnology firms, to fulfill specific tasks along the way of the value-added chain 
from scientific discovery over drug development, clinical trials, regulatory approval, and 
marketing. The new layer of biotechnology companies, many of them focused on only one 
molecule or technology, are a typical example of diversification and outsourcing of risk 




   
 
(2006) therefore argue that the effect of biotechnology is not that it radically changes 
industrial organization, but that it contributes to 
 
“a Toyota-style knowledge supply chain, where a range of diverse technologies and 
leads are generated in small biotechnology firms, focusing on very uncertain and 
potentially problematic technologies. When the uncertainties are reduced, large 
pharmaceutical firms bring them in-house to expand their capacity utilization.” (p. 
104) 
 
Therefore, despite having been proclaimed time and again, so far there has been no 
‘biotechnology revolution’140. Yet the more competition in drug development is shifted 
upstream (and, ultimately, into the sphere of academia), the more resources are wasted on 
bargaining and transaction costs (Cockburn 2004, p. 19). This inflates the entire R&D 
value-added and drug companies that decided to re-organize their R&D architecture have 
to live with high uncertainty about what type of upstream R&D activity will ultimately be 
useful. The fear of ‘missing the boat’ induces them to invest in a variety of technologies, 
and, contributing to hypes around certain technologies, will overpay for many of them that 
do not realize added value as expected.  
 
This was for instance the case for big pharmaceutical companies’ huge upfront investments 
for research collaborations with genomics companies in the late 1990s. From the 
beginning, there was something paradoxical about large pharmaceutical companies’ 
                                                 
140 Nightingale argues that other indicators notwithstanding, the claim proved attractive to be picked up by 





   
 
investment in the results emanating from the sequencing of the human genome. 
Understanding the genetic bases of diseases could in theory create the opportunity to 
‘personalize’ medicine, including drugs. Drug treatments would then be customized 
according to individuals’ genetic predisposition. As drug development becomes more 
targeted, it should advance improved therapeutics. At the same time, however, and as a 
logical consequence, therapeutic markets would fragment. This provides a major challenge 
to the current blockbuster drug approach, because for large pharmaceutical companies, the 
way they conduct their business at the moment, they are interested inmarkets as large and 
as homogeneous as possible. A fragmentation into, for instance, a number of markets with 
each only $100 million would run counter to their main business strategy (Pisano 2002, p. 
266).  
 
As big pharmaceutical companies’ appreciation for genomics firms led to a speculative run 
on these firms, genomics, like the promises of many previous technological boom cycles, 
eventually became oversubscribed. In a capitalist society that considers the market as the 
preeminent instrument to disseminate new technologies, scientific potential has to lead to 
marketable and profitable outcomes sooner rather than later. Investors do not get involved 
for the beauty of science or the fascination of technologies, but for the financial metrics. In 
the case of genomics, big pharmaceutical companies and investors first lost a lot of money 
and then also their patience. There were neither a slew of new, genomics-based drugs, from 
which the old stewards of medicine would have profited. Nor was there a rebellious 
contender at hand – no Apple, no Google, no Napster - that would have allowed investors 




   
 
alternative business concept, it was the SNP consortium. Its purpose, however, was purely 
defensive as big pharmaceutical companies feared that the genomics start-ups would block 
that technological alley altogether. By the early 2000s, high tech companies’ hopes based 
on the many possibilities created by the sheer mass of available data went up in smoke. 
Proclamations about the ‘New Economy’ were proven wrong and capitalism’s creative 
destruction put things in order: Stock markets’ speculative bubbles were purged of the 
many information-rich and cash-poor high-technology firms. The ‘New Economy’ lost and 
so did genomics. For the time being, old-style business persevered, among them Big 
Pharma141. 
 
7.7 Blockbuster Drugs: Innovations in Science and Marketing  
 
In the long run, however, big pharmaceutical companies’ unparalleled profitability has 
faced increasing criticism. To begin with, it has been questioned how innovative the 
current drug development process indeed is. For the period from 1998 through 2002, 
Angell (2004, pp. 54-5) found that of all the 415 drugs approved by the FDA to enter the 
U.S. market for the first time, only 14 percent were truly innovative142. In 2009 the ratio 
went up to 23 percent, which is hardly a proof that the drug development process has 
become more innovate143.  
                                                 
141 Interestingly, Schumpeter has little to say about hyperbolic expectations from new technologies. His views 
on creative destruction and business cycles are based on companies that are driven out of business because 
the winners others adopted decisive technologies first, and not because most invested too much in the wrong 
technologies. 
142 Innovative drugs were both new molecular entities and were considered by the FDA to provide significant 
improvement over already approved products. 
143 As of July 2009, the FDA approved 35 new drugs, 8 were innovative new drugs as defined above. See 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBio




   
 
This figure is all the less impressive as the FDA’s overall approval rate of new drug 
applications has risen simultaneously thanks in part to several industry-friendly policy 
changes that were described in chapter 5 (see 5.8). In sum, these data point to the scarcity 
of genuinely novel drugs and the relevance of ‘me-too’ drugs and the reapplication of 
already existing drugs for new medical indications.  
 
Nonetheless, also non-innovative developments are costly. Pharmaceutical companies 
claim to spend on average about 10 to 14 percent of revenues on R&D. This figure is 
considerably lower than what biotechnology firms spend on R&D: Biotechnology 
companies included in this survey on average allocated 57 percent on R&D (see Table 4.5 
Chapter 4). This difference is to be expected as biotechnology firms often times have no 
products but work as outsourced research departments for larger pharmaceutical 
companies. However, for both industries data about how much of the R&D goes into truly 
innovative medicines versus me-too drugs are hard to come by. The interviews with 
biotechnology executives in chapter 4 indicated that also small, allegedly high-tech focused 
biotechnology firms are often times engaged in copycat product research. 
 
Therefore, irrespective of the involvement of biotechnology, the real costs of developing 
drugs have become a topic of debate. The figure most frequently quoted by industry 
representatives and politicians alike was produced by DiMasi et al., (2003), who calculated 
the expenditures to bring a drug to the market at $802 million. This estimate has been 
criticized for its methodology, because it relies on a non-random sample of firms and 




   
 
almost half of this figure is attributed to the costs of failed drugs and the opportunity costs 
of foregone, alternative investments. Seen this way, a pharmaceutical company is not in the 
business for developing drugs that have a positive effect on the public’s health, but just 
another investment vehicle to optimize return on investment and shareholder value (Angell 
2004, p. 45).  
 
Despite the controversy about the DiMasi figure of $802million, there is consensus that 
drug development has become more lengthy and costly since the 1970s. Introducing a new 
innovative drug probably costs several hundred million dollars. But even the former CEO 
of Merck admits that the price for drugs is not determined by the costs for R&D. Instead, 
pharmaceuticals are priced according to  
 
“their value in preventing and treating disease…it is the doctor, the patient, and those 
paying for our medicines who will determine its true value.” (Relman and Angell 2002, 
p. 32). 
 
This is another way of saying, as one interviewed financial analyst did, that the cost for 
curing a particular ailment and therefore the potential of a market is “what society is able 
to absorb”144. In absence of an overarching regulatory entity for drug costs in the United 
States, marketing is the key intervening variable for shaping this absorption capacity. The 
absorption capacity of the American society for new and expensive drugs was considerably 
increased by a decision of the FDA in 1997, which allowed pharmaceutical companies to 
                                                 




   
 
advertise their products directly to consumers. Since then, drug manufacturers’ 
expenditures on advertising steadily increased up to $12 billion in 2006. Of this $4.8 billion 
were directly targeting customers, and $7.2 billion went into advertising for physicians. 
Over one decade, spending for consumer advertising had increased four-fold and that for 
the medical profession two-fold (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008, pp. 2-3). Yet direct-to-
customer advertising does more than only promoting lucrative brands: It also transforms 
perceptions about health into diseases for which lucrative cures will be made available145. 
This business model became increasingly contested for many of the absurdities it created. 
For example, in 2000, direct-to-consumer advertising for the anti-arthritis drug Vioxx, 
whose lethal side effects on non-suitable prescribers later almost bankrupted Merck, cost 
the company $160.8 million in 2000 alone. This amount was more than what PepsiCo spent 
on advertising for Pepsi ($125 million) or what Anheuser Bush spent to Promote 
Budweiser ($146 million) (Ceccoli 2004, p.156).  
 
By the mid of the 2000s, the public perception of large pharmaceutical companies was that 
of sophisticated marketing machines with limited in-house innovative capacity that profit 
from federally funded basic research146. For example, one study found that public research 
was at the basis of the five bestselling drugs in 2005 (National Institutes of Health 2000). 
Inevitably, the question was asked who picks up the tab for such a profitable and successful 
business.  
                                                 
145 For instance, the drug company Lilly helped establish within the scientific community and at the FDA the 
clinical indication of women’s premenstrual dysphoric disorder to market its anti-depressant Prozac for this 
new indication when Prozac's patent was about to expire in the late 1990s (Moynihan and Cassels 2005). 





   
 
Apparently, subsidizing the supply end of technology development for biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies – foreign and domestic – is not a contested issue. Direct funding 
for biomedical research, mostly through the annual NIH budget is globally unparalleled. 
Yet the NIH’s $28.4 billion budget submitted for 2007 merely presented one percent of the 
United States’ annual federal budget of $2.7 trillion. On the other hand, as a part of the 
general unease about rising healthcare costs, it has become increasingly contested that 
Americans pay considerably higher prices for prescription medicines than anyone else in 
the industrialized world. These elevated drug prices are an integral part of the competitive 
advantage of the innovation system of the United States. But as citizens increasingly have 
to pay this technology premium out of their own pocket, the question arises as to how long 
this important component of the United States biomedical innovation regime can – or 
should – be sustained.  
 
The rise of prescription drug costs is an impediment to their broad availability. For 
instance, studies found that a lack of insurance coverage for prescription drugs made it 
more likely that nonelderly adults would not fill or use a prescription because of the cost 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2008, p. 3). Another strategy of individuals without insurance 
to counter high drug costs was the import of drugs from Canada147. The relief from such 
purchases that amount to merely 0.3 percent of all U.S. prescription drug sales may be 
important on an individual level. Yet they did not provide much respite for society at large 
from rising drug costs, which, increasingly, also hurt individuals with health insurance. 
                                                 
147 While ‘Parallel Importing’ of drugs is one of the most contentious issues among WTO member states, it 




   
 
 Insurance plans reacted to prescription drug cost hikes by raising the copayments for drugs 
not included on a preferred drug list (ibid.). In particular, specialty drugs such as biologics 
push up the expenses for healthcare plans. Employers increasingly decide to include them 
only in their most expensive benefit plans, to which only a small population of employees 
has access (Elswick 2003). The consequences of both developments are the same: An 
increase in prices leads to increasing inequality in access to drugs.  
 
At the end of 2008, triggered by the meltdown of financial markets and the onset of the 
deepest economic recession since the Great Depression, in the United States the issue of 
healthcare reform and cost control resurfaced. Even if it is rather unlikely that this will lead 
to a comprehensive overhaul of the United States healthcare system, the next section will 
draw some preliminary conclusions about the increasing cost awareness will affect the 
biotechnology industry’s interests and therefore the functioning of the American innovation 
regime for biotechnology.  
 
7.8 The (Not So) Great Transformation: Healthcare Reform in the 21st 
Century 
 
Compared to circumstances that the Clinton White House faced in 1993, for the incoming 
administration of President Obama the environment for a comprehensive healthcare reform 
has changed in two important ways. First, healthcare has become a middle class problem. 
The topic has gained political traction not because of the many Americans, particularly 
children, being uninsured or underinsured, but because of working, tax-paying citizens who 




   
 
disadvantage of the employment-based system. For instance, the former CEO of General 
Motors, Rick Wagoner, used to complain that his company spent more on health insurance 
than on steel, which put his company at a disadvantage with competitors such as Toyota, 
which benefits from Japan’s universal health system148. 
 
As the most recent healthcare reform debate shaped up, the most encompassing healthcare 
overhaul, a national single-payer health insurance plan, remains out of reach. Such national 
approach, a ‘Medicare for all’, would have the potential to achieve universal coverage 
while at the same time curbing costs by eliminating duplicate bureaucratic structures and 
cut overheads (Woolhandler et al. 2003) . Yet as long as there is no broad-based social 
movement for this proposal, it is highly unlikely to be realized against entrenched, vested 
interests will most likely circumscribe the way in which alternatives are structured. So far, 
all proposals not only stop short of a single-payer plan, it remains also doubtful to what 
extent they will successfully alleviate the most contended issues of the current health 
system.  
 
Hence, the discussion focuses on alternatives that are politically feasible while not 
necessarily effectively tackling the problems. The Democratic Party used its majority to 
pass on November 7, 2009, in the U.S. House of Representatives, the Affordable Health 
Care for America Act149 and on December 24, 2009150, in the U.S. Senate, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
                                                 
148 See http://www.autoweek.com/article/20050401/FREE/504010702, retrieved 08/03/2009 
149 H.R. 3962. 




   
 
At the beginning of 2010, passing a comprehensive health care reform has become 
increasingly difficult as the Democratic Party lost its filibuster-proof majority in the Senate 
when the Republican Scott Brown was elected to take over the seat of the late Edward 
Kennedy (D-MA). When President Obama announced his own proposal on February 22, 
2010, which included ideas from both the Senate and House-passed bills, it was stripped 
down of many aspects addressed earlier on, such as new public health insurance option 
(‘public option’) as an alternative to private, for-profit health plans.   
 
In contrast with previous health reform debates, health industry interest groups have 
abstained from head-on resistance. For example, in May 2009 during a highly publicized 
meeting with President Obama, health industry leaders, including representatives from the 
American Health Insurance Plans and PhRMA, promised to collaborate with the 
administrations efforts to overhaul healthcare and to decrease the United States’ healthcare 
spending by 1.5 percent annually. The first stakeholder to come up with a concrete 
concession was PhRMA, which in June 2009 declared to forego $80 billion in drug sales to 
seniors and federal health programs over the next decade. Some $36 billion would come 
from lowering drug prices for Medicare recipients who fall into the ‘doughnut hole’ of 
coverage under Medicare’s prescription drug plan. This concession may have been more a 
preemptive move than a real economic sacrifice: Data for 2009 indicate that wholesale 
drug prices continued their ascent by more than 9 percent, adding another $10 billion to the 
revenues of pharmaceutical companies and the United States’ drug expenditures. 
Consequently, the industry has been pressured since to deliver further cost cuts (Wilson 




   
 
proposal in February 2010 urge pharmaceutical companies to accept bigger discounts to 
close the donut hole151. At the same time, one of the collaterals of this struggle was Billy 
Tauzin, Phrma’s CEO, who resigned in February 2010 after having been criticized by 
pharmaceutical firms for making too far-reaching concessions to accept healthcare reform 
too early (Kirkpatrick and Wilson 2010). In sum, therefore, whereas comprehensive 
healthcare reform is nowhere in sight, the issue of cost cutting in healthcare, including for 
prescription drugs, will most likely persevere.  
 
Also the biotechnology industry seems to realize that the current climate makes cost cuts 
inevitable. Throughout the Medicare reform debate of 2003, the biotechnology interest 
group BIO continued to warn that “small biotech companies could fail under even the 
threat of price controls” (2009). Similarly, the investment community continued to warn 
about the specter of price controls in the U.S. prescription drug market: 
 
“The top threat facing the [biotechnology, V.L.] industry is the escalation of price 
controls and access regimes. In particular, the specter of price controls in the U.S. 
market would make it difficult to continue to fund the industry’s innovation.” (Ernst & 
Young 2008, p. 5) 
 
But as some kind of healthcare overhaul seems to become more likely than not, the more 
enlightened biotechnology actors, such as the CEO of Exelixis, a San Francisco 
biotechnology company, acknowledge that  
                                                 




   
 
 
“some type of price pressure on drugs is likely to be part of the reform. The way in 
which those pressures become institutionalized will have important consequences for 
the biotech industry…it will be important to work with legislators to achieve an 
outcome that is reasonable for our industry and responsive to the needs of society.” 
(Scangos 2009, p. 424) 
 
This is not to say that the industry should be expected to give away too much too freely. 
For instance, as expenditures on biologics as the fastest growing segment of 
pharmaceuticals have become increasingly scrutinized, legislation to set boundaries to the 
exclusive commercial rights on generic versions of biologics, so-called ‘follow-on 
biologics’ has become a contested issue. First draft bills were granting only a limited 
period of exclusive rights – 5 years – to the makers of original biologics. But thanks to the 
well-functioning political machinery of interest representation, BIO managed to extend this 
to 12 years in recent draft legislation (Greenwood 2009), proving again the industry’s 
leverage to influence policy-making process152.  
Yet most consequential for the future of the drug innovation regime may in fact be that the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated $1.1 billion to research 
carried out by federal agencies on comparative effectiveness of treatments and drugs 
already on the market153. Such comparative effectiveness studies are heavily opposed by 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
152 The 12-year provision is also included in President Obama’s own proposal from February 2010 (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2010, p. 25). 
153 As the global economic downturn lowered investors’ willingness to bankroll biotech companies’ losses 




   
 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical alike. They argue that it would inevitably lead to a 
centralized government agency like the UK’s National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE). Industry representatives argue that a government-run entity assessing 
efficiency would rationalize access to technology if such studies were a prerequisite for 
obtaining regulatory approval or healthcare coverage. In any event, federally administered 
comparative studies would potentially change the dynamics between doctors, patients, and 
pharmaceutical companies. Unlike comparative effectiveness studies that are carried out by 
CROs for the sake of marketing or other undisclosed reasons, the implementation of the 
bill could lead to scientific comparisons that would make drug efficiency susceptible to 
public scrutiny. This would undermine an important pillar of the current innovation regime, 
because it would become harder for companies to launch ‘me-too drugs’ that currently hold 
a considerable share of newly approved drugs in the United States.  
 
While the current healthcare struggle will certainly have important consequences for the 
innovation model pursued by biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, these 
industries may not be the decisive corporate actors that decide the destiny of healthcare 
reform. In the history of the United States, the longest-lasting track record of derailing 
national solutions for healthcare is held by the medical profession and insurance 
companies. Without them, it seems, no reform can be achieved, but with them the meaning 
of reform may get lost in the process. It also proves that healthcare is more deeply rooted in 
national politics, histories, and gospels about commonly held values, than many other 
                                                                                                                                                    
debate of 2003. Instead, the trade group lobbied cap-in-hand to have some of the $787 billion economic 
stimulus package directly injected into the biotechnology industry (Fox 2009). These efforts failed and 




   
 
issues of public policy. This was a lesson that in her time also the icon of neoliberal 
deregulation, Margaret Thatcher, had to learn. Thatcher, for whom there was no such thing 
as society, and suspicious of all forms of common burden-sharing, failed miserably when 
touching the British National Health Service (NHS). She initially had hoped to establish a 
mandatory private health insurance system. However, this privatized alternative was too 
costly and was confronted with the popularity of the all-inclusive, free-of-charge NHS, so 
that privatization plans were quickly given up (Pierson 1994, pp. 132-34). Ideological sea-
changes create windows of opportunity for real, historical, political change. They hardly 
ever remake institutions from scratch.  
 
7.9 Biotechnology After the Failure of Neoliberal Economics 
 
This political economy of the medical biotechnology industry analyzed the neoliberal 
political conditions under which biotechnologies have been invented and commercialized 
in the United States. Neoliberalism assumes that the individual desire for profit is the most 
productive engine for innovation, from which society will receive broad benefits as a 
whole. While there is no doubt that private profits often also increase the wellbeing and 
wealth of the general public, the question remains what to do when market incentives are 
not sufficient to spark innovation. The answer to this question is all the more pertinent 
when it comes to contemporary global health challenges. It is one of the unavoidable, 
unintended consequences of the increase in global exchange of goods and people that it 





   
 
New types of viruses, including HIV, and pandemics as swine and bird flu pose new threats 
against which individualized protection becomes increasingly impossible, even for the 
upper echelons of the global pyramid of wealth and health. Solutions can only take place at 
a global level. Biotechnologies may be part of it, but only if they were embedded in a 
broader strategy towards health as a global public good. For the time being, however, most 
biotechnologies are devised to be a profitable individual commodified quick technological 
fix, out of reach for the majority of the globe’s population. 
 
As these demands for global health solutions are currently neglected, the flipside of the 
same coin is that the demand side for biotechnologies is shaped by the most lucrative 
market. America’s healthcare market and its unparalleled profitability are the result of a 
long history of healthcare politics that have always had a neoliberal streak in that it put 
private actors in the driver’s seat for the provision of a public service. Ultimately, the 
neoliberal prescriptions that structured creative destruction in the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry had several conflicting effects. On the one hand, the United States 
became the country in which the largest and most competitive biotechnology industry 
developed. On the other hand, the products that this supply-side driven innovation regime 
generated have exacerbated the tension in America’s healthcare, which is too expensive 
and too exclusionary.  
 
Arguing that the public is served best by private entrepreneurship leaves decisions about 
resource allocations completely to the market. Yet this ideological proposal led to the 




   
 
biomedical innovation based on ‘opportunity costs’. By putting the costs of foregone 
investments at the center of high R&D expenditures and, ultimately, America’s 
exceptionally high drug prices, the entrepreneur will be remunerated for what he does with 
his money, but also for what he does not do with it. Laissez-faire prescriptions should 
encourage the free choice of investment opportunities. If investors decide that resource 
allocations elsewhere are more profitable than products for human health, so be it. 
Consequently, healthcare sees itself in a heads-on competition with other productive assets 
or purely speculative financial vehicles. Future studies will probably elucidate the extent to 
which the finance-driven economic boom of the mid 2000s first attracted, and then 
destroyed, resources that otherwise would have been invested in health products and 
services. In any event, putting increasing returns on investment into the drivers’ seat for 
fulfilling society’s health needs inevitably leads to a collision, because health is a 
Polanyian fictitious commodity. As an unintended side effect of speculative energy and the 
commodification of health, healthcare in the United States has finally turned into the 
political crisis that it deserved to be for long. Healthcare inequalities have generated social 
and political tension that are the driving motor for current health reform efforts. The 
outcome will be far from comprehensive, but it will certainly lead to greater cost awareness 
and an increasing role for the state. Therefore, the institutionalization of the political 
compromise will affect to a large extent how biotechnologies will be invented and 
















0. Interviewee Information 
0.1. What is your current responsibility within this company?  
0.2. Where have you been working before?  
0.3. How did you become engaged with this company?  
  
1. General Company Information 
1.1. When was the enterprise founded? 
1.2. How was the enterprise founded? 
 - wholly new organization 
 - new subsidiary of an existing organization 
 - spin-off organization (e.g. from university) 
 - joint venture of two or more existing organizations 
 - privatisation 
 - other 
1.3. How is the enterprise currently owned? 
1.4. How was the enterprise originally capitalised? 
 - Private Investment 
 - Public Funding 
 - Other Sources 
1.5. How much capital is currently needed and how is it generated? 
 - Re-investment of profits 
 - Private investment 
 - Public Funding 
 - Other Sources 
1.6. Number of employees (absolute figures or percent) 
 - Management 
 - Administration 
 - R&D 
 - Production 
 - Sales Department 
 - Others 
1.7. How has employment grown in your enterprise?  
1.8. How have revenues of your enterprise developed? (absolute or %) 
1980 - 1989 
1990 - 1994 
1994 – 1999 




   
 
1.9. What are the main products respectively lines of products manufactured in your 
enterprise? 
 - Product lines / Group of Products 
 
2. Employment and Qualification 
2.1. What are the main types of qualification your employees possess? (PhD, Masters, BSc, 
Highschool) 
 - PhD 
 - Masters 
 - Bachelor 
 - Highschool/None 
2.2. Which labour markets do you look to or the recruitment of new personal? 
 - Own enterprise 
 - Regional 
 - National 
 - International 
2.3. If colleagues leave your enterprise, to what jobs or other organisations would they 
normally go? 
 
3. Co-operation  
3.1. - 3.3. With which enterprises, research institutes or other organisations do you co-
operate in production, distribution/marketing, or R&D? 
3.4. What is the quality of relations/co-operations you maintain with important large 
enterprises?  
3.5. Of those organisations mentioned above which are the most important for future 
development? 
 
4. R&D, Production and Distribution 
4.1. If your company faces a significant technological challenge, who do you approach for 
technical collaboration and why? 
4.2. With which enterprises/research institutes would you like to co-operate in the future 
and why? 
4.3. How is technological development financed? 
- Revenues:  
- Private Funds:  Bank loans 
                            Venture capital 
- Public Funds:  National level 
                          Regional level 
                          Local level (city or municipality) 
- Other (e.g. stock market) 
4.4. How much money has been spent on R&D in the last decade?  
Total: 
- Own research units 






   
 
 
4.5. Which regions or countries do you envision as new markets? 
4.6. What kind of measures do you take to open up new markets? 
 
5. Assistance Programs 
5.1. What public support programs available for your business are you aware of? 
5.2. What kind of financial support or public assistance programs have you been using to 
date?  
- state (government) programs 
- national (government) programs 
5.3. What support programs do you intend to use in the near future? 
5.4. How would you judge the relevance of public assistance programs? 
- state (government) programs 
- national (government) programs 
 
6. Conclusion 
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